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ABSTRACT 
Embracing the Half: 
Aristotle’s Revision of Platonic Erōs and Philia. (May 2006) 
Emil Salim, B.A., Universitas Tarumanagara, Indonesia; 
M.Div., Evangelical Reformed Theological Seminary, Indonesia 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robin Smith 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I am investigating the nature of e[rwV (erōs) and filiva (philia) in Plato 
and Aristotle. I have confined this project to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (EN) and 
Metaphysics, with a background discussion of Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. I will 
argue for the following claims. First, Plato’s Symposium poses a dilemma with respect 
to the object and nature of e[rwV. The dilemma is that the objects of e[rwV must be either 
particular individuals or the Beautiful itself. Second, Plato’s Phaedrus may be seen as 
Plato’s attempt to solve the dilemma by giving a synthesis: e[rwV is a virtuous maniva 
and should be directed to particular individuals en route to the Beautiful. However, 
another problem arises; viz., given Platonic metaphysics, it is difficult to see how the 
lovers can genuinely love one another in and of themselves when the ultimate object of 
love is the Form of Beauty. Third, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics sees e[rwV as an 
excess of filiva. !ErwV in human relationships must be avoided because it is seen as 
something bad and irrational, even though it is not a vice. The account of e[rwV and 
filiva in EN may be seen as Aristotle’s attempt to propose another kind of solution to 
the dilemma by escaping the horns, i.e., by deprioritizing e[rwV in favor of filiva with 
 iv 
respect to achieving the virtuous life. Fourth, this negative view of e[rwV does not 
appear in Metaphysics L. In 1072b3-4, Aristotle writes that the Unmoved Mover 
moves all things as being loved (wJV ejrwvmenon). The best interpretation of the phrase 
wJV ejrwvmenon is that the Unmoved Mover moves all things by letting them follow their 
nature. There is a shift of emphasis in Aristotle’s philosophy from e[rwV to filiva, 
which brings another dilemma with respect to the objects of filiva, namely between 
filiva for particular individuals and filiva for the good. I will not try to solve the 
dilemma, but will try to circumscribe the issue.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a thesis project on the place of e[rwV in Aristotle’s philosophy, which is a 
field that has not truly been investigated in Aristotelian scholarship. I see a possibility 
to construct a comprehensive account of Aristotle’s idea of e[rwV not only based on his 
ethical works, but also by utilizing other areas in his corpus, such as the metaphysical 
and biological works. However, given the breadth and depth of the subject, I have 
confined this project to his Nicomachean Ethics (EN) and Metaphysics, with a 
background discussion of Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. 
In this thesis, I am arguing for the following points. First, Plato’s Symposium 
poses a dilemma with respect to the object and nature of e[rwV, as concluded in the 
speech of Alcibiades. The dilemma is that the object of e[rwV must be either (i) 
particular individuals (as represented in the speech of Aristophanes), or (ii) the 
Beautiful itself (as represented in the speech of Socrates and Diotima). Option (i) is 
problematic because e[rwV is neither eternal nor rational even though it is human. 
Option (ii) is problematic because the object is not human even though it is eternal and 
rational. It is also problematic because abandoning particular beauties disables one 
from climbing the scala amoris at all. Basically I am agreeing with Nussbaum’s 
interpretation here that in the middle dialogues, Plato’s view on the objects of e[rwV is 
___________ 
This thesis follows The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. 
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mutually exclusive: we must choose between loving particular individuals and loving 
wisdom. Furthermore, Plato’s view on non-rational elements in the middle dialogues is 
negative: they are free of and even opposed to cognitive service to human life. With 
respect to filiva, there are three views in the Symposium on its relationship with e[rwV: 
filiva as the counterpart of e[rwV, filiva as the product of e[rwV, and filiva as identical 
with e[rwV. Both e[rwV and  filiva are indispensable in a virtuous life. 
Second, Plato’s Phaedrus may be seen as Plato’s attempt to solve the dilemma 
by giving a synthesis: e[rwV is a virtuous maniva and should be directed to particular 
individuals en route to the Beautiful. The difference between the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus is that the former suggests that loving particular individuals and loving the 
Form of beauty are mutually exclusive, whereas the latter suggests that it is possible to 
love both particular individuals and the Beautiful. Again, this is in line with 
Nussbaum’s interpretation of this issue. Nussbaum believes that in the Phaedrus the 
non-intellectual elements are required to motivate our intellect to go in a certain 
direction. The non-intellectual elements also have a cognitive task: to give information 
on where goodness and beauty are. Finally, the non-rational elements have intrinsic 
values of goodness and beauty, and not just an instrumental value. With this picture of 
e[rwV, there is no mutually exclusive either/or relationship anymore between loving 
particular individuals and loving the Form of Beauty. However, another problem 
arises, viz., given Platonic metaphysics, it is difficult to see how the lovers can 
genuinely love one another in and of themselves when the ultimate object of love is the 
Form of beauty. This is problematic since true love must be profitable not only for the 
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sake of the lovers, but also for the beloved in a genuine way.1 In the Phaedrus, both 
e[rwV and filiva are also indispensable in a perfectly virtuous life. 
Third, Aristotle’s EN, by contrast, sees e[rwV as an excess of filiva. @ErwV in 
human relationships must be avoided because it is seen as something bad and 
irrational, even though it is not a vice. The account of e[rwV and filiva in EN may be 
seen as Aristotle’s attempt to propose another kind of solution to the dilemma by 
escaping the horns, i.e., by deprioritizing e[rwV in favor of filiva with respect to 
achieving the virtuous life. Unlike e[rwV, which is prone to being excessive and 
irrational, filiva is completely virtuous in feelings and actions. However, a new 
dilemma concerning the objects of love seems to appear, viz., whether it can be 
genuinely directed towards both particular individuals and wisdom in and of 
themselves. 
Fourth, this negative view of e[rwV does not appear in Metaphysics L. In 
1072b3-4, Aristotle writes that the Unmoved Mover moves all things as being loved 
(wJV ejrwvmenon). To understand this claim, we need to understand Aristotle’s 
metaphysics of motion. I have argued that (1) Motion is a process instead of an 
actuality of a certain degree of potentiality; (2) the Unmoved Mover is both a principle 
and a substance (it is possible to interpret a principle as a substance, which is a 
category of entity); and (3) the best interpretation of the phrase wJV ejrwvmenon is that the 
Unmoved Mover moves all things by letting them follow their nature. But here a 
                                                
1. Vlastos writes, “Not that Platonic eros is ‘egocentric’ and ‘acquisitive’ as Nygren has 
claimed; it is only too patently Ideocentric and creative. But while it gives no more quarter to self-
indulgence than would Pauline agape or Kantian good will, neither does it repudiate the spiritualized 
egocentricism of Socratic philia” (Platonic Studies, 30).  
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paradox arises: when human beings follow their own nature, they know that they 
should have filiva in their daily life. Recognizing this compels them to accept their 
humanness, which requires them to accept their imperfection and interdependency with 
their fellow human beings. Platonic love wishes to have wholeness and perfection. 
Aristotelian friendship accepts that wholeness and perfection can be attained only by 
embracing the half and imperfection. 
Notice that if the dilemma in Plato is about the objects of e[rwV, Aristotle has 
succeeded in giving a solution to the dilemma by claiming that e[rwV in terms of human 
relationship should be avoided. However, there is a shift of emphasis in Aristotle’s 
philosophy from e[rwV to filiva, which brings another dilemma with respect to the 
objects of filiva, namely between filiva for particular individuals and filiva for the 
good. I will not try to solve the dilemma, but will try to circumscribe the issue. 
Intuitively, I see that the ultimate solution to this issue should be metaphysical: there is 
no dilemma because in Aristotle’s philosophy there is no such thing as the Platonic 
Forms of the Good and Beauty. When friends love one another, they love particular 
goodness in and of itself and they help one another cultivate philosophical virtues. 
 The organization of this thesis is as follows. First, I will discuss Plato’s concept 
of e[rwV and filiva in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. Second, I will discuss 
Aristotle’s view of e[rwV and filiva by referring to the works of some Aristotelian 
scholars. Third, I will give my own interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of e[rwV and 
filiva. A short conclusion will be given in the end to recapitulate the discussion and 
pose further questions that are related to this project 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ON LOVING THIS OR THAT BEAUTY: 
!ERWS  AND FILIA  IN PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM 
 
There are plenty of discussions about e[rwV in the Symposium,2 but there are 
fewer discussions about filiva in it. Even fewer are the discussions about the 
relationship between the two terms. What is the relationship between e[rwV and filiva 
in the context of achieving the best life in Plato’s Symposium? I believe the best way to 
answer this question is by investigating the occurrences of the two words in certain 
contexts. I will undertake this task by discussing discourses about e[rwV given by each 
of the characters in the Symposium. 
I will argue three things in this paper. First, there are three kinds of 
relationships between e[rwV and filiva in the Symposium, viz., the positions taken by 
Phaedrus (P), Pausanias-Eryximachus-Agathon (PEA), and Aristophanes-Socrates-
Diotima (ASD). The three positions can be described as follows: 
(P) e[rwV is an elevator of filiva. 
(PEA) e[rwV is the originator of filiva. 
(ASD) e[rwV is filiva (for Aristophanes, the objects of Love are particular 
individuals, whereas for Socrates-Diotima the objects of Love is the beautiful). 
                                                
2. I am using Plato, Complete Works, ed., with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper. For 
the Greek text, I am using Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb. 
 6 
Second, based on these findings, I will argue that all the speeches in the Symposium see 
e[rwV and filiva as an indispensable part of the virtuous life.3 Third, agreeing with 
Nussbaum, I will argue that the “real battle” in the Symposium is between 
Aristophanes’ speech and Socrates-Diotima’s. The “battle” is about the objects of love, 
i.e., about whether one should love particular individuals or true beauty. 
The Symposium begins with Apollodorus’ saying that “I used to think 
philosophy was the last thing a man should do” (173a3). But then he says, “After all, 
my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation, even if I’m only a 
listener, whether or not I think it will be to my advantage” (173c3). The dialogue is 
indeed an attempt to give an alternative view that philosophy is one of the most rational 
things a person should do in order to have meaningful human relationships, particularly 
love and friendship. Let us begin now with Phaedrus.4 
                                                
3. However, in Pausanias and Eryximachus’ speeches, the excessive love that belongs to the 
PavndhmoV  jAfrodivth must be separated from the virtuous life, but not the one that belongs to the 
Oujraniva  jAfrodivth. 
4. Richard Patterson insists that “at each level of the ascent the lover is stimulated by the object 
of eros to bring forth logos – logos  which attempt to say, of its object, what is so wonderful about it, 
what makes it so beautiful. . . . Once that has been identified in logos, it becomes apparent that what the 
lover really found so attractive was not quite what he took it to be, for logos reveals that the original 
object was only beautiful insofar as it embodied, expressed, or, to adopt a more Platonic terminology, 
imaged or reflected, the new beauty brought to light by logos” (“The Ascent in Plato’s Symposium:” 
196). Some of Patterson’s textual evidence is as follows. First, 210b6-c3: “Next he must deem beauty in 
souls more admirable (timiwvteron) than that in bodies, so that if someone possessed little beauty, but a 
fitting soul, that would be sufficient to love him and care for him, to seek out and beget logoi of a sort 
that would improve the young.” Second, 210c6-7: “After practices he must proceed to branches of 
understanding (maqhvmata, ejpisthvmai), so that he may see the beauty of these.” Third, 210c7-d6: “and, 
looking upon much beauty, no longer slavishly love any one beauty, any fair boy or man or any one 
practice, a servile fool and simpleton, but rather, looking out upon and contemplating the great see of 
beauty, give birth to many, and beautiful, and magnificent logoi and thoughts in philosophy that is free 
of envy and jealousy.”  As Lawrence points out, Patterson seems to be reading the Symposium with the 
perspective of the Republic, where the systematic application of reason is at work (Joseph P. Lawrence, 
“Commentary on Patterson:” 218). I agree with Lawrence that the Symposium is more poetic in its 
presentation of the speeches. This does not mean that the Symposium gives a priority to poetry more than 
to philosophy. Cf. Thomas M. Alexander’s remark on the relationship between philosophy and poetry in 
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1. Phaedrus: e [rwV as the elevator of fili va  
The route of Love is depicted as the best way to go if one is to live beautifully 
(178c). Love gives human beings a sober sense of shame and pride in acting well. 
Without this knowledge of how to act properly, nothing great can be achieved in life. 
This is because Love is a wonderful passion that makes a lover manifest his best 
virtues, especially to his beloved, more than to his family or friends (eJtaivrwn, 178d8). 
The desire to always give the best, motivated by Love, enables a person to do amazing 
things, and hence be heroic. Love, according to Phaedrus, is stronger than a thousand 
deaths (179a). Familial feelings and friendly affections are not as excellent as Love in 
helping a person undertake heroic deeds. 
That is why, when Phaedrus presents the first encomium to Love in the 
Symposium, he depicts e[rwV as a willingness to sacrifice for the beloved that is more 
wonderful than friendship. Phaedrus says (179b-d): 
Besides, no one will die for you but a lover (oiJ ejrw:nteV), and a lover will do this even 
if she’s a woman. Alcestis is proof to everyone in Greece that what I say is true. Only 
she was willing to die in place of her husband, although his father and mother were 
still alive. Because of her love (dia; to;n e[rwta), she went so far beyond his parents in 
family feeling (uJperebavleto th:/ filiva/) that she made them look like outsiders, as if 
they belonged to their son in name only. . . . The eager courage of love (to;n e[rwta) 
wins highest honors from the gods. 
                                                                                                                                        
Plato’s Symposium: “Philosophy is not higher than poetry, it is a higher form of poetry because it, too, is 
concerned with a type of making, with a shaping of the human drama in order to draw forth is meaning” 
(“Eros and Poiēsis in Plato’s Symposium:” 103). I tend to see that e[roV and lovgoV in the Symposium are 
maintained in a state of tension. Moreover, I agree with Lawrence that Patterson is not very accurate in 
claiming that when one loves a particular body, the beautiful does not reside in that particular body, but 
in the beauty of all bodies. That way, the beautiful in all bodies serves as the motivation to love the 
lower level of the instantiation of beauty. The problem with this account is that there is no more beauty 
in the physical reality, which seems to be a denial of much of Plato’s description of bodily beauties in 
the Symposium. Paul Ricoeur makes an interesting remark on the relationship between e[roV and lovgoV: 
“Happy and rare is the meeting, in living fidelity, between Eros, impatient with all rules, and the 
institution which man cannot maintain without sacrifice” (Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for 
Theological Reflection, eds. James B. Nelson and Sandra P. Longfellow, 84). 
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The talk about Alcestis serves as an illustration that Love is stronger than parent-child 
friendship as a motivation to live well. This indicates that love and family feelings can 
be seen as independent of one another. What I mean by “independent” is that family 
feelings can be present without love and vice versa. 
Phaedrus later also praises Achilles for his bravery in avenging his lover, 
Patroclus. Phaedrus’ strong claim is quite striking, that it is not possible for a person to 
sacrifice herself unless he is a lover. Yet Love by itself is just a motivation for action. It 
does not automatically make people act well. People have to choose to Love. One can 
be in Love without acting based on Love, as in the case of Orpheus, who searched for 
his dead wife Eurydice, but did not dare to die for Love’s sake. Friendly affection, too, 
is a motivation to act well. In human society, relationships between parents and 
children and among friends are inevitable. A life lived well will incorporate a right 
attitude towards friends and parents/children. But friendship cannot cause one to die for 
his friends. 
It is questionable why Phaedrus denies the possibility that parents might 
sacrifice their lives for their children or vice versa. Phaedrus’ point seems to be that 
Love is superior to friendship as a motivation to live well. But in order to make his 
point, Phaedrus could just say that (1) Love most likely will cause a person to see 
friendship and friends as less important than love and his beloved, and (2) Love 
probably will help someone achieve greater things more than friendship. Still, we can 
see some problems with this revision. With respect to (1), we can ask why Love is 
more important than friendly affections, and why the beloved is more important than 
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friends. There must be some reason for regarding the beloved as worthier than one’s 
parents, for example. Unfortunately, the reason is not really given clearly in the 
Phaedrus’ speech. If the reason is just because it is Love, then it will be a bare 
assertion: Love makes a person choose the beloved instead of his friends because it is 
Love. It is not a good justification to opt for Love instead of friendship if the reason for 
that is rather mysterious. With respect to (2), surely Love can help someone achieve 
greater things than friendship. Yet we still need to ask the rationale for the action, 
which is not given clearly. Moreover, there is no argument given by Phaedrus to 
exclude the position that there might be at least one case in life where a person is 
willing to die for his friends in comparison to a lover who is not willing to die for his 
beloved. 
Having said that, we can still try to understand the relationship between Love 
and friendly affections as Phaedrus presents it. Both Love and friendly affections are 
feelings that are present in human relationships. Both affections are necessary 
ingredients for a good life. Love, though, is nobler than friendship because it more 
likely brings more honor, since Love can make a person heroic. Love is an elevator of 
friendly affections in the sense that a person with both friendly affections and Love 
will live a better life than a person who only has friendly affections.5 The origins and 
objects of these two affections may be different, but they should be present in one 
person’s life. For example, a father may only have friendly affections towards his 
                                                
5. My interpretation here is similar to David Halperin’s: “[Alcestis’] love for Admetus – the 
fundamental motive force behind her act of self-sacrifice – was a strong and militant love because it 
happened to be accompanied by the additional ingredient of erotic passion” (“Platonic Eros and What 
Men Call Love,” Plato: Critical Assessments, Vol. I, 67). 
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children. But he needs to have Love for his spouse in order to be more virtuous. The 
two feelings will remain different from one another in the sense that family affections 
do not change into Love. Phaedrus might well agree that in a relationship there is only 
Love, but not family affections. This brings us to the conclusion that the principle of 
friendly affections may be something different from that of Love. At any rate, having 
both feelings is the ideal thing to do.  
 
2. Pausanias: fili va  as the outcome of e [rwV  
We should begin our eulogy about Love, according to Pausanias, not by 
praising him, but by first defining his nature. Since Love is not simple, we need to 
make a proper differentiation of kinds of Love before we can decide which Love we 
should give praise to the most. He starts his discussion by pointing out that there are 
there are Common and Heavenly Aphrodite, which give birth respectively to two kinds 
of Love. The Love of Common Aphrodite is the one that is felt by the vulgar, and it is 
characterized by the love of the body more than the love of the soul, that is, to the more 
unstable than stable things. The vulgar do not care about what is noble. However, they 
are not always bad, even though they only do “whatever comes their way, sometimes 
good, sometimes bad” (tuvcwsi, 181b8), which is compatible with the fact that the 
Love of Common Aphrodite “strikes wherever he gets a chance (tuvch|, 181b2).” This 
means that the vulgar do not have control over their actions over the power of the Love 
of Common Aphrodite. They are “hasty” and even “unfair to their loved ones” (182a). 
That is why the vulgar are sometimes blamed for tainting the reputation of Love. The 
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Love of Heavenly Aphrodite, by contrast, inspires people to desire not only the body, 
but more importantly the soul. This Love nourishes the characters of human beings, 
forms shared human relationships, and brings out the best in life with respect to noble 
actions. When people are influenced by the Love of Heavenly Aphrodite, they wish to 
live together and build one another up without evil intention. Love, then, by itself is 
neither noble nor worthy of praise: “that depends on whether the sentiments he 
produces in us are themselves noble” (181a). 
In a more complex culture, the presence of love can be regarded as a sign of 
vileness, such as shown by the example of the Persian empire that was lusting for 
power and rejecting love, and even philosophy and sport, because they probably affect 
the formation of strong bonds of friendship (filivaV ijscura;V kai; koinwnivaV) and love 
is able to make people intractable and unruly. Here we may say that if filiva is not the 
outcome of e[rwV, at least it is the by-product of e[rwV. Pausanias illustrates this point by 
reciting the story of Harmodius and Aristogiton, whose love and affection enabled 
them to attempt to topple down the tyrant Hippias in 514 B.C.6 In a simpler culture, 
like in Elis or Boetia, every case of lovers seems to be approved without any difficulty 
(182b). But then, this indiscriminate approval shows the laziness of the soul of the law-
                                                
6. In the defense for Timarkhos’s prostitution this following reasoning was given by an 
Athenian general: “He [Timarkhos] will put before you first of all the example of your benefactors, 
Harmodios and Aristogeiton … and … sing praises of the love (philiā) of Patroklos and Achilles which 
is said to have come into being through erōs ….” Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 41. Dover gives an 
explanation for this quotation: “Harmodios and Aristogeiton killed Hipparkhos, the brother of the tyrant 
Hippias, in 514 B.C., and were regarded in popular tradition as having freed Athens from tyranny, 
though Hippias was not in fact expelled until 510. Both Harmodius and Aristogeiton perished in 
consequence of their act; Harmodios was the eromenos of Aristogeiton, and Hipparkhos’s unsuccessful 
attempt to seduce him was the start of the quarrel which had such a spectacular political outcome (Thuc. 
vi 54-9). . . . The defence envisaged by Aiskhines as likely to be offered on Timarkhos’s behalf by the 
unnamed general amounts to this: a homosexual relationship can engender the most heroic self-sacrifice” 
(ibid.). 
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makers (182d). Pausanias takes a middle way. He does not want to reject Love 
altogether, but does not want to approve love without qualifications. To him, the 
customs in his time only provide one way for a person to have an honorable erotic 
relationship, that is, by loving and being loved according to two principles (184c): (1) 
the principle governing the proper attitude toward the lover of young men and (2) the 
principle governing the love of wisdom and of virtue in general. These principles serve 
as a guardian against two extreme attitudes, that of rejecting love altogether and of 
receiving cases of love unreasonably. At any rate, Pausanias’ point remains the same, 
that Love, “considered simply in itself[,] . . . is neither honorable nor disgraceful – its 
character depends entirely on the behavior it gives rise to” (183d). 
The relationship between Love and friendly affections in Pausanias’ speech is 
not clear. We have some hints about it at least from two passages. First, we remember 
that Phaedrus mentions the hostility of the Persian empire towards Love (182c). People 
there reject Love, even philosophy and sport, since those might be a stimulant for the 
presence of great friendships. The case of Harmodius and Aristogiton is worth looking 
at more closely. The Greek text reads +O ga;r =AristogeivtonoV e[rwV kai; hJ 
+Armodivou filiva . . . (for Aristogiton’s love and Harmodius’s friendship . . . ) (182c6-
7). It is unclear in the Greek text whether Aristogiton has friendly feelings towards 
Harmodius or not, and whether Harmodius has passionate romantic feelings towards 
Aristogiton or not.7 But one thing that we can conclude here is that the presence of 
                                                
7. As a speculation, since Harmodius is the youth and Aristogiton is the older man, probably the 
former only has friendly feelings towards the latter, but the latter only has romantic passion towards the 
former. 
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filiva can be ascribed to, i.e., is produced by, Love (oJ e[rwV ejmpoiei:n, 182c5), 
presumably the heavenly one. Yet Pausanias claims that filiva is independent of the 
Common Love, as indicated by this following passage: 
We also consider it shameful for a man to be seduced by money or political power, 
either because he cringes at ill-treatment and will not endure it or because, once he has 
tasted the benefits of wealth and power, he will not rise above them. None of these 
benefits is stable or permanent, apart from the fact that no genuine affection (filivan) 
can possibly be based upon them. (184b) 
 
We can see that there is a similarity here between the Love of the Heavenly Aphrodite 
and friendship: both must be based upon something stable or permanent. Unlike Love 
that has two kinds, there is only one kind of friendship and it is always good in nature.  
 Second, in relation to the attempt to achieve a virtuous life,  it is filiva that is 
responsible for the intellectual aspect and character building in an erotic relationship 
(185a): 
By the same token, suppose that someone takes a lover in the mistaken belief that his 
lover is a good man and likely to make him better himself (dia; th;n filivan ejrastou:), 
while in reality the man is horrible, totally lacking in virtue . . . . 
 
Notice that the Greek text explicitly says that it is not Love that is the cause of the 
betterment of the beloved, but the friendly feelings. Genuine affections, then, are a 
necessary condition for virtuous living. But if friendly feelings are the outcome of the 
Heavenly Love, then love cannot be absent in a virtuous life. Other instances of filiva, 
such as parental affections and affections between rulers and the ruled, are not 
necessarily generated by Heavenly Love.  
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3. Eryximachus: fili va  as the result of e [rwV  
 Eryximachus’ speech uses Pausanias’ distinction between two kinds of Love.8 
But Eryximachus goes further in applying the distinction not only in the realm of 
human character and arts, but also in the realm of both gods and concrete material 
objects (186a).9 He is concerned not only about the harmonious character of music, but 
also the concord between elements in material bodies.10 If Pausanias thinks that Love 
can lead us towards loving beautifully or in an ugly way, Eryximachus thinks that Love 
has either life or death force. The finer species of Love brings harmony and agreement, 
while the bad one incites chaos and destruction. To illustrate this point, Eryximachus 
says that “the love manifested in health is fundamentally distinct from the love 
manifested in disease” (186b). Eryximachus believes that the Love force is present in 
many, if not all, fields of human life: medicine, physical education, farming, music, 
poetry, and so forth. These subjects investigate the effects Love brings to certain 
things, whether it makes them recover or deterioriate. But Eryximachus’ emphasis in 
his speech is specifically about the power of Love in bringing harmony and unanimity 
                                                
8. Ludwig Edelstein gives an interesting interpretation of Eryximachus’ role in the banquet. He 
writes, “Eryximachus . . . lays the foundation for the whole contest. He holds the conversation together 
at the point where it is in danger of breaking up. As there would be no encomia of Eros without him 
[since he was the one that gave Phaedrus credit for suggesting the topic of the discourse], there would be 
no praise of Socrates without his insistence [that is, by his insisting that Alcibiades give a speech instead 
of ruining the party]” (“The Role of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium:” 96). 
9. “But Eros exists in the souls of men not only toward beautiful people, but also toward many 
other things and in other things – in the bodies of all animals, in what grows in the earth, and in general 
in all that is.” 
10. “For attunement is concord, and concord a kind of agreement – it is impossible for 
agreement to derive from things at variance so long as they are at variance; on the other hand, it is 
impossible to attune what is at variance and does not agree – just as rhythm too derives from the quicker 
and slower, which had before been at variance but afterward come to agree. Music here, like medicine 
there, puts agreement into all these things, implanting Eros and unanimity with each other. And music in 
turn is knowledge of the things of love concerning attunement and rhythm. It is not hard to diagnose the 
things of love in the very constitution of attunement and rhythm, nor is the twofold Eros there yet.” 
(187b-c) 
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(oJmovnoian, 187c4). The kind of Love that is felt by good people, which is the Heavenly 
one, must be protected and nourished. About the vulgar one, Eryximachus is not 
suggesting that we eliminate it because it is not entirely bad, as long as one can be 
careful in enjoying pleasures without falling into debauchery. But this is as difficult as 
regulating appetites within the proper boundaries.  
The relationship between Love and friendly affections in Eryximachus’ speech 
with respect to attaining a good life is not very clear. At least there are two passages 
that indicate that both genuine affections and Love are necessary elements for a 
virtuous life. The first is in 186d6: 
The physician’s task is to effect a reconciliation (fivla) and establish mutual love (ejra:n 
ajllhvlwn) between the most basic bodily elements. 
 
The word fivla, from fivloV, indicates a kind of friendly bond. We have seen that 
Heavenly Love brings harmony to the bodily elements. When Eryximachus adds 
“reconciliation” to mutual love, perhaps he is talking about the same thing. The word 
kaiv/ in the sentence can just mean “that is.” If this is the case, then “to effect a 
reconciliation” is “to establish mutual love.”  
Our second passage gives more information about the relationship between 
Love and genuine affections (188c-d): 
Our object is to try to maintain the proper kind of Love, and our deference to the other 
sort, when we should have been guided by the former sort of Love in every action in 
connection with our parents, living or dead, and with the gods. The task of divination is 
to keep watch over these two species of Love and to doctor them as necessary. 
Divination, therefore, is the practice that produces loving affection (filivaV) between 
gods and men; it is simply the science of the effects of Love on justice and piety. 
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This passage is Eryximachus’ illustration for harmony in the domain of religious 
practices. Heavenly Love is needed to guard human beings from impiety (ajsevbeia), 
which seems to break human bonds. But then Eryximachus talks about the practice of 
divination (hJ mantikhv) as the practice that produces friendship between gods and 
human beings. The divination must supervise (ejpiskopei:n) the two species of Love 
and doctor (ijatreuvein) them if needed. It seems that the divination uses custom (qevmin) 
and piety (eujsevbeian) as the standard to keep watch on the two species of Love. When 
Heavenly Love is guarded properly, friendship between gods and human beings most 
likely will arise.  
 From this discussion, we may derive the conclusion that in order to have a good 
life, one must have both kinds of Love taken care of properly. The presence of 
friendship seems to result from the presence of Love. Now, we can go back to interpret 
our first passage. Based on our view about the relationship between Love and 
friendship, Eryximachus seems to be saying there that to have friendship, we need to 
have mutual Love. If this is correct, then genuine affections here are not independent of 
Love as a tool to have a good life. Friendship, anyway, is one of the wonderful gifts 
from the god of Love (188d9). 
 
4. Aristophanes: fili va as e [rwV  for wholeness 
Aristophanes took over the conversation after he recovered from his hiccups. 
The suggestion given by Eryximachus to Aristophanes about the Sneeze Treatment 
might very well be a sign of his friendship for him in the setting of a lovely and orderly 
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symposium. Since Eryximachus had talked earlier about medicine and harmony in 
relation to Love and friendship, we can well interpret Aristophanes’ hiccups case, 
which involved his yielding to Eryxmachus’ speech, as a live and immediate 
illustration of how the orderly sort of Love in the body (to; kovsmion tou: swvmatoV, 
189a3) creates a bodily harmony. After Eryximachus’ talk, Aristophanes seemed to be 
making a joke about whether the Sneeze Treatment really did incite Heavenly Love in 
his body, which was then followed by the reconciliation of opposite bodily elements 
that cured the hiccups. Eryximachus was apparently being serious about that. But he 
knew too well that Aristophanes was a comedian. Eryximachus might understand that 
Aristophanes was yet about to offer his friendship in a very different way, through his 
supposedly funny oration. Surprisingly, the oration turns out to be not only comical, 
but also very tragic and touching. It is an oration about the journey of human beings 
towards wholeness, a journey in which we are ready to take part now as we discuss it. 
Human beings, according to Aristophanes, have missed the power of Love. Had 
they understood it, they would already have built beautiful shrines for the god. One of 
the reasons that the god is worthy to receive human worship is that “he loves 
(filanqrwpovtatoV) the human race more than any other god” (189c8). The wonder of 
the god of Love’s love towards human beings is obvious from the fact that human 
beings have rebelled against the gods, and presumably against Love himself, but still 
he loves them in a way that surpasses how the other gods love them. The three 
primitive kinds of human beings were so powerful that they threw their fists against the 
gods. The comedy is that their form was round and they rolled around, but they dared 
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to fight against the most powerful. The gods assembled and decided to cut them into 
halves to weaken them. That way, the human beings would not be able to show their 
hubris anymore, yet they could still exist and serve the gods. After being cut, they were 
cured by Apollo. We remember in Eryximachus’ speech that every cure is made 
possible by the force of Heavenly Love. But this physical recovery is not enough. The 
separation they experienced was not only physical, but also psychological and even 
existential. They felt that their existence was incomplete without the other half of their 
being. First they longed to be with one another all the time that they neglected other 
things in life, even their need for sustenance. One by one they died miserably.11 Then 
Zeus took pity on them and gave them the ability to have intercourse. They could be 
consoled with the sexual intimacy and their ability to reproduce, hence they were able 
to be productive in other areas of life. Aristophanes concludes (191d), 
This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into every human 
being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of 
two and heal the wound of human nature. 
 
That is why Aristophanes thinks that Love loves human beings more than other gods. 
The god of Love not only spared them from death, but wanted them to experience their 
original unity – by the permission of Zeus. Note that the unity here is not just sexual 
unity. It is a reunion of the soul of the halves that is important. It is obvious, says 
Aristophanes, that besides the sexual intimacy, “the soul of every lover longs for 
                                                
11. Arlene W. Saxonhouse writes, “Eros . . . when there is no sexuality and only longing, leads 
to death. It is to these humans that Aristotle refers in his discussion of unity from diversity – the 
individuals for whom the discovery of the appropriate mate is of such importance that they destroy 
themselves and each other – their diversity – in their unity. It is not only a lack of clothing and shelter 
that kills them; the unity which they achieve, despite their diversity, transforms them into beings who no 
longer show any potential. They are whatever they might be. At such point they need no others; they 
become asocial and apolitical. In Aristotle’s model they become either gods or beasts” (“The Net of 
Hephaestus: Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s Symposium:” 25). 
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something else” (192d). This going back to the original nature is the only proper way 
to preserve the life of human beings. When the reunion is achieved, love has been 
brought back to perfection.12 
 The relationship between friendly affections and Love in Aristophanes’ speech 
is not clear either. We have seen above that the god of Love himself loves human 
beings with filiva (189c8). One passage that is worth our noticing is 192c, which is 
one of the most beautiful passages in Aristophanes’ myth (192c): 
And so, when a person meets (ejntuvch/) the half that is his very own, whatever his 
orientation, whether it’s to young men or not, then something wonderful happens: the 
two are struck from their senses by love (filiva/), by a sense of belonging to one 
another (oijkeiovthti), and by desire (e[rwti), and they don’t want to be separated from 
one another, not even for a moment. 
 
The origin of friendly feelings and Love are is the same here, viz., a person’s meeting 
the other half. But the relationship between Love and friendship is not specified 
further. It is possible that filiva and e[rwV are actually two different names for the same 
desire. The two passages serve as textual evidences for this interpretation: 
That’s why a man who is split from the double sort (which is used to be called 
“androgynous”) runs after women (filoguvnaikevV). (191d9) 
 
Many lecherous men have come from this class, and so do the lecherous women who 
run after men (fivlandroiv). (191e1) 
 
                                                
12. Again, Saxonhouse writes (ibid., 21-2), “Why then for Aristophanes is our ancient form our 
tevloV? It is a form without e[rwV (pain) because it is self-complete. Its spherical shape indicates the 
absence of a beginning or an end. It requires nothing more to be complete. There is no interdependence 
among the spherical bodies. They do not need each other, even for the sake of procreation. The absence 
of need makes them divine rather than human. Their perfection makes them models towards which 
humans can strive, that is, the gods we have now are inferior representations of perfection. The ancient 
spherical beings, our ancestors, are our true gods. There is no political life among these ancient beings. 
There are no families. Both cities and families (and lovers) indicate the absence of perfection. Both 
reveal men as needful creatures who cannot survive or procreate on their own. Political life and families 
arise from a sense of partiality, something these spherical creatures do not feel.”  
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Both of these passages talk about sexual orientation. However, the “running after” is 
not only about physical sexuality, but also about regaining wholeness. Love itself is 
defined by Aristophanes as “the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be 
complete” (193a). A little ambiguity arises here since now Love is not seen as the god 
of Love anymore, but as a desire to be whole.13 It seems, then, that genuine affections 
are Love in this latter sense since they are desires to be whole as well. Love is needed 
through and through because it brings human life back to its original nature, which is 
necessary for us to be happy and blessed (makarivouV kai; eujdaivmonaV, 193d6). 
 
5. Agathon: fili va as the creation of e [rwV  
The celebration of Love continues with Agathon’s speech. Agathon begins his 
talk by speaking about how he ought to speak. In praising the god of Love, he feels 
compelled to speak about his nature first, then his gifts. The reason is that “you must 
explain what qualities in the subject of your speech enable him to give the benefits for 
which we praise him” (195a). He insists that Love is the happiest among the gods 
because he is the most beautiful and the best. He also believes that Love is the source 
of all beauty and goodness (197c). The god of Love is charming both in his nature and 
his appearances. He is the youngest among the gods, with absolute delicacy. Agathon 
praises the exquisite color of his skin and how good-looking he is. Yet outward 
appearances themselves are just the expression of the god’s moral virtues. Agathon 
adores the god of Love because the god possesses of the cardinal virtues of the Greeks: 
                                                
13. Gerasimos Santas interprets this issue with a conclusion that “eros (a lover) cannot be a 
god” (“Plato’s Theory of Eros in the Symposium: Abstract:” 69). 
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justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom. The virtues that are present in the world, 
according to Agathon, naturally spring from the god of Love. Love not only dwells in 
delicate and beautiful places, but also transforms anything he touches into a thing 
having a Love-like quality, full of virtues and delicacy. Even other gods, including 
Zeus, were once pupils of the god of Love in matters of wisdom: Apollo in prophecy, 
the Muses in music, etc.   
One possible way to interpret the relationship between Love and other beauty in 
the world is by using a universal quantifier. Agathon says that Love “is himself the 
most beautiful and the best; after that, if anyone else is at all like that, Love is 
responsible” (197c). In other words, for all x, if x is beautiful and good, x’s being that 
way can be ascribed to Love. One instance of this is the case of poetry. Agathon 
believes that “the god is so skilled a poet that he can make others into poets: once Love 
touches him, anyone becomes a poet” (196e). It seems, though, that Love himself is not 
the form of beauty or the good. Perhaps we may say that his task in the universe is to 
instantiate the forms of beauty and goodness, much more like the demiurge (cf. the 
occurrence of dhmiourgivan in 197a3). 
If this universal quantification is acceptable, then we can easily say that friendly 
feelings arise from Love. There is at least one passage in Agathon’s speech that support 
this interpretation (195c): 
Those old stories Hesiod and Parmenides tell about the gods – those things happened 
under Necessity, not Love, if what they say is true. For not one of all those violent 
deeds would have been done – no castrations, no imprisonments – if Love had been 
present among them. There would have been peace and brotherhood (filiva) instead, as 
there has been now as long as Love has been king of the gods.  
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The reasoning given by Agathon here is simply that because there was no Love, there 
was no friendly affection either. If we are allowed to require the presence of Love as a 
necessary condition for the presence of friendly affections, we can say that if there 
were friendly affections, then it is necessary that Love was present as well. Notice that 
Agathon’s theory of Love is very virtuous and free of wild passions. In every aspect of 
our lives, Love takes care of us, guiding us and guarding us against vileness. That is 
why Love is our comrade and savior. He is the source of all our virtuous actions. 
 Before we proceed to Socrates and Diotima, let us summarize our findings on 
the first five speeches. First, Phaedrus might suggest that love and friendly affections 
have different origins and objects. However, both are needed for virtuous life since 
love is depicted as a better way of life than friendship. Second, Pausanias and 
Eryximachus see Heavenly Love as responsible for generating friendship. Heavenly 
Love cannot be absent in a virtuous life, but uncontrolled Common Love must be 
avoided. Third, Aristophanes sees Love as necessary for human beings to return to 
their original state of wholeness. Interestingly, Aristophanes suggests that filiva is 
e[rwV with respect to desire for wholeness. It is a desire for particular individuals that 
can complete us as human beings. Fourth, Agathon also sees Love as the producer of 
friendship.  
We can conclude that the first five speeches in the Symposium see e[rwV as 
indispensable in virtuous living. We can also conclude that, in the first five speeches, 
filiva is a necessary but not sufficient condition for virtuous living. A person needs to 
have friendly and family affections to be virtuous. Furthermore, only in the speech of 
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Phaedrus is there a possibility for filiva to have a separate principle from e[rwV. In the 
rest of the speeches, filiva is not independent of e[rwV in the sense that (1) the former is 
generated by the latter (Pausanias, Eryximachus, Agathon) or (2) the former is the 
latter with respect to the desire for wholeness (Aristophanes).14 We are now ready to 
hear Socrates and Diotima’s wisdom about Love. 
 
6. Socrates and Diotima: e [rwV  as the fili va  for wisdom 
 
 The beauty of Agathon’s speech worries Socrates a little bit. He is not sure now 
whether he really understands Love (cf. 177e). It is possible, of course, that Socrates 
does not really mean what he says. His remarks that he will “not be able to say 
anything that came close to them [Agathon’s speech] in beauty” (198b) is perhaps just 
a rhetorical introductory note for his later point that Love is not beautiful. To Socrates, 
“Love is the love of something . . . and he loves things of which he has a present need” 
(201a). However, Love is the love of beauty and never of ugliness. It follows from this 
that Love is not beautiful because it desires beauty. By the same reasoning, Love is not 
good either, since good things are beautiful and Love lacks beauty.15 
                                                
14. For an interesting discussion of the structures of the dialectic of goodness and love in the 
Symposium, see Kenneth Dorter, “A Dual Dialectic in the Symposium:” 256-27. Dorter believes that 
there is no linear ascent of the concept of goodness and love in the Symposium, but rather dialectic 
relations. For example, with respect to goodness, the speech of Phaedrus promotes self-sacrifice, in 
contrast with that of Pausanias that promotes “self-seeking behavior in the guise of justice.” 
15. I will not discuss whether Socrates’s arguments against Agathon are valid not since the 
issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Two of the articles that discuss this issue are by Andrew Payne, 
“The Refutation of Agathon: Symposium 199c-201c:” 235-53 and by Alan Soble, “Love is not Beautiful: 
Symposium 200e-201:” 43-52. One of the main debates is about whether “love” in the speech of Socrates 
should be understood as the subject or object of love or the relation between the lovers, i.e., the desire 
for the beautiful. Soble insists that if love is the relation between the lovers, love can be understood as 
one beautiful thing among others that pushes people towards the Beautiful. 
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 Socrates proceeds to present an account given by Diotima, who sees Love as 
the intermediate of two extremes. Love is neither wise nor ignorant, neither mortal nor 
immortal, neither beautiful nor ugly, neither totally rich nor penurious. Love is of “the 
good forever (oJ e[rwV tou: to; ajgaqo;n auJtw/: ei\nai ajeiv)” (206a9-10). Love then is not 
about being loved, but about loving: 
Love is . . . in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It 
follows that Love must be a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise 
and being ignorant. (204b4) 
 
As a correction to Socrates’s claim that the object of Love is the beautiful, Diotima 
insists that the object of Love is the reproduction and birth in the beauty in respect to 
the body and soul. It is this reproduction that enables a person to own the good 
eternally. That is why Love loves immortality as well (207a). Diotima points out the 
incompleteness of Phaedrus’ account about Alcestis’ willingness to die for her husband 
(208d). Diotima believes that Alcestis would have not done that had she not expected 
to be immortal by means of being remembered because of her virtue. The desire to own 
the good stems from the wish to obtain happiness in life, which is the final answer for 
any question about utilities. The talk about possessing the good forever makes Love 
universal because the good can be present in any aspect of human life.  
 As stated before, the manifestation of goodness in human life is preserved by 
the act of reproduction. Diotima talks about two kinds of pregnancy with respect to 
giving birth to beauty. The first is physical pregnancy. Those who care less about 
wisdom tend to pursue women and concern themselves with reproduction in the 
ordinary sense of the word, viz., the multiplication of progeny. Those who are pregnant 
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in soul will find another soul to educate. Reproduction here will be both in the realms 
of body and knowledge. The beauty in the lover recognizes the beauty in the beloved. 
The lover will help the beloved reach immortality by guiding him in his ascent to the 
very idea of beauty itself. 
 With a proper training, the beloved will be a leader himself. He will first find 
beauty in particular individual bodies. He then will realize that actually all the beauties 
are one and the same. He knows eventually that he should love all beautiful bodies. But 
even further still, he will soon find out that the beauty of the soul is more valuable than 
the beauty of the bodies and will seek to give birth to ideas for the betterment of young 
people. The next step is that he will be forced (ajnagkasqh/:) to gaze at the beauty of 
observances and laws, before he moves on to perceiving the beauty of the branches of 
knowledge. Finally, he will reach the idea of Beauty itself, which is the final 
destination of his pursuit of wisdom: “But the lover is turned to gloriously beautiful 
ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom” (210d6). At this point, he can really 
help other people follow the path he has taken. This is a blissful ascent as opposed to 
the rebellious ascent (eijV to;n oujrano;n ajnavbasin, 190c1) made by Aristophanes’ 
three kinds of human beings. In Aristophanes’ case, the human beings did not succeed 
in their attempt for an ascent to the gods, and they ended up staying on the earth in a 
diminished condition. In the case of Diotima’s account of the ascent, a true lover will 
be able to experience the ascent and will be able to “return” to earth, promoting the 
instantiation of the Beauty in human life, in order to bring more people to go “upwards 
for the sake of this Beauty” (211c). 
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 The relationship between Beauty and virtue is clear: only those who have 
experienced this pure and absolute Beauty can be truly virtuous, as opposed to those 
who can only produces images of virtue (212a). Here we have a strong justification for 
saying that e[rwV is sublimated into philosophy. The friendly affections among human 
beings are strengthened by the love of wisdom, which is Love itself (209c6): 
such people, therefore, . . . have a former bond of friendship, because the children in 
whom they have a share are more beautiful and more immortal. 
 
Friendship between human beings itself is not enough for virtuous life. One must have 
Love for Beauty,16 which is philosophy. Friendship can help people become virtuous 
because they can help one another climb the ladder of Love. 
There is also a kind of “ladder” as well with respect to the role of desire 
(ejpiqumiva) in the Symposium.17 Pausanias first mentions, concerning the healthy and 
diseased constitutions of the body, that “dissimilar subjects desire (ejpiqumei:) and love 
(ejra/:) objects that are themselves dissimilar” (186b6). This desire is of something 
related to physical matters. The same use of this word occurs in Aristophanes’ speech, 
which is actually a comment on Eryximachus’ idea of desire and Love:  
The hiccups have stopped all right – but not before I applied the Sneeze Treatment to 
them. Makes me wonder whether the ‘orderly sort of Love’ in the body calls for 
                                                
16. F. C. White insists that love is not directed toward the beautiful, but of the Good. He writes, 
“It may well be a traditional and popular view that the ultimate object of love is beauty, but it is not 
Diotima’s. On the contrary, she is at pains to correct it, arguing at length that whatever role beauty plays 
in love, it is always subordinate to that of the good” (“Love and Beauty in Plato’s Symposium:” 153). 
Though I see a possibility that White might be right, I also see that the “traditional” view, as White 
construed it, is plausible. For example, Diotima says that Ei[per pou a[lloqi, biwto;n ajnqrwvpw/, 
qewvmenw/ auto; to; kalovn (211d). As Halperin says (pp. 85-6), “[Diotima’s] insistence that eros is a 
desire for ‘birth and procreation in the beautiful’ does not bear at all on the identity of the erotic object. 
Rather . . . Diotima is speaking entirely to the question of the erotic aim – that is, she is attempting to 
specify what the lover wants his erotic object for, what he wishes to do with it or to accomplish by 
means of it.” 
17. e[rwV is a form of ejpiqumiva. See Ann R. Cacoullos, “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato:” 89-92. 
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(ejpiqumei:) the sounds and itchings that constitute a sneeze, because the hiccups 
stopped immediately when I applied the Sneeze Treatment. (189a3) 
 
Notice that the desire here is still physical, since it is about the harmony between 
bodily elements. But when Aristophanes starts talking about the craving of human 
beings to be united, he uses the word to refer to a desire for something more abstract, 
viz., a reunion of the souls: 
And supposed they’re perplexed, and he asks them again: “Is this your heart’s desire 
(ejpiqumei:te), then – for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as near as 
can be, and never to separate, day or night? Because if that’s your desire (ejpiqumei:te) . 
. . .” (192d6,8) 
 
The objects of desire in Diotima’s speech are even more abstract, viz., the desire for 
wisdom (204a1), the desire for good things or for happiness (205d2), the desire to 
“give birth” (206c4), the desire for immortality (207a1), and the desire (ejpiqumhth;V) 
for intelligence (203d6). In a sense, there is an “ascent” with respect to the objects of 
desire in the Symposium up to Diotima’s account of Love. 
The same case happens with the case of friendly affections. We have seen that 
in Eryximachus’ account, friendly affections are present for the sake of health. We 
have also seen in other speeches that friendly affections are present in friendship 
among human beings. One important note is about Aristophanes’ speech that suggests 
particular individuals as the object of friendly affections (which is e[rwV itself). This is 
a direct contrast with Diotima’s, where friendly affections ultimately have a glorious 
object, viz., wisdom.18 
                                                
18. See K. J. Dover, “Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s Symposium:” 47-8. F. M. Cornford gives 
us the “usual” interpretation of Diotima’s ladder of love: “There are four stages in this progress. The first 
step is the detachment of Eros from the individual person and from physical beauty. . . . Next, we must 
learn to value moral beauty in the mind above beauty of the body, and to contemplate the unity and 
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Up to this point, I have tried to show that the relationship between friendly 
affections and Love with respect to attaining a virtuous life in the Symposium up to 
Diotima’s speech can be divided into three kinds. First, in the speech of Phaedrus, 
Love is an elevator of friendship. Second, in Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Agathon’s 
encomia, Heavenly Love is the originator of friendship. Third, in the speeches of 
Aristophanes and Socrates-Diotima, Love is equated with friendship. However, in 
Aristophanes’ speech the objects of love are particular individuals, whereas in the 
speech of Socrates-Diotima the object of love is the beautiful. Throughout the 
Symposium Heavenly Love is necessary for virtuous living, whereas the improper 
Common Love must be avoided.19  
I have also made an attempt to show that there is a progression with respect to 
the objects of desire, friendly affections, and Love in the Symposium.20 The progression 
goes from the physical world to the world of ideas, particularly the idea of Beauty. It 
                                                                                                                                        
kinship of all that is honourable and noble – a constant meaning of to; kalovn – in law and conduct. . . . 
The third stage reveals intellectual beauty in the mathematical sciences. . . . The final object – beyond 
physical, moral, and intellectual beauty – is the Beautiful itself” (“The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s 
Symposium,”Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. II, ed. Gregory Vlastos, 126-7). 
19. Cf. Cacoullos: 97: “For those of us who are interested in the structure of the moral life, the 
important question which ought to be put is whether or not the erotic drive or erotic motivation – the 
desire to create and the actual concentrating of energies towards the achievement of specifiable goals – 
constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for the adoption and pursuit of the moral point of view, 
in Platonic terms, for the achievement of arete or excellence. Plato would say that this is a necessary 
condition but not sufficient. Partly because he conceived of arete in the way he did and partly because he 
does place a premium upon education and knowledge of the Forms, eros for Plato must be fortified by 
intellectual training. This is especially true for those persons who are capable of achieving the highest 
sort of knowledge and virtue.” If we may read Cacoullos’s interpretation of Platonic e[rwV into the 
distinction between Heavenly Love and Common Love, then perhaps we can say that Heavenly Love is 
Love with excellence. 
20. I disagree with Drew A. Hyland who tries to differentiate between e[rwV, ejpiqumiva, and 
filiva in too strict a way. “  [ErwV, jEpiqumiva, and Filiva in Plato:” 32-46. He writes, “there is a 
distinction between ejpiqumiva, [ErwV and filiva, and that the distinction hinges on the presence and 
degree of reason” (ibid.: 40). I have tried to shown that even ejpiqumiva can be directed to wisdom. By the 
same token, filiva can be directed to wine and horses. 
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might be useful to examine the relationship between this ascent in the Symposium and 
the one with respect to the divided line in the Republic.21 Now, I will discuss the last 
speech in the Symposium and argue for the third point in my paper, viz., that the 
“battle” in the Symposium is between Aristophanes and Socrates-Diotima with respect 
to the objects of love, i.e., about whether the proper objects of love should be particular 
individuals or the Form of beauty. 
 
7. The Speech of Alcibiades as a Gateway to Plato’s Phaedrus 
 As beautiful as Diotima’s speech is, it is not the final word in the Symposium 
about Love. Alcibiades comes drunk and insists that he wants to tell the truth about 
Socrates (214e). Alcibiades falls deeply in love with Socrates. He cannot live with him, 
but cannot live without him either (216c). The fact that his love is unrequited by 
Socrates makes him suffer every time he is with Socrates. Yet, he is not ready to lose 
Socrates altogether. It is not a coincidence that the dialogue takes place at Agathon’s 
place, which literally means the place of “the good”. Socrates at least acts as if he is 
falling in love with the good, which is symbolized in the dialogue by Agathon.22 
Socrates is terrified by the fierceness of Alcibiades’s passion (filerastivan) (213d6). 
Alcibiades, on the other hand, is falling in love with a particular individual, viz., 
Socrates. Instead of praising Love, Alcibiades praises Socrates. 
                                                
21. Cacoullos has briefly tried to do this (Cacoullos: 98). 
22. Gary Alan Scott and William A. Welton point out that there are two kinds of e[rwV in the 
speech of Alcibiades: Alcibiades’s and Socrates’s. The former is acquisitive and jeopardizes others’ 
freedom because it is prideful and excessive. The latter, by contrast, is liberative since it is the desire to 
free people from the bondage of the shadows (e.g., traditions and myths) (“An Overlooked Motive in 
Alcibiades’ Symposium Speech:” 67-84). 
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 The reason for Alcibiades’s encomium on Socrates is at least threefold. First, 
Alcibiades adores Socrates for his friendship. Even though there is no explicit mention 
about friendship between Alcibiades and Socrates, Alcibiades tells a story about how 
Socrates saved his life in the battle between Athens and Potidaea (220e). Socrates’s 
bravery reminds us of Phaedrus’ speech about how Love helps people do amazing 
things, including sacrificing themselves for their friends. Second, he praises Socrates 
for his uniqueness (221d). Socrates is incomparable to anyone in his bizarre ideas. 
Third, he praises Socrates for being able to entrap souls with his philosophy. 
Alcibiades is well aware that Socrates has driven him crazy because of philosophy. 
Alcibiades sees philosophy as madness (maniva), a thing characterized by Bacchic 
frenzy (218b3). In his words, 
Well, something much more painful than a snake has bitten me in my most sensitive 
part – I mean my heart, or my soul, or whatever you want to call it, which has been 
struck and bitten by philosophy, whose grip on young and eager souls is much more 
vicious than a viper’s and makes them do the most amazing things. (218a5) 
 
Alcibiades’s whole life is just “a constant effort to escape from [Socrates] and keep 
away” (216b). Yet it is inevitable that he is drawn back by being possessed by 
Socrates’s magic. 
 Above all, though, Alcibiades knows that the most important thing in his life is 
to be the best man he can be (218d). He also knows very well that there is no other 
person who can help him achieve that besides Socrates. The problem is that he is not 
satisfied with Socrates’s frigid attitude towards him. He wants more intimacy, more 
sexuality. The fact that he sometimes wrestles in the gymnasium with Socrates without 
getting sexual at all frustrates him. But Socrates is well known for his sobriety and 
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virtuosity. Socrates was never drunk and he is not interested in beautiful bodies. 
Socrates never even got tired. He did not sleep until the evening after the symposium 
ended. 
Martha Nussbaum insists that the real tension in the Symposium is between the 
speeches of Aristophanes and of Socrates-Diotima. As I said earlier, Diotima’s idea of 
love is not the final word in the Symposium. The reason is that the Symposium ends 
with Alcibiades: 
With his claim that a story tells the truth and that his goal is to open up and to know, he 
suggests that the lover’s knowledge of the particular other, gained through an intimacy 
both bodily and intellectual, is itself a unique and uniquely valuable kind of practical 
understanding, and one that we risk losing if we take the first step up the Socratic 
ladder. (The Phaedrus will develop this suggestion, confirming our reading.)23 
 
Nussbaum’s point is that Alcibiades sees that non-rational elements in human life, such 
as personal interactions, emotions, and imagination, serve as “cognitive resources” for 
being virtuous in particular situations. These elements also help a person to know the 
beloved in a different way from propositional knowledge. Despite the vulnerability, 
madness, and “chanceness” that accompany it, loving a particular individual is 
indispensable if one wishes to climb the ladder of love. But there is a dilemma here.24 
In Nussbaum’s words, 
                                                
23. Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 190. 
24. There is a word-play in the Symposium between the verb ejrwtavw and the noun e[rwV. 
Socrates seems to say that he has dual mastery of the art of questioning and the art of love. See C. D. C. 
Reeve, “Telling the Truth About Love:” 92-3. It is possible to say that the Symposium is not an answer, 
but a question about love. See also an interesting analysis by David L. Roochnik on this issue in “The 
Erotics of Philosophical Discourse:” 117-29. Roochnik writes, “To understand ta erotica is thus to 
understand the primacy of the question, that mode of discourse emanating from the knowledge of 
ignorance” (ibid.:128). Another kind of dilemma is pointed out by R. A. Markus: “either perfect 
happiness (which consists in perfect possession of the good and the fulfillment of all desire – cf. 204E) is 
impossible of attainment; or love must cease, since it must, by definition, involve unsatisfied desire, on 
the attainment of perfect happiness. There is no escape between the horns of the dilemma short of re-
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We see two kinds of value, two kinds of knowledge; and we see that we must choose. 
One sort of understanding blocks out the other. The pure light of the eternal form 
eclipses, or is eclipsed by, the flickering lightning of the opened and unstably moving 
body. You think, says Plato, that you can have this love and goodness too, this 
knowledge of and by flesh and good-knowledge too. Well, says Plato, you can’t. You 
have to blind yourself to something, give up some beauty.25 
 
I also see that the passage 206e supports Nussbaum’s claim that the “battle” in the 
Symposium is between Socrates/Diotima and Aristophanes: “‘Now there is a certain 
story,’ she said, ‘according to which lovers are those people who seek their other 
halves. But according to my story, a lover does not seek the half or the whole, unless 
my friend, it turns out to be good as well.’” 
Price disagrees with Nussbaum’s exclusive reading of the Symposium.26 He 
believes that there must be a degree of inclusivism in the Symposium, even though the 
degree is undefined. The extreme exclusivist view is wrong because “Diotima’s theme 
is that Beauty itself is supremely beautiful, and not that the lesser beauties are no 
beauties at all.”27 Price is not categorizing Nussbaum into the extreme exclusivist 
camp. Nussbaum would agree that the lesser beauties are beauties in lesser degrees “in 
amount and in location.”28 The exclusivism in Nussbaum involves the inevitable action 
to exclude the lesser beauties once one reaches the true beauty, since those lesser 
beauties are ephemeral in nature.29 
                                                                                                                                        
defining ‘love’ in a way which loosens its logical connexion with ‘unsatisfied desire’” (Plato: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, vol. II, ed. Gregory Vlastos, 136). 
25. Nussbaum, 198. 
26. Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 43ff. 
27. Ibid., 44. 
28. Nussbaum, 180. 
29. See also Price, “Martha Nussbaum’s Symposium:” 290. Price writes, “I would concede that 
Socrates may ultimately be discarding the love of persons for a love of Forms. That is not my preferred 
understanding (cf. Price 1989, 45-54); yet it seems probable that, if this is what Socrates is saying, it is 
what Plato approves (at the time of writing). But the Symposium offers less support for supposing that 
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Price mentions the roles of the beloved in the process of climbing the ladder of 
love: (1) he perhaps has some instantiation of certain kinds of beauties, which makes 
him attractive to the lover who are interested in those kinds of beauties; (2) he may 
receive new types of beauty from the lover, that the lover’s life is flowing through him. 
It is the second role that can help us question the exclusivist interpretation. Since the 
goal of the ascent is to reach immortality by mental procreation, then it is compatible to 
say that even until the end of the ladder, the lover still loves the beloved in the sense 
that he is procreating in the soul of the beloved, hence actualizing his love for 
immortality. Price insists that 
if the ascent-passage has standardly been read as describing a discarding of persons for 
the sake of Forms, that is, if I am right, the result of two connected mistakes (whose 
effect is only slightly mitigated by an inclusive reading): confusing the loved one’s 
role as an object of contemplation (in which he is soon largely superseded) with his 
role as a recipient of thought, and taking the passage out of context.30 
 
Price concludes that the individuals as the objects of love are retained throughout the 
ascent. When the lover reaches the true Beauty, the contemplation of the Form brings 
intense experience that “at once refreshes and eclipses the experience with which he 
began: gazing upon the Form of Beauty is even more, incomparably more, ravishing 
than looking at the forms of boys.”31 
One potential problem in Price’s suggestion is that if the experience of the true 
Beauty only reminds the lover of the beloved, then actually there is no love of 
                                                                                                                                        
Socrates would have us discard individuals on behalf of a beauty that is uniform and unvariegated, and it 
is that claim that ascribes to him a view that even Plato could hardly have held without reservation.” 
30. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 49. 
31. Ibid., 53. 
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individuals in the end of the ascent.32 Moreover, the final word in the Symposium is not 
Diotima’s but Alcibiades’s, which seems to support the exclusive interpretation, even 
though not the extreme one. Alcibiades’s speech would allow the retaining of 
individuals as objects of love until the lover reaches the Form of Beauty, where he has 
to abandon the temporary for the love of eternity. Price’s suggestion that immortality 
involves the reproduction of ideas in the soul of the beloved is more compelling. But 
still Nussbaum could answer the objection by pointing out that it is the idea of 
immortality itself that is ultimate in the lover’s mind, and not the individual of the 
beloved. In Price’s interpretation, it seems that the beloved is still being used as merely 
a utility for a better end. 
I do not find Price’s account more persuasive than Nussbaum’s. The ascent 
passage in the Symposium support’s Nussbaum’s claim that in the end of the ladder, 
particular individuals are no longer objects of love: “he will see the beauty of 
knowledge and be looking mainly not (mhkevti) at beauty in a single example” (210d). 
Diotima also insists that the true beauty is “always in one form; and all the other 
beautiful things share in that . . . . [O]ne goes always upwards (ajei ejpanievnai) for the 
sake of this Beauty” (211b-c). Of course, going upwards does not always mean 
discarding what is left. However, given the ascent passage about looking no more to 
                                                
32. Cf. David L. Roochnik, “The Erotics of Philosophical Discouse:” 127. He writes, 
“Philosophical discourse is erotic in origin. It is maniacally perverse: it turns away from all that is 
naturally familiar to human being, namely the particularized world of bodies, cities, and sciences. It is 
about everything: its object is universal. This, however, it cannot articulate theoretically. Its object is not 
being as being, but (being as being) as object of desire. This means two things: first, that philosophical 
discourse desires objective knowledge; second, that it can never loosen itself from the discoursing agent 
in order to make visible with certainty an undisturbed object. Its object is seen through a kaleidoscopic 
lens manufactured by an erotic being who desires to overcome finitude.” 
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the particular beauties, the passage about always going upwards for the sake of Beauty 
strengthens the fact that the particular individuals must eventually be forsaken.  
If Nussbaum is correct, it seems then Plato’s Symposium ends with a big 
question on how to reconcile friendship, Love, and madness.33 The reconciliation of 
these three things may be found in Plato’s Phaedrus, especially when Socrates talks 
about the fourth kind of madness. If that is the case, then we can see the speech of 
Alcibiades as a shining gateway to Plato’s Phaedrus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33. Martin Warner insists that the speeches culminate in Socrates’s speech “which attempts to 
integrate all the symposiasts’ claims in a comprehensive account which frees itself from their flaws by 
going beyond them. “Dialectial Drama: The Case of Plato’s Symposium:” 166. One problem with 
Warner’s contention is that it seems to ignore the ongoing tension in Alcibiades’s speech between the 
love of Alcibiades for Socrates and the interest of Socrates for Agathon. Another problem with his 
account is that we see in the speech of Socrates some big revisions of the ideas in the earlier accounts. 
For example, Socrates sees e[rwV not as god but as daemon, and that the true and ultimate object of love 
must be wisdom and not particular individuals. These revisions suggest that there is no attempt of 
integrating the speeches in the Symposium into a comprehensive account. 
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CHAPTER III 
WHOSE MADNESS? WHICH LOVE?: 
!ERWS  AND FILIA  IN PLATO’S PHAEDRUS 
 
 In the end of the Symposium, we are left with a dilemma with respect to the 
objects of love. On the one hand, we can love particular individuals, but then our love 
will be ethereal and sometimes full of negative emotions. On the other hand, we can 
love wisdom, which is something that we can have forever. However, excluding 
particular individuals as objects of love would make love inhuman, since it seems 
natural that we love our fellow human beings in the recognition of our passions to be 
whole. Furthermore, it would not be possible to climb the scala amoris at all. Notice 
that the nature of love in the Symposium is defined with respect to its objects. In a 
sense, the Symposium is an aporetic dialogue, since the problem about the objects of 
love is left unresolved in the hands of Alcibiades. However, one thing is clear in the 
Symposium, viz., that e[rwV is indispensable in a virtuous life. 
 It is time to move on to Plato’s Phaedrus. Agreeing with Nussbaum, I will 
argue that the Phaedrus is an attempt by Plato to solve the dilemma given in the 
Symposium by using dialectic.34 On the one hand, love seems to be an irrational 
                                                
34. I will assume that the Phaedrus was written later than the Symposium. See Leonard 
Brandwood, “Stylometry and Chronology,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut, 
112. Cf. R. G. Tanner, “Plato’s Phaedrus: An Educational Manifesto?” Understanding the Phaedrus, ed. 
Livio Rossetti, 221. Tanner writes, “I believe the present text must be dated shortly after 376 B.C., and 
that its composition or revision was prompted by the death of Gorgias. The death of Lysias may have 
helped to prompt either this dialogue (if. As Thompson conjectures, it was ca. 378 B.C.) or else 
Thesleff’s «first draft».” Tanner also claims that Phaedrus emphasizes the pedagogical element in the 
context of philosophical yet romantic relationship more than the Symposium. 
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madness that is closely related to being overwhelmed by passion instead of by 
intelligence. On the other hand, true love seems to require sobriety. We see a similarity 
here with the problem posed in the Symposium, since the tension in the Phaedrus is 
also between love for particular beauty and love for true beauty. The Phaedrus 
suggests that it is possible to see that love is a perfectly rational madness and serves as 
a reminder of the true beauty.35 
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will explain Lysias’s view of 
love and friendship. Lysias thinks that we should be non-lovers instead of lovers. 
Second, I will describe Socrates’s two opposing speeches on love. Socrates first 
affirms Lysias’s negative view on love, but then refutes it and praises love. Third, I 
will explain the dialectical nature of Socrates’s speeches and his view on rhetoric and 
writing. Using the discourses on love, Socrates claims that rhetoric without truth is 
despicable and writing is useless if it is a mere rhetorical tool. Fourth, I will discuss 
Nussbaum’s arguments that the second speech of Socrates gives a possible solution to 
the dilemma in the Symposium. 
 
1. Lysias: fili va is superior to e [rwV  
Lysias insists that we should be non-lovers instead of lovers. The arguments for 
this claim are manifold. First, a lover would be full of regret once his desire has passed 
                                                
35. F. C. White’s contention that Nussbaum “writes as if love in the Phaedrus were concerned 
solely with humans, a thing altogether of this world” seems to be wrong (“Love and the Individual in 
Plato’s Phaedrus:” 396 [n.2]). Nussbaum writes that “we advance towards understanding by pursuing 
and attending to our complex appetitive/emotional responses to the beautiful; it would not have been 
accessible to intellect alone,” The Fragility of Goodness, 215. Also, “The erotic appetite is now not a 
blind urge for the ‘replenishment’ of intercourse; as we have seen, it is responsive to beauty and serves 
as a guide as to where true beauty will be found,” ibid., 217. 
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away (231a). The cause of the regret is that the lover usually has done a lot of favors, 
maybe excessively, for his beloved. After all the infatuation, he would realize that his 
effort to please the beloved was just empty since his desires have faded away. The 
important thing to note here is that such action is something imposed (ajnavgkh) upon 
the lover’s will, as opposed to something voluntary. A non-lover (a friend), by contrast, 
always does the best by choice. The non-lover is in control of his actions. Second, a 
lover is always worried about the gain he would get from the romantic relationship 
(231b). He has spent a lot of time, energy, and perhaps money for the beloved. He even 
has neglected his own business for the sake of the beloved. But surely there is no 
selflessness in such romantic relationship. The lover wishes to receive something good 
in return, or else he would complain to the beloved. A non-lover is different. He is 
doing something good for another person because he wants to, without any agenda to 
get something in return. This will save him from something bad (kakovV). Third, a lover 
would not be the best friend, since once he finds another more attractive person, he 
would neglect and even ridicule his first beloved if that would make the new beloved 
happy (231c). Fourth, a lover is comparable to a sick person in the sense that he is not 
thinking straight (231d). This point is similar to the first point, viz., that a lover is out 
of control since he is driven not by reason, but by desire. Fifth, a non-lover can build 
decent friendship (filiva) with more people than just with those who are in love with 
him, who are not really good friends (231e). Sixth, a lover would do something good to 
the beloved more because he wants to be admired, perhaps for his success in 
enchanting the beloved (232a). He does not really care about doing what is best, but 
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more about what brings him glory and popularity in the eyes of society. Seventh, other 
people usually suspect that when a lover and his beloved are found together in a 
conversation, the togetherness must be related with satisfying their desire (232b). 
Friendship is free from this accusation, since people always need to converse with each 
other. This point is interesting since even though society would praise the lover for 
getting the beloved, the same society would also ridicule them because of the dynamic 
of the relationship that is limited only to eroticism. Eighth, a lover is full of jealousy 
and possessiveness (232c). He does not want to lose his beloved and isolate the 
beloved from other friends. This would make the beloved unable to develop his 
potentials, including his intelligence. A non-lover, by contrast, would bring all the 
excellence out of the other person’s character. Ninth, a lover loves the beloved before 
knowing his character (233a). A lover is unable to decide whether he wants to be 
friends with the beloved once the desire has gone. Non-lovers are more superior since 
they befriend other people first before doing anything good to them. That is why there 
should be no worry in a friendship that the give and take will ever end. Tenth, a lover 
will not be able to give right judgment toward the beloved because he is afraid of being 
disliked (233b). A lover tends always to praise the beloved and never gives correction. 
Progress in the character of the beloved is not really possible in this kind of interaction.  
Lysias concludes his arguments by emphasizing four points. First, similar to the 
first and the fourth point, love overwhelms the lover and makes him out of control. He 
is not the master of himself. A lover is not able to control his desire, including anger. 
He is impatient toward his beloved and usually does not tolerate small mistakes. This is 
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very different from a friend. A friend wishes that his friend learn from mistakes and 
improve his character. That is why friendship is more long lasting. The second point in 
the conclusion is an answer to a very important question: “Have you ever been thinking 
that there can be no strong friendship in the absence of erotic love?”  (233d). Lysias 
believes that that kind of thinking is questionable. He believes that we could still care 
for our family and friends even though there is no romantic love. Remember that in the 
Symposium, Phaedrus’ speech states that erotic love is more heroic that friendship. 
Lysias is rejecting that notion here. The third and final concluding point made by 
Lysias is about the object of our caring. Care must be directed only toward those who 
deserve it, viz., good and decent friends who will not leave their friends because of 
trivial things. Care must be given to steady friends who will maintain the friendship for 
the rest of their lives. This implies that we probably cannot have such friendship with 
all people and we should not care about all people, since the quality of the relationships 
would not be deep. 
 Socrates, after hearing Lysias’s speech read by Phaedrus, sees the speech as 
creating a sort of Bacchic frenzy for Phaedrus, which is reminiscent of Alcibiades’s 
observation in the Symposium about Socrates’s philosophy. However, Socrates is not 
very impressed with the speech since Lysias seems to be repeating the same points 
several times. His speech is not the clearest among the Greeks. Socrates is then 
challenged and forced by Phaedrus to give a better speech about love, to which we now 
turn. 
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2. The First Speech of Socrates: A Confirmation of Lysias’s View 
 The discussion is about whether a boy should make friends with his lovers 
rather than those who do not love him. Socrates will speak with his head covered 
because he is not sure whether he can give good arguments in his speech (237a). To 
understand the issue better, it is important to talk about the nature of love and its 
effects. Socrates begins with the claim that love is some kind of desire. However, 
Socrates reminds us that those who are not in love still have a desire toward what is 
beautiful. Human beings are torn between two principles, the desire for pleasure and 
the pursuit of what is best based on judgment (237e). Sometimes the desire for pleasure 
is in control over reason, which brings outrageousness (u{briV). The outrageousness 
takes many forms. One form is gluttony, which is the desire for food. The other form is 
called e[rwV, which is the desire for human bodies. Socrates’s etymology of the word is 
interesting, since Socrates mentions that it is from force (rJwvmh) (238c). But when 
reason is the master, human beings are in the state of being in the right mind 
(swfrosuvnh). 
A lover, who is a slave to desire for pleasure, will try to keep the beloved for 
himself by being superior to the beloved in such a way that the beloved must depend 
on him. A lover is not trying to develop all the potentials of the beloved and could be 
manipulative in order not to lose the beloved. A lover will even inhibit the mental and 
physical development of the beloved if it is necessary. He will be jealous of other 
people who are trying to do good to the beloved. Moreover, a lover will want the 
beloved to be deprived of any possessions so that the beloved will want to accompany 
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him. In that way, the beloved is by necessity forced to give pleasure to the lover. 
Notice that the idea of necessity appears several times already. The first was when 
Socrates was forced by necessity to give the speech. The second was the talk about 
e[rwV as something controlling. The third was when Socrates was talking about being 
taken by “the Nymphs’ madness” (238d). Now, Socrates is talking about the necessity 
of the beloved to give pleasure to the lover. Socrates’s point is that the lover is harmful 
to the beloved, not to mention that after the desire has gone, the lover would try to flee 
away from his promises to the beloved. The friendship of a lover is not based on any 
goodwill at all, but it is very manipulative: “Do wolves love lambs? That’s how lovers 
befriend a boy!” (241d). 
 
3. The Second Speech of Socrates: A Denial of Lysias’s View36 
Socrates feels obligated, though, to be more charitable to the notion of romantic 
love since e[[rwV is the son of Aphrodite. He now will try to offer praise for the god of 
Love with his head uncovered. Socrates sees that madness (maniva), which is a 
characteristic of romantic love, can bring the best things in life if it is divine (244a).  
Socrates observes that there are several kinds of madness. The first is prophetic 
madness. This madness makes the prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses of Dodona 
out of their minds when they are on duty. However, because the madness is a gift of the 
                                                
36. Tomás Calvo points out that Socrates’s first speech is not entirely the same in content with 
Lysias’s speech. Socrates in fact states that he will not argue for to; tw/: mh; ejrw:nti carivzesqai. Calvo 
insists that Socrates’s first speech adds dual truth to Lysias’s, viz., the truth that love is an egoistic desire 
and that rhetoric is dominated by this kind of desire. “Socrates’ First Speech in the Phaedrus and Plato’s 
Criticism of Rhetoric,” Understanding the Phaedrus, 47-60. 
 43 
gods, they are still better off in predicting the future than those people who are clear-
headed but use human science to understand the future. Madness as a tool for the 
inspiration of prophecy is attributed to Apollo. Second, there is mystical madness that 
is attributed to Dionysus. This kind of madness possesses people and brings safety to 
them from present and future troubles. Third, there is madness attributed by the Muses 
that instills the sense of poetry to the poets. It is better for the poets to be possessed by 
the Muses than not, since they will be able to produce better poems.  
These three kinds of madness have the same characteristic, viz., those who are 
possessed by them are out of control. However, being out of control is not necessarily 
bad if it is caused by the gods. Socrates relates the discussion of madness to the idea of 
friendship. It is true that when one is in love romantically, he is out of control. But that 
is not necessarily a bad thing if the cause of the madness is something divine. 
Socrates’s task is then to prove that love is sent by the gods for the benefit of the lovers 
and the beloved. 
To undertake the task, Socrates first discusses the nature of the soul, whether it 
is divine or human. This is actually a reassertion of the earlier conundrum stated by 
Socrates: “Am I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon, or am I a tamer, 
simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature?” (230a). Socrates asserts that 
the soul is immortal since the soul moves and whatever moves is eternal. There must 
be an eternal, imperishable self-mover that functions as the source of motion. The 
immortal souls in the Phaedrus are the self-movers and they do not need external 
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source for motion.37 The idea of an Aristotelian Unmoved Mover does not appear here, 
since it seems to be redundant for the self-movers to have the Unmoved Mover as 
another source of motion. 
Regarding the structure of the soul, it is like a union of a pair of winged horses 
and their charioteer. The souls of the gods consist of good horses and sober drivers, 
whereas the souls of human beings have one good horse, which loves modesty and 
self-control, and one bad horse, which loves indecency. The drivers will have a 
difficulty in controlling the chariot since the two horses are going in different 
directions. Socrates gives a mythical explanation of how the wings of the horses of 
human beings fell away: it is because the chariot cannot afford going to the upper level 
of heaven where the gods were having a festivity. The upper level of heaven is a place 
where the plain truth lies as is. The souls of man were in rivalry, trying to reach to the 
top of the region of heaven, but they were too heavy since one of the horses is driving 
them to the opposite direction. The souls of human beings had to land on earth and take 
human bodies to become living beings. Those who have seen some of the truth in 
heaven, which are the Forms, would become philosophers and lovers of beauty 
(filosovfou h] filokavlou) by way of recollection (248d). The horses of the souls will 
become winged again only through philosophical remembering. The philosophers will 
be like mad people since they are focusing their life on the divine. This is what 
                                                
37. Aristotle will develop his metaphysics of motion later and his theory of the soul in a more 
sophisticated manner. In chapter V we will discuss the relationship between e[rwV and motion, and we 
will compare Aristotle’s Metaphysics L with Plato’s Phaedrus on this issue. 
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Socrates called the fourth kind of madness, viz., the madness of the philosophers in 
seeing the truth and loving the beautiful.38  
We arrive here at the crucial part of the explanation about e[rwV. Here love is 
seen not as something irrational or out of control, but totally virtuous.39 Love is 
aroused by wisdom itself. The objects of love are not particular individuals but the 
beautiful itself. This is different from Lysias’s account of Socrates’s first speech, that 
love is always being out of control, irrational, and vile, and is directed to particular 
individuals. Lysias seemed to say that filiva is directed to the good and e[rwV is not 
concerned about what is good at all. However, Socrates here tries to show that e[rwV 
must ultimately be directed to the beautiful. 
The interesting thing is that Socrates is not saying that the objects of love 
cannot be particular individuals at all. He believes that particular individuals can be 
objects of love as long as their souls are philosophical and lordly in nature (filovsofovV 
te kai hJgemoniko;V th;n fuvsin) (252e).40 The beloved then will be seen as the cause 
                                                
38. As M. Dyson points out, it is not only the followers of Zeus can be true philosophical 
lovers. The followers of other gods can attain that highest goal as well (252c-253c) as long as they aim 
to recollect the knowledge of the Forms. By the same token, followers of Zeus could fail to live a 
philosophical life and fall into the love of honor. “Zeus and Philosophy in the Myth of Plato’s 
Phaedrus:” 309. The Phaedrus utilizes the talk about gods to express various characters that can grasp 
the true beauty: “Ares’ followers will be quick to feel dishonour, Zeus’ will be capable of wise 
leadership, Hera’s will be kingly” (ibid.: 311). 
39. A. W. Price believes that “even the best madness falls within the genus of the irrational 
(265e3-4)” (“Reason’s New Role in the Phaedrus,” Understanding the Phaedrus, 243-4). Price shows 
that “the eyes” are the ones responsible for seeing the Beautiful. But The Beautiful as a Platonic Form is 
also captured by reason. Price concludes that “Reason’s new role is an aspect of the marriage of love and 
philosophy” (ibid., 245). I agree with Price that the best madness is a part of non-rational elements in 
human life. However, the best madness is totally virtuous in the sense that it has a cognitive role in a 
virtuous life. 
40. I agree with Paul W. Gooch’s critique of Nussbaum. Nussbaum might be too strong in 
saying that in the Phaedrus, Socrates sees Phaedrus as the beloved, “the particular individual” (“Has 
Plato Changed Socrates’ Heart in the Phaedrus?” Understanding the Phaedrus, 309-12). This is not to 
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for the lovers to reach the beautiful, since the latter desire to find the character of the 
gods in the character of the beloved and to develop such character (253c): 
This, then, any true lover’s heart’s desire: if he follows that desire in the manner I 
described, this friend who has been driven mad by love (e[rwta manevntoV fivlou) will 
secure a consummation (telethv) for the one he has befriended (tw:/ filhqevnti) that is as 
beautiful and blissful as I said – if, of course, he captures him. 
 
In fact, only those who love particular individuals for the sake of the love of the 
beautiful are called lovers (249e). The beloved, on the other hand, unconsciously sees 
himself in the self of the lover just as if he were seeing himself in a mirror. He is 
nonplussed about why he is yearning for the presence of the lover all the time. He 
thinks that what he has is friendship (filiva) and not romantic love, and he longs to 
touch, kiss, and lie down with the lover as his best friend. 
 The relationship between the lover and the beloved can be manifested in two 
ways. First, it can be totally virtuous and modest in the sense that the interaction is 
controlled not by the bad horses, but by the good horses. The lover and the beloved 
become a philosophical pair. There should not be sexual intercourse between them. The 
interaction between them would be modest and not manipulative: the lover will not 
abuse the willingness of the beloved to give anything he wants. Upon their death, their 
wings will grow out and they will finally be able to see the Forms. Second, the 
relationship can be consumed by passion and not totally virtuous. There will be 
moments in their relationship where their minds are not totally in control, e.g., when 
                                                                                                                                        
say that Socrates is not attracted at all to Phaedrus’ beauty. In fact, as Victorino Tejera points out, 
Socrates “is blocked, overcome (eklagēnai) by the eroticism of the situation” (“The Phaedrus, Part I: A 
Poetic Drama,” Understanding the Phaedrus, 291). It seems to me, though, that the philosophical lovers 
in the Phaedrus must have deeper relationships than just mere attraction or sexual intercourse. The ironic 
part is that Socrates praises the philosophical lovers who love each other without sexual passions. 
Socrates’s lust toward Phaedrus is then suppressed and hence Socrates preserves his integrity.  
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they are drunk. In this case, the lover and the beloved will also be able to reach the 
higher level of heaven, but not as quickly as those who are completely virtuous and 
modest. The interesting thing is that there is a situation where the lover and the beloved 
are no longer in love, but only in the state of mutual friendship. Friendship is 
characterized by keeping the vows the friends have exchanged and seems to be free of 
the madness of love. But this kind of mutual friendship is weaker than the 
philosophical pair, which has friendship and is always driven by the divine madness of 
love.41 The non-lovers will not be able to reach the beautiful since they are restraining 
themselves from experiencing the beautiful by refusing to be in love. 
 Notice that Socrates’s argument perhaps can be applied only to the souls who 
have previously seen the Forms before they were entrapped in the bodies. For those 
who have not perceived reality as it is, there is no hope of remembering the beautiful, 
since there is nothing to remember. For the latter, it seems that being in love or not 
does not really matter since they are not able to grow the wings of their horses.  
 
4. The Dialectic of Love 
 I agree with Nussbaum that the interpretation of e[rwV in the Phaedrus is a 
possible solution to the dilemma in the Symposium (and in the Republic). The dilemma 
in the Symposium arises because there is a choice within the non-rational aspects of 
human life: “the boy must choose, simply, between good sense and madness, between 
                                                
41. Even though one may argue that friendship is also something divine, since it is of Zeus 
(Dio;V filivou) (234e). 
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good control by intellect and a disorderly lack of control.”42 Nussbaum believes that 
the second speech suggests that there is no exclusive disjunction between maniva and 
swfrosuvnh in a virtuous life, since the former can cause greater good in some aspects 
of life (244a) while by the same token, the latter sometimes can bring “narrowness in 
vision.”43 According to Nussbaum, the second speech gives three new positive points 
about non-rational elements in human life, including maniva.44 First, the non-intellectual 
elements are required to motivate our intellect to go in a certain direction. The 
exclusion of appetites and emotion will result in the weakening of the personality. 
Nussbaum reminds us that even divine beings have horses, one of which represents the 
non-rational elements, that have to be nurtured. Nussbaum states that “the starved 
philosopher [who is deprived of emotions] may, in his effort to become an undisturbed 
intellect, block his own search for the good.”45 Second, the non-intellectual elements 
have a cognitive task to give information on where goodness and beauty are. For Plato, 
certain high insights come through the guidance of passions. If in the middle dialogues 
the movement of the soul inevitably must leave the body, in the Phaedrus it is 
impossible to separate the sensual aspects of human life from intellectual enterprises. 
Furthermore, the interaction between the philosophical lovers in the Phaedrus will 
bring self-understanding through understanding the lover of the beloved. In 
Nussbaum’s words, “Once ‘looking to the lover’ was opposed to looking to philosophy 
(239a-b). Now the lover’s soul is a central source of insight and understanding, both 
                                                
42. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 205. 
43. Ibid., 213. 
44. Ibid., 214-22. 
45. Ibid., 214. 
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general and concrete.”46 Third, the non-rational elements have intrinsic values of 
goodness and beauty, and not just an instrumental value, since the Phaedrus mentions 
that e[rwV is a god that is completely good, and not just a mediator between the Good 
and human beings (242e). The philosophical lovers nurture one another in goodness 
and beauty. Love itself, then, is something beautiful and must be desired. That means 
the virtuous life must incorporate e[rwV,  which would require the lovers to have a 
second order desire, viz., a desire for Love. One important point made by Nussbaum is 
that the best lovers in the Phaedrus reject having sexual intercourse not because the 
Phaedrus rejects non-rational elements as something that have to be avoided, but 
because sexual intercourse would inhibit the cultivation of better feelings such as the 
feelings of tenderness, respect, and awe. 
  Another important thing to discuss here is Nussbaum’s claim that Socrates’s 
second speech is the final word in the Phaedrus with respect to the notion of e[rwV, viz., 
it is the apologia for both e[rwV and poetic writing. Nussbaum’s arguments may be 
reconstructed as follows. First, after the first speech Socrates says that he must purify 
himself (243a). This is the point where Socrates applies the sentence “there’s no truth 
to that story” from the palinode of Stesichorus to his first speech. Second, Socrates 
says that his first speech is the speech by Phaedrus, Pythocles’ son, from Myrrhinus, 
while the second speech is of Stesichorus. Nussbaum interprets this, saying “by this he 
means, we suppose, that it expresses Phaedrus’ current view, what he would say right 
                                                
46. Ibid., 218. 
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now if asked to give himself advice.”47 Nussbaum makes an important argument that 
both Lysias’s speech and Socrates’s first speech might represent Plato’s view in the 
middle dialogues that there is an exclusive either/or between reason and madness, 
which is then recanted. Third, in the second speech Socrates uncovers his head. 
According to Nussbaum, the purpose of the head covering in the first place is that 
Socrates attacked erotic passion, which is something shameful.48 I agree with this, but 
would add that the head covering is also intended to show that Socrates sees the 
content of his first speech as not his own. This is apparent from his remarks in 237a 
that he feels that he might not be able to give good arguments for his speech. The 
uncovering then suggests that in the second speech Socrates is confident about what he 
is saying. 
Notice that Socrates continues the discussion about Love by questioning the 
usefulness of rhetoric as speech and writing with respect to attaining truth. The aim of 
the discussion is to further undermine Lysias’s conclusion that we should be non-lovers 
instead of lovers. Socrates first points out that Lysias’s speech is a kind of rhetoric and 
it is not very useful because it is not aiming at conveying the truth, but is mere 
persuasion for Lysias’s advantage. In fact, a rhetorician would not care about what is 
good and just as long as they can convince other people, which is the case in the courts 
of law where people are trying to win the case without regard to presenting the truth. 
Socrates believes that this ignorance of what is really good deserves reproach (277d). 
A rhetorician would try to understand the nature of the souls of his hearers, but it is 
                                                
47. Ibid., 207. 
48. Ibid., 201-2. 
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because he wants to be effective in his speech, viz., that they can adjust the content and 
the style of the speech in order to win consent from the hearers.  
Socrates wants to show that Lysias writes “artlessly” (a[tecnon) (263a). He 
shows that Lysias’s speech is not organized well, but put together as if it is an epigram. 
The first and last parts of the speech are the same, but the middle part is just something 
random. Lysias does not explain the word “love” in its fullest sense either. The 
problem is that the word can mean something bad, but it can also mean something 
divine. The ambiguity of words gives way to deception. That is why rhetoricians are 
fond of discussing words with more than one meaning. Socrates’s point is that Lysias’s 
interpretation of love is not the only one available for living virtuously and that perhaps 
Lysias does not fully understand about love. However, “as the Spartan said, there is no 
genuine art of speaking without a grasp of truth, and there never will be” (261a). 
Lysias’s speech is not an art because he might be deceiving himself as a result of his 
ignorance of the subject of his speech.49  
Socrates suggests that, instead of doing rhetoric without truth, we philosophize 
by doing dialectic (278d). Socrates calls himself a lover of discourse (filolovgw/) 
(236e) and a lover of learning (filomaqh;V) (230d). That is why Socrates does not 
immediately reject Lysias’s view, but instead agrees with it first and then shows that 
there is an alternative interpretation for the idea of love. That way, Socrates is showing 
the practice of dialectic himself while talking about dialectic. The method he proposes 
to use in the Phaedrus is one of division: “First, you must know the truth concerning 
                                                
49. Suddenly here we are reminded of Plato’s cave and the whole idea of finding the clear and 
distinct truth instead of staying in the deception of the blurry shadow. 
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everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing 
in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you 
reach something indivisible” (277c). Words are floating in the air and bursting into a 
pluriformity of semantical discourses. It is imperative that we speak lucidly of the 
meaning of terms. Socrates proceeds, concerning philosophy: “Second, you must 
understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind 
of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech 
accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple 
speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to 
the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in 
order to persuade” (277c). The method of division does not preclude art and poetry, as 
long as they help us convey philosophical truths. 
There is also a dialectic with respect to the role of filiva in the Phaedrus. In 
237c, Socrates proposes that the discussion must begin with clarifying the definition, 
nature, and power of love. Up until now, we can conclude that in the Phaedrus 
Socrates does give an exact definition of love by rejecting the speech of his own first 
speech, which is in line with Lysias’s that claims that filiva is superior to e[rwV because 
the former is more rational than the latter. But here filiva is primarily directed toward 
particular individuals. But in the second interpretation, filiva is directed both to 
particular individuals (256e) for the sake of attaining true beauty and wisdom (256a).50 
                                                
50. An interesting appearance of filiva is in 279c. There Socrates uses the word as referring to 
the harmony of external possessions and internal richness. Another instance where is used for harmony 
between people is in 237c. 
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Moreover, in the second interpretation, life should be directed simply at loving through 
philosophical discourses (aJplw:V pro;V  [Erwta meta; filosovfwn lovgwn to;n bivon 
poih:tai) (257b). 
We see here that “the battle” in the Symposium is supposed to be settled 
because one can simultaneously love the particular individuals and the ultimate beauty 
and knowledge. This positive view on non-rational elements of human life, including 
on e[rwV, allows lovers to love each other and climb the ladder of love. Nussbaum 
thinks that the lovers love each other not as “exemplars of beauty and goodness” but 
“one another’s character, memories, and aspirations – which are, as Aristotle too will 
say, what each person is ‘in and of himself’.”51 Given Plato’s metaphysics that the 
lovers are exemplars of beauty and goodness, what we can say at most is that the 
lovers love one another’s character without realizing that they are exemplars of beauty 
and goodness. But if they realize that the true beauty is not in themselves, then surely 
they must love one another because of that true beauty, even though their love for each 
other is itself worthy and not only instrumental.52 
My suggestion to approach the problem in the Symposium is to differentiate 
between proximate and ultimate objects of love, both of which are worthy. The lovers’ 
love for one another is the manifestation of the same love for proximate objects, 
whereas the lovers’ love for true beauty is their love for the ultimate object of love. I 
                                                
51. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 220. 
52. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 98, writes “It is a mistake to try to solve 
the problem for love at first sight; once love has got going, the beloved will be singled out by a unique 
role within a historical relationship. . . . To infer that what I really love is not a person, but a complex of 
repeatable qualities and irrepeatable relations, seems a category-mistake: we must not confuse the object 
of an emotion with its grounds (whether these are its reasons, citable by the subject, or its causes, 
perhaps hidden from him).” 
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claim that it is the same love because the Phaedrus only speaks about the same maniva, 
which is directed towards both particular individuals and true beauty. There is no 
hierarchy of worthiness between love for proximate objects and ultimate objects: it is 
the same kind of love, and both objects are necessary to be loved in a virtuous life. It is 
true the view of e[rwV in the Phaedrus eliminates the exclusive either/or character of 
the objects of love as indicated in the Symposium. But still the problem remains about 
whether we can love someone genuinely in and of herself with such Platonic 
metaphysics. 
F. C. White believes that we can.53 If the meaning of “loving someone for his 
sake” is “loving that person as something that constitutes our final goals”, then he 
believes that we can love a person for his sake qua an image of the true beauty. White 
gives an analogical argument for his claim: 
If we love Helen for her own sake, in virtue of her physical beauty, we have similarly 
good grounds for loving a portrait of Helen for its own sake1,54 provided that the 
portrait adequately captures her beauty. In such cases we can love the image because it 
is an image, and at the same time love it for its own sake1. We can love the portrait of 
Helen because it is an image of her, recalling her to mind when she is absent and so on, 
and also love it for its own sake1 – for the beauty of form which it itself possesses.55 
 
The problem with this analogy is that we can love the statue of Helen and stop there 
without loving Helen. This is not the case with Platonic metaphysics. One should not 
                                                
53. F. C. White, “Love and the Individual in Plato’s Phaedrus:” 396-406. 
54. By “for its own sake1” White means that Helen is pursued as the final end, but for our 
interest. This is differentiated from “for its own sake2” that emphasizes Helen’s sake, not ours. White 
writes, “The Forms of Beauty, Wisdom, Temperance and the like are not lovable for their own sakes2, 
since they do not have interests. But a person who resembles those Forms and thereby has the qualities 
of beauty, wisdom and temperance is lovable for his own sake2. For in addition to having these and 
similar qualities he is a person, and being a person he has interests” (ibid.: 401). White does not suggest 
that Plato has an idea that there are interests of persons qua persons. White’s intention here is to show 
that in the Phaedrus there is a notion of loving the beloved for his own sake. This excludes the 
simplicistic interpretation of the lovers’ love as being entirely egoistical.  
55. Ibid.: 399. 
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just love the image of the true beauty and stop there for the sake of the image. Loving 
the image of beauty is not the ultimate goal in Platonic metaphysics; loving the true 
beauty is. It seems to me that Platonic metaphysics does not allow a person to love 
particular individuals for their sake since they are supposed to be stimuli for true 
beauty. I can grant White’s point that we can love particular individuals for their sake 
qua images of the true beauty. But the Platonic metaphysics demands a justification for 
the love for particular individuals. The justification is that a person must love true 
beauty through loving particular individuals. I do not see it as possible that the lovers 
in the Phaedrus can genuinely love other people for their sake. White himself suggests 
that when the lovers love one another, they do not love the individuality of the other 
person, but the qualities instantiated in that person. This seems to be problematic 
because it is more difficult now to say that we love other people for their sake, since 
what we are looking for is not them, but the qualities in them. This is also Vlastos’s 
conclusion concerning Platonic love: 
When he [Plato] speaks of  e[rwV for a person for the sake of the Idea, we can give a 
good sense to this at first sight puzzling notion, a sense in which it is true. It is a fact 
that much erotic attachment, perhaps most of it it, is not directed to an individual in the 
proper sense of the word – to the integral and irreplaceable existent that bears that 
person’s name – but to a complex of qualities, answering to the lover’s sense of 
beauty, which he locates for a time truly or falsely in that person.56 
 
The crux of Platonic love for other persons, according to Vlastos, is this: “What we are 
to love in persons is the ‘image’ of the Idea in them. We are to love the persons so far, 
and only insofar, as they are good and beautiful. . . .[T]he individual, in the uniqueness 
                                                
56. Platonic Studies, 28. 
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and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object of our love.”57 
Vlastos’s interpretation of Plato does not say that there are no individuals. There might 
be the individuals of images, which might be not real individuals. However, the 
argument here boils down to the fact that it is the qualities in the images of Beauty that 
are supposed to be loved: “So too in the theory of love the respective roles of Form and 
temporal individual are sustained: the individual cannot be as lovable as the Idea; the 
Idea, and it alone, is to be loved for its own sake; the individual only so far as in him 
and by him ideal perfection is copied fugitively in the flux.”58 
Having said all these, it is also worth mentioning there is a deeper problem with 
respect to Lysias’s attempt to talk about love, because he conveys his speech in the 
form of writing. First, writing discourses makes people lazy since they do not want to 
memorize the discourses (275a). This is a hindrance to the internalization of the 
knowledge in the souls of human beings. But the biggest problem with writing is that 
writings are similar to paintings with respect to their silence. Once discourses are 
written down, they are open to hermeneutical enterprises and are ignorant of praises 
and calumnies from people who read them. But this is not the case with the discourses 
written in the souls of human beings. These ones are living discourses of people who 
have knowledge. Written discourses are just the image (ei[dwlon) of these kinds of 
discourses. The people who know truth would not write the knowledge in ink since 
                                                
57. Ibid., 31. 
58. Ibid., 34. Later I will try to briefly suggest that Aristotle’s solution is more thorough 
because of his revision of Platonic metaphysics. Since Aristotle does not admit that there is the Platonic 
world of Forms, then the lovers (or, more exactly, the friends) can love one another in and of themselves. 
The idea of beauty and goodness is just an abstraction of the beauty and goodness in particular 
individuals. 
 57 
they knew that written discourses could not teach truth adequately. They would write 
the discourses for themselves as a reminder of what they know. It is naïve to think that 
“words that have been written down can do more than remind those who already know 
what the writing is about” (275d). They should use the art of dialectic in the form of 
speech to plant the seed of discourses in the soul of the hearers (277c). That way, the 
discourses can be internalized and flourish in the character of those people and bring 
knowledge and happiness. Socrates is not rejecting the form of writing altogether. His 
point is that writings must always be accompanied by a live explanation by the author, 
and the explanation must be in the form of dialectic. It is useless to play only with 
written words without being able to defend them when other people are asking for 
clarifications. A person who can defend his writings and are willing to engage in 
dialectical conversations can decently be called a philosopher since he or she loves 
wisdom and wants to know the truth. Isocrates is an instance of a philosopher since a 
more divine impulse (oJrmh; qeiotevra) has led him into the love of wisdom, as opposed 
to Lysias who is only a rhetorician who does not care about truth.59 
                                                
59. There is an ongoing debate of whether Isocrates in the Phaedrus is “the malignant rhetoric 
or the reformed rhetoric”. See Maureen Daly Goggin and Elenore Long, “A Tincture of Philosophy, A 
Tincture of Hope: The Portrayal of Isocrates in Plato’s Phaedrus:” 301-24. R. L. Howland holds the 
former position: “There are thus two general criticisms of Isocrates. First, that he does not teach rhetoric 
properly because he does not make ejpisthvmh the essential basis of it (in fact he does not teach dialectic), 
and second, that rhetoric, the art of writing discourses, is of no serious value, because at best it is a 
paidiva and not a spoudhv” (“The Attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus:” 158). Goggin and Long argue 
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intersection permits a view of Isocrates and Isocratean rhetoric as the tincture of hope for a reformed 
philosophical rhetoric” (ibid.: 302). However, “while Isocrates wanteded to reform rhetoric for the very 
practical goal of the political and social revitalization of the Hellenic states, Plato wanted to reform 
rhetoric for spiritual and individual ends” (ibid.: 308). I will not pursue this issue more in depth. My 
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 In this chapter we can conclude three things. First, as in the Symposium, e[rwV is 
something necessary to a virtuous life. Second, the Phaedrus gives a possible solution 
to the dilemma posed by Plato in the Symposium by way of showing that the non-
rational elements in human beings are not necessarily bad. @ErwV is a virtuous maniva 
and should be directed to particular individuals en route to the Beautiful. Along with 
the synthesis of philosophy and poetic writings, there is also a synthesis concerning the 
idea of e[rwV. However, the solution in the Phaedrus still leaves a problem, viz., how 
can the lovers genuinely love each other in a Platonic metaphysical scheme of ideas 
and their instantiation? The revision of this problem might be found in Aristotle’s idea 
of love. Third, the relationship between e[rwV and filiva in the Phaedrus is that the 
latter without the former is weak. It is possible to have a life with filiva but without 
e[rwV, which is a life that is not totally virtuous. However, it seems that it is not possible 
to have e[rwV without filiva in a virtuous life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
generous interpretation of Isocrates is based on my own reading of the Phaedrus. It seems to me that 
Socrates praises Isocrates genuinely instead of ridiculing him. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
VIEWS OF ARISTOTLE’S IDEA OF !ERWS AND FILIA 
 
 Up to this point, I have tried to show two main points in the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus. First, Plato’s Symposium poses a dilemma with respect to the objects of 
love. The dilemma compels us to choose between loving particular individuals and 
loving the Form of Beauty. I see the Phaedrus as one possible solution to the dilemma. 
The Phaedrus redefines e[rwV to be entirely virtuous and capable of loving particular 
individuals en route to the Beautiful. However, even though the Phaedus enables us to 
love both particular individuals and the Form of Beauty without discarding either one 
of them, the problem still remains about whether the love for particular individuals is 
genuinely for the sake of them. Second, throughout the Symposium and the Phaedrus, 
both e[rwV and filiva are indispensable for a virtuous life.  
 Now, I will begin discussing Aristotle’s view of e[rwV and filiva with the 
intention to compare it later with that of Plato’s. My discussion will revolve around the 
two issues above, viz., about whether one can genuinely love particular individuals for 
the sake of themselves and whether e[rwV and filiva are indispensable for a virtuous 
life. Before I give my own interpretation of these issues, I will start with the views of 
three contemporary Aristotle scholars: Martha Nussbaum, Juha Sihvola, and Gabriel 
Lear. 
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1. Martha Nussbaum 
In The Fragility of Goodness, Nussbaum discusses Aristotle’s concept of e[rwV 
and filiva.60 Personal love and friendship are human activities that necessarily need 
external goods. This kind of activity is in contrast with contemplation, which is a self-
sufficient activity. Love and friendship require another loving person. They are 
relations and not virtuous states.61 The state of excellence is present not primarily in 
the relations but in the characters of those who are involved. When the relations 
become non-existent, the excellence will remain in the characters. Nussbaum believes 
that the core of this excellence, which resides in the personality, is not invulnerable, but 
relatively more stable even though there is no relation. Love and friendship as relations 
are more vulnerable because they involve two parties that are two different elements in 
the world. They require mutual generosity, justice, and kindliness from each party. But 
Nussbaum also points out another cause of the vulnerability of such relations, viz., 
luck. Perhaps what she means is that the relations would neither be present in the first 
place nor last long if there were no luck. Luck here seems to be connected to meeting 
the person that we are able to be friends with or be in love with. Nussbaum believes 
that even so, Aristotle rejects the view that life must be contemplative and solitary. To 
Aristotle, vulnerable relations such as personal and political friendship are necessary 
means to achieve the best human life and happiness. 
                                                
60. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 343-372. 
61. But we might ask Nussbaum why love and friendship are just relations and not virtuous 
states. It seems to me that friendship, at least, is a virtuous state that incorporates certain virtuous 
characteristics between the parties involved. 
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Nussbaum does not want to translate filiva into “friendship,” since the word 
embraces various relationships that cannot be classified as friendship, such as the love 
between a mother and a child. Moreover, the word sometimes implies a stronger 
intimacy that involves sexual passions. Nussbaum uses “love” instead of “friendship” 
with a reminder that “the emphasis of philia is less on intensely passionate longing 
than on disinterested benefit, sharing, and mutuality; less on madness than on a rare 
kind of balance and harmony.”62 Nussbaum also makes a point that there is no 
passive/active distinction between friends who love one another. The relation can be 
symmetrical, even though it need not be that way. 
What we need to notice in Nussbaum’s account is about her claim that in 
friendship “each partner loves the other for what the other most deeply is in him or 
herself (kath’ hauto), for those dispositions and those patterns of thought and feeling 
that are so intrinsic to his being himself that a change in them would raise questions of 
identity and persistence.”63 The love here is primarily based on character and not just 
on pleasure and utility. At this point Nussbaum contrasts the Aristotelian account of 
love with the one in Plato’s Symposium. In the Symposium, Plato’s account of love, 
both personal and philosophical, involves the desire to possess and control and, 
accordingly, jealousy and fear of loss. Speculatively, Nussbaum sees that Aristotle 
reminds us that the separate elements in the world should love each other by letting one 
another move separately. Love is not the only motion in the world, but there are 
motions of the elements that are in love. By letting the elements move themselves, love 
                                                
62. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 354. 
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serves as a context to bring the richness of life since the elements can grow without 
being suffocated by each other’s presence and imposition. Filinais  
a relationship that expresses, in the structure of its desires, a love for the world of 
change and motion, for orexis itself, and therefore for the needy and non-self-sufficient 
elements of our condition. . . . Philia, loving the whole of another person for that 
person’s own sake, loves humanity and mutability as well as excellence. Platonic erōs 
seeks wholeness; philia embraces the half.64  
 
With respect to the idea of motion in the Symposium, Nussbaum writes on the net of 
Hephaestus: “Wrapped in each other’s arms, there they lie, for the rest of their lives 
and on into death, welded into one, immobile.”65 I think Nussbaum is interpreting that 
passage poetically, since there is no discussion of motion at all in the Symposium. But 
this discussion of motion and friendship will be particularly interesting when we later 
discuss e[rwV and motion in relation to the Unmoved Mover. If Nussbaum’s 
interpretation of the net Hephaestus is something significant, we can compare that to 
the idea of motion in Aristotle’s Metaphysics L and EN, which suggests that human 
beings must always be in perpetual motion in the context of friendship. 
According to Nussbaum, there are three differences between Aristotle’s idea of 
love and Diotima’s. First, Aristotle’s love seeks particularly human virtues, such as 
justice and generosity, and not something divine. Second, a person loves another 
person’s character because the character comprises the individual, and not because they 
are parts of universal qualities. Love is an effort to know the other party through and 
through. Aristotle’s love believes in the effability and describability of the lovers. 
Third, a person sees the features of his relationship with the other person as something 
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unrepeatable, such as shared activities and mutual pleasure. Nussbaum writes, 
“Aristotle stresses these shared elements, then, not in order to bypass the individuality 
in love, but in order to give a richer account of what that individuality comes to.”66 In 
love, people learn from one another to be better. Notice here that Nussbaum is 
incorporating Aristotle’s metaphysical account of individuals in her explanation of 
Aristotle’s idea of love: 
This reflective look at models of goodness enhances our understanding of our own 
character and aspirations, improving self-criticism and sharpening judgment. . . . [W]e 
must remind ourselves again of what Aristotelian ethical knowledge is and what sort of 
experience it requires. This knowledge, we have said, consists, above all, in the 
intuitive perception of complex particulars. Universals are never more than guides to 
and summaries of these concrete perceptions.67 
 
The emphasis of knowing individualities is reminiscent of “the knowledge of persons 
exemplified in the speech of Alcibiades and praised in the Phaedrus.”68 
 I would like to comment on the second point of Nussbaum’s contention that a 
person loves another person’s character because the character comprises the individual, 
and not because they are parts of universal qualities. I do not think this is perfectly 
accurate. Aristotle says in EN book I that we should befriend people for the sake of the 
ultimate good, viz., happiness. Moreover, Aristotle stresses the fact that Teleiva d= 
ejsti;n hJ tw:n ajgaqw:n filiva kai; kat= ajreth;n oJmoivwn (1156b7-8). Friends love one 
another because of their individuality but in so far as they are good and virtuous. I will 
briefly discuss this issue later after interpreting EN VIII-IX. 
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Nussbaum does not explicitly talk about the relationship between e[rwV and 
filiva. She is aware that Aristotle does not write a lot about e[rwV. Her guess is that 
Aristotle’s rather sexist view of women keeps him from seeing the highest kind of 
filiva happening between opposite sexes. But because Aristotle is heterosexual, he 
does not see the necessity of having sexual components in filiva between males. 
Nussbaum writes, 
This avoidance [of e[rwV] is extremely odd, given the prominence of homosexuality in 
his culture and in the philosophical tradition of writing about human goodness. And 
this is not only an injustice to his own method. It is a failure in philia as well. For 
Aristotle’s manifest love for Plato and his years of shared activity with him should 
have made him look to the life of his friend as a source of information concerning the 
good life. But if he had looked, he would have noticed the ethical importance in that 
life of the combination of sensuousness and ‘mad’ passion with respect, awe, and 
excellent philosophizing. And then, if he did not himself opt for this life through 
awareness of his difference in sexual inclination, he might at least have set it down 
among the appearances and given it its due as one human way of aiming at the good.69 
 
Nussbaum admits, though, that in filiva taking pleasure in the physical presence of the 
other is important.70 Furthermore, Nussbaum says that even though Aristotelian love is 
not a mad infatuation, it does have a strong affective element. 
One more thing worth discussing is the comparison between EN and Plato’s 
Phaedrus. Nussbaum sees the similarity between the two works, viz., both see love’s 
highest value when the object of love has similar characters and aspirations. The 
difference between the two is twofold. First, the difference is additive. Aristotle goes 
beyond the Phaedrus in emphasizing the importance of the intimacy of living 
together.71 Second, the difference is subtractive. Aristotle does not see sexuality and 
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sexual attraction as significant in filiva. He does not speak of the divine madness either 
that helps the lovers in the Phaedrus reach the true beauty. Nussbaum notes, 
The specifically erotic pleasure and insight of Platonic lovers is mentioned only as a 
case of especially intense and exclusive philia (1171a11); it is not even clear that the 
reference is approving.72  
 
  
2. Juha Sihvola 
 Sihvola derives a lot of his resources from the Organon. He understands that 
the cases about love and friendship in the Organon might not represent Aristotle’s 
thoughts. Often those cases are merely hypothetical and serve solely as neat instances 
for logic cases. However, they might represent the common view of love and 
friendship in his time since in the Rhetoric Aristotle requires that a rhetorician should 
know about the popular beliefs in his day in order to be powerfully persuasive. 
One passage that Sihvola quotes is from the Prior Analytics 2.22.68a40-b7: 
If then every lover in virtue of his love would prefer A, i.e., that the beloved would be 
such as to grant him favors without, however, actually granting them (for which C 
stands) to the beloved’s granting his favors (for which D stands) without being such as 
to grant them (for which B stands), it is clear that A, i.e., being of such a nature, is 
preferable to granting the favors. To receive affection in virtue of love is thus 
preferable to sexual intercourse. Love then is more related to affection than to 
intercourse. If it is most related to this, then this is its goal. Intercourse then either is 
not an end at all or is an end for the sake of receiving affection. The same goes for 
other appetites and arts, too. 
 
From this passage, Sihvola concludes that there are two aspects in erotic love: one is 
directed to sexual desire and the other is directed to receiving friendly affection. The 
latter desire serves as the goal for erotic love. The dilemma, simply sketched, is about 
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how to resolve the tension between the madness of passion and the wish for virtuous 
life in erotic love.  
 Sihvola gives a brief biographical analysis of Aristotle’s life, noting that 
Diogenes Laertius suggests that “Aristotle fell in love (erasthēnai) with Pythias and 
was so exceedingly delighted (huperchairōn) by [Hermias’] consent to their marriage . 
. . .”73 From Diogenes’ writings, Sihvola concludes that Aristotle has a strong 
affectionate love for Pythias. Later I will show that Aristotle rejects e[rwV in marriage. 
However, If Sihvola’s short biography of Aristotle is true, then I would speculate for 
two possibilities. First, Aristotle does have a strong erotic love for Pythias, but then 
later revises his account after his wife’s death. Second, Diogenes is mistaken about 
Aristotle’s relationship with Pythias. It is possible that Aristotle’s affection is a strong 
friendly affection, but Diogenes misinterprets it as romantic love. This could happen 
because the manifestation of the affection is the same. Nevertheless, Aristotle might be 
well aware that his relationship with Pythias is a virtuous friendship rather than the 
romantic love commonly accepted in his time. 
 Aristotle sees ajfrodisiva or sexual appetite as something natural and an 
acceptable desire. When a person is no longer temperate, then one can abuse the 
appetite. However, sexual appetite is more complex than hunger or thirst because e[rwV 
cannot be defined simply as sexual intercourse. Notice here that Sihvola uses the words 
ajfrodisiva and e[rwV interchangeably. I will show later that the two are not the same. 
My reading of Aristotle is that ajfrodisiva refers more to sexual bodily pleasure, 
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whereas e[rwV refers more to the state of being in love. However, Sihvola is right when 
he writes that “Aristotle remarks that love (erōs) cannot simply be defined as the 
appetite for intercourse (epithumia sunousias) since the one who is more intensely in 
love does not – necessarily – feel a more intense appetite for intercourse, although they 
should both have become more intense simultaneously.”74 Sihvola, further agreeing 
with Nussbaum’s De Motu Animalium, writes that Aristotle divides desires into three 
kinds: rational (bouvlhsiV), spirited (qumovV), and appetitive desire (ejpiqumiva). The 
appetitive desires do not “listen” to reason at all, where the spirited ones are aimed for 
the beautiful and able to “understand” reason. Erotic love is not merely appetitive 
desire, but also spirited desire. Sihvola then sees the desire for sexual intercourse as 
appetitive desire, and the affection in erotic love as spirited desire. In Aristotle’s ethics, 
there is a “kind of expansive process in the development of erotic love. . . . [T]he desire 
for intercourse develops into a desire for receiving affection, which constitutes the 
proper goal and sense of an erotic relationship.”75  
With respect to friendship, Sihvola agrees that erotic love is a kind of 
friendship, which is less valuable than perfect friendship. Sihvola believes that the best 
kind of friendship can emerge from erotic love when there is reciprocity in concern and 
respect between lovers.76 
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 Sihvola admits that his work is still in progress. But his tentative conclusion 
now is that “Aristotle’s appreciation of erotic love is mainly positive, although he also 
points to several moral problems in sexual relationships.”77 Sihvola insists that 
Aristotle’s account in EN is more similar to Socrates’s than to Lysias’s in the 
Phaedrus. I assume that Sihvola is talking about Socrates’s second speech. To support 
his claim, Sihvola finally uses his “trump card,” which he thinks as “one precious piece 
of supporting evidence.” That “precious” text is 1171a10-13, in which Aristotle writes 
that love is a kind of excess of friendship. The passion here, according to Sihvola, is 
not the detached Stoic e[rwV, since Aristotelian e[rwV “implies taking risks and accepting 
one’s vulnerability before the contingencies of the outside world to an extent which no 
Stoic would accept as rational.”78 
 I will show later that Sihvola’s positive interpretation of e[rwV is questionable. 
In my reading, the notion of “excess” in EN VIII-IX with respect to e[rwV is something 
negative. Accordingly, I disagree that Aristotle would endorse the existence of e[rwV in 
marriage, since it is something bad. Marriage should be an instance of virtuous filiva.  
 
3. Gabriel Richardson Lear 
 Lear poses a problem on middle-level ends in Aristotle’s philosophy, viz., the 
problem on the “goods whose ends are in themselves and also beyond themselves, in 
eudaimonia.”79 The problem is how these goods, such as friendships, can be genuinely 
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choiceworthy both for itself and for the sake of something else. Lear rejects the 
means/ends relationship between the human goods and eujdaimoniva. She argues that the 
teleological relationship of approximation or imitation is central to Aristotle’s 
cosmology and biology. In fact,  
it is this relationship of imitation that Aristotle refers to in Metaphysics L when he 
makes the obscure remark that the heavenly spheres act for the sake of the Prime 
Mover as for an object of love. When we love something, in the sense relevant to the 
Metaphysics . . .  we strive to approximate it insofar as that is possible for us.80 
 
This love for the Unmoved Mover is apparently different from love in human 
relationships, especially from love in friendships. In friendships, there is no effort for 
the friends to become like one another. Friendship happens because the friends are 
already similar to one another. 
In Lear’s reading, Aristotle agrees with Plato’s Symposium 206e2-207a4 that 
this principle of approximating the highest idea of the good is ubiquitous in the natural 
world. The first heavens emulate the Unmoved Mover in order to be like him. The 
Unmoved Mover is the goal “for the sake of which” the natural world moves forward. 
Lear gives a note on this point: 
There is another reason it makes sense to call this desire “love,” for whereas an 
ordinary object of desire need only change one’s life temporarily and superficially, 
acting on love (in Plato’s account) involves a shift in one’s whole life. The first heaven 
does not desire the Prime Mover for only a moment; if his love of the Prime Mover is 
to ensure the eternity of change, it must be everlasting. Love is the name of the desire 
to devote one’s life to the object of desire. Perhaps this is what Elders (1972, 174 not. 
Ad 1072b3) has in mind when he says that, unlike an object of love, an object of desire 
need not be actually desired. This fact, he believes, explains Aristotle’s preference for 
erômenon instead of orekton at 1072b3.81 
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Lear gives another textual support from Q.8 1050b28-9 for the relationship of 
approximation: “Imperishable things are imitated (mimetai) by those that are involved 
in change, e.g. earth and fire.” Also, from GC II.10 337a1-7: 
That, too, is why all the other things – the things, I mean, which are reciprocally 
transformed in virtue of their qualities and their powers, e.g. the simple bodies – 
imitate (mimeitai) circular motion. For when water is transformed into air, air into fire, 
and fire back into water, we say the coming-to-be has completed the circle, because it 
reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating (mimoumenê) circular motion 
that rectilinear motion too is continuous. 
 
This is compatible with the EN in that the way of approximation is a genuine 
teleological relationship with respect to attaining the happy life. The moral virtues have 
intrinsic values even though they are also done for the sake of happiness. The moral 
virtues, more exactly, imitate the values of the contemplative life, which is 
eujdaimoniva. Lear’s claim is that the choiceworthiness of the imitation is as valuable as 
the choiceworthiness of the paradigms. Lear’s suggested solution is metaphysical. 
Since Plato’s idea of imitation is just merely of appearance, then it is not possible to 
choose approximations for their own sakes. But since in Aristotelian metaphysics there 
is only this world and reality, then there is intrinsic worth in every degree of the 
realization of virtue towards an ideal state. 
 To support her interpretation, Lear points out the focal relationship of the idea 
of the good in EN I.6, viz., the pros hen relationship and relationship by analogy (kat= 
ajnalogivan). Lear argues that the relationship between practical wisdom and theoretical 
wisdom is a focal one, where the theoretical wisdom serves as the paradigm for 
practical wisdom. With respect to analogical relationship, Lear believes that 
contemplation to its end (grasping scientific truth) is analogous with practical wisdom 
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to its end (grasping ethical truth). Since the relationship is analogical, there is no 
hierarchy between contemplation and practical wisdom. 
The paradigmatic relationship of virtues is also manifested in the discussion of 
friendship. The highest kind of friendship is the paradigm of lesser kinds of friendship: 
“Character friends are malista friends because they are paradigms of friendship by 
which the other varieties are measured and understood.”82 Friendship, then, is 
teleological in the sense that it is aiming for something perfect in terms of rationality. 
The highest kind of friendship is the most virtuous because it is the most rational, 
which is compatible to the idea of human beings as mavlista nou:V in EN X. 
In the global view, “all plants, animals, and living heavenly bodies, in realizing 
their own natures, are striving to partake of the divine life by imitation.”83 We need to 
be like the gods as much as possible: 
Aristotle says that lives are happy only insofar as they participate (koinônei) in some 
kind of contemplation . . . . When a person exercises phronêsis while dealing with 
distinctly human concerns springing from our animal and political nature, he engages 
in something like (homoiôma ti) divine contemplative activity (1178b27). (Animals, on 
the other hand, do not have a share of [metechein; 1178b24] happiness because they do 
not participate [koinônei; 1178b28] in theôria.) Thus, in Aristotle’s account, the happy 
philosopher lives like a god not only by directly engaging in the divine activity but also 
and necessarily by pursuing an approximation of contemplation in his practical life. I 
suggest that in passages such as these in NE X.7-8, Aristotle is reiterating that the most 
happy person makes himself like a god to the extent possible for a human being.84 
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There is also approximation in Plato’s Symposium, but according to Lear it is 
“seriously incomplete” since it is not giving the images of the true beauty their 
worthiness.85 The Phaedrus gives more generous view of the images of the Beauty: 
Now although it is certainly true, in the Symposium, that the lover stops feeling erotic 
love for the initial beloved as he climb the ladder, I believe it is a mistake to think that, 
when he does, the lover considers his former beloved as a mere instrument. True, there 
is a shift in attitude, but what changes is that the lover no longer sees the beloved as the 
ultimate object of his mad desire and longing – there are other things, arising from his 
reproduction with the beloved, that captivate him more. There is no reason to think, 
though, that the lover does not continue to see the beloved as beautiful and continue to 
want to spend time with him. This fact is clearer in the Phaedrus, where Socrates says 
that after philosophical lovers enslave their sexual appetites, they turn their attention 
jointly to the lifelong pursuit of understanding (256a7-c1). 
 
Lear sees that there is a shift from erotic love to friendship in the Symposium: 
after the physical lover gives birth, he turns his attentions to the offspring (209c4-6). 
The lover despises his false expectation that divine happiness will be reached in his 
union with the beloved. He understands that divine happiness will be attained only in 
the ascent to divine rationality. That is why he turns his beloved into a friend. 
Something similar occurs in Aristotle’s idea of morally virtuous actions. In the 
Aristotelian metaphysical scheme, practical wisdom is seen as an approximation of 
theoretical wisdom. Later I will show that Aristotle rejects erotic love in human 
relationship altogether, hence probably solving Plato’s concern that the lovers must 
become friends.  
As a last note, even though in the Platonic metaphysical scheme it is not 
possible to love the particular individuals for their sake, still they are not merely tools 
to achieve the true beauty. They are loved in so far as they are approximations and 
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“will continue to be as intrinsically valuable as anything in the natural world, in the 
Platonic account, can be.”86 
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CHAPTER V 
 
O DEAREST FRIEND, SHALT THOU MINE LOVER BE?: 
!ERWS  AND FILIA  IN ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
 
It is not lack of love but lack of friendship that makes unhappy marriages. 
(Friedrich Nietzsche)87 
 
In this chapter, I will give my own view on Aristotle’s idea of e[rwV and filiva 
his EN.88 Two main passages serve as a starting point to discuss this issue. First, in EN 
1158a9-12, Aristotle writes: 
No one can have complete friendship (fivlon kata; th;n teleivan filivan) for many 
people, just as no one can have an erotic passion (ejra:n) for many at the same time; for 
[complete friendship, like erotic passion,]89 is like an excess (uJperbolh/:/), and an excess 
is naturally directed at a single individual. And just as it is difficult for many people to 
please the same person intensely at the same time, it is also difficult, presumably, for 
many to be good. 
 
Later, Aristotle writes in 1171a8-13: 
 
Presumably, then, it is good not to seek as many friends as possible, and good to have 
no more than enough for living together; indeed it even seems impossible to be an 
extremely close friend to many people. That is why it also seems impossible to be 
passionately in love (ejra:n) with many people, since passionate erotic love tends to be 
an excess of friendship (uJperbolh; gavr tiV ei\nai bouvletai filivaV), and one has this 
for one person; hence also one has extremely close friendship for a few people. 
 
Concerning the second passage, Sir Alexander Grant comments that “this is almost a 
verbatim repetition of Eth. VIII. vi. 2 [1158a9-12], which passage contains the germ of 
the present chapter.”90 However, there is an important difference between the first and 
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the second passage above, which is not explicitly mentioned by Grant. In the first 
passage, Aristotle says that complete or perfect friendship, like erotic love, is like an 
excess. But in the second passage, Aristotle says that erotic love tends to be an excess 
of friendship. 
How should we understand these passages, and how could we understand the 
relationship between friendship91 and erotic love92 in EN? In this chapter, I will answer 
these questions by using the following strategy. First, I will discuss the different 
meanings of the word “extreme” (uJperbolhv) in EN, claiming that the word “extreme” 
can mean a noble perfection but can also mean a bad excess.93 Second, I will explain 
how these two meanings relate to the idea of erotic love and friendship. I will argue 
that Aristotle uses the word “extreme” equivocally with respect to erotic love and 
friendship. Simply put, Aristotle sees erotic love as a bad kind of extreme, but 
complete friendship as a good one. Relatedly, I will also show (a) why erotic love is 
not a vice even though it is a bad excess (the reason is that erotic love is an excess of 
friendship, which is something pleasant and necessary in life) and (b) that erotic love is 
an excess of friendship because it is excessive in some features of friendship, viz., in 
                                                
91. It seems natural to interpret the phrase “to be a friend with perfect friendly feeling” as a 
perfect state between friends (cf. 1166b1). In general, the word filiva does not line up well with any 
single sense of “love.” Aristotle’s filiva could mean love between hosts and guests, an older person and 
a younger person, a husband and a wife, rulers and the ones they rule (1158b13ff.), etc. Throughout this 
thesis, I have been using the common translation for the word, viz., “friendship.” I have also translated 
filiva into “genuine affection” and “friendly feeling.” 
92. In 1158a9-12 Aristotle uses the verb ejra:n (to be in love with) that means “to desire 
something passionately.” One important note here is that being in love with someone does not just mean 
wishing to have sexual relations with that person. There are other features that are present in a state of 
being in love besides wanting to experience a sexual bodily pleasure (ajfrodisiva), such as the desire to 
be together with the beloved (1167a6-7) and the wish to have a mutually beneficial relationship (1157a6-
7). 
93. Throughout this paper, the word uJperbolhv will be translated either into “extreme” or 
“excess.” An excess is a bad kind of extreme. 
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feelings and actions. I will then show two implications of my interpretation with 
respect to friendship between men and women, and also friendship between men. I will 
argue that Aristotle sees complete friendship as the route to a perfectly virtuous life 
while romantic love must be avoided.94 
To conclude the chapter, I will discuss a possible new dilemma that must be 
faced by Aristotle as a consequence of his rejection of e[rwV. In a nutshell the potential 
problem in Aristotle account is that he has to choose whether to have filiva toward 
particular individuals or the good. My take on this issue is that Aristotle can get away 
with the problem since his metaphysical account does not admit that the good as 
having an ontological status apart from particular entities. 
 
1. Of “Extreme” 
Let us consider 1158a9-12 again. Irwin comments on the passage: “The 
supplement95 assumes that the comparison with excess applies both to complete 
friendship and to erotic passion. Alternatively, one might take it as applying only to 
erotic passion; in that case, ‘for . . .’ would be a parenthesis.”96 I tend to disagree with 
the claim that the word “excess” in the passage applies to perfect friendship because 
the excess is to be directed only at a single individual, which is a description for 
romantic love. Hence it is better not to see 1158a9-12 as claiming that complete 
                                                
94. My conclusion is almost in direct opposition to Sihvola’s remarks that “Aristotle’s 
appreciation of erotic love is mainly positive, although he points to several potential moral problems in 
sexual relationships” (“Aristotle on Sex and Love,” The Sleep of Reason, eds. Martha C. Nussbaum and 
Juha Sihvola, 218). It is important to note, though, that the account of e[rwV in Metaphysics L is positive. 
In 1072b3-4 Aristotle writes that the Unmoved Mover moves all things as being loved (wJV ejrwvmenon). 
95. “[complete friendship, like erotic passion,].” 
96. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 278-9. 
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friendship is an extreme. However, based on the textual evidence in 1166b1, which I 
will discuss below, I concur that complete friendship is an extreme. With this 
qualification, we may say that both to be a friend with perfect friendly feeling and to be 
romantically in love with someone are extremes. 
In general, the word “extreme” (uJperbolhv) can indicate either a vice or 
something perfect or noble. Regarding “extreme” as a vice, which can be equated with 
“excess,” abundant textual evidence is readily available. Aristotle talks about excess 
and deficiency as vices, which are contrasted with virtue that consists in a mean 
(1106b15ff.): “By virtue I mean virtue of character; for this is about feelings and 
actions (peri; pavqh kai; pravxeiV), and these admit of excess, deficiency, and an 
intermediate condition” [italics mine].97 I will relate this finding later with the fact that 
friendship is also about feelings and actions. 
One example of excess is prodigality, which is an excess in relation to wealth 
(1119b28). A prodigal person gives too much without getting anything and neither 
feels pleasure (h{detai) nor pain (lupei:tai) in the right way (1121a8ff.). A wasteful 
person tends to give away things without considering whether she has enough 
resources or whether the resources are appropriate (e.g., the resources from her 
property, not others’). She also seems to feel pleasure in such excess. Other instances 
of excess as a vice include irascibility (with respect to anger), rashness (with respect to 
confidence), and vanity (with respect to honor). All these instances can be explained in 
terms of excess in both the feelings and actions of a person. 
                                                
97. See also 1108b18. 
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The word “excess” could also mean something noble or in the “superlative 
degree.” Two pieces of textual evidence can support this point. First, in 1166b1 
Aristotle talks about an “extreme” degree of friendship (hJ uJperbolh; th:V filivaV) that 
resembles one’s friendship to oneself. This section is in accord with the interpretation 
that complete friendship is an extreme. This extremity is something good, which is 
indicated by the fact that Aristotle in that passage is talking about the excellent person 
who is of one mind with himself, and also because Aristotle contrasts that kind of 
relationship with the relationship of base people that is lacking these features (1166b5). 
Aristotle mentions early in book VIII that friendship is either a virtue or involves 
virtue. He never complains about a person’s being too good a friend. By contrast, he 
encourages one’s having the highest kind of friendship. The second place where 
“extreme” is understood as something noble is in 1145a23, where Aristotle discusses 
the possibility of the extreme of virtue by which human beings become gods (ejx 
ajnqrwvpwn givnontai qeoi; di= ajreth:V uJperbolhvn). Here Aristotle does not say that the 
gods have virtues. In fact, if there were gods, they would be blessed and happy only 
with respect to their activity of study98 (1178b10ff.). Aristotle’s gods are not moral 
beings. But the point is still clear, viz., that the word “extreme” could mean something 
admirable. With this in mind, I will turn to the discussion about romantic love as an 
excess of friendship. 
 
 
                                                
98. This is Irwin’s translation of qewriva. 
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2. Love as an Excess of Friendship 
The question is how to comprehend the idea that love is an excess of 
friendship.99 Unfortunately, it is a subject that has hardly been investigated in Aristotle 
scholarship. Most commentaries provide little guidance. For instance, one anonymous 
commentator writes of 1158a9-12: 
It is not possible for a worthy person to be a friend to many in accord with complete 
love, just as it is not possible to love many erotically at the same time; for complete 
love is a kind of excess of love, and such a thing by nature occurs toward one 
person.100 
 
Also, Michael of Ephesus writes,  
For just as, [Aristotle] says, it is impossible to love many people passionately (for 
passionate love is an excess of friendship [or: of friendly love]), so too it is not 
possible intensely to love many people [as friends].101 
 
                                                
99. To help the discussion of love as an excess of friendship, one minor translational matter 
should be noted. Irwin translates 1171a12-3 with “passionate erotic love tends to be an excess of 
friendship” (uJperbolh; gavr tiV ei\nai bouvletai filivaV). But the phrase “tends to be” could simply be 
rendered as “means.” Irwin himself does this in 1125b33: “For [if mildness is something to be praised,] 
being a mild person means being undisturbed, not led by feeling” (bouvletai ga;r oJ pra:oV ajtavracoV 
ei\nai kai; mh; a[gesqai uJpo; tou: pavqouV). And Irwin translates 1160b28-9 as “since kingship is meant 
to be paternal rule” (patrikh; ga;r ajrch; boulevtai hJ basileiva ei\nai). Other instances may also be 
found (e.g., in 1160b118-9; in 1132a21-2, Irwin translates bouvletai ei\nai with “intended to be”). There 
may be no specific reason, then, for Irwin, not to translate the phrase in 1171a as “love means an excess 
of friendship.” Translating the sentence as such will give us a stronger case to say that romantic love is 
an excess of friendship, rather than the weaker “love tends to be an excess of friendship.” I will proceed 
with the stronger translation.  
Cf. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 241. Price writes, “In the Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle remarks that love ‘tends to be an excess of friendship’, and exclusively for that reason; 
this indicates that one cannot enjoy intense friendship with many (9.10.1171a10-13, cf. 8.5.1158a10-13). 
A tendency does not yield an identity (and friendship towards oneself, to which ‘an excess of friendship’ 
can be likened, 9.4.1166b1-2, is hardly a case of being in love); yet the connection suggests an 
affectionate side to friendship, and a benevolent side to love. Whatever may be said now and then about 
love itself, or the lover qua lover, there cannot be any incompatibility between love and even the best 
friendship.” Price does not give any justification for his translation. Contra Price, my interpretation will 
show that erotic love is incompatible with friendship. 
100. Aspasius, Anonymous and Michael of Ephesus, On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 8 and 
9, trans. David Konstan, 71. 
101. Ibid., 205. 
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The commentators here are more or less reciting Aristotle without more explanation. 
The problem is how exactly to understand that love is an excess of friendship. 
If we see complete friendship as an extreme in the second sense, i.e., as a 
superlative degree of something, which is the best and the noblest of that something, 
then the question would be “What is the lesser degree of complete friendship?”  The 
answer is quite straightforward: it is the incomplete sorts of friendships, which are 
pleasure-based, utility-based friendships, or a mixture of those.  
On the other hand, if we see erotic love also as an extreme in this sense, what is 
the lesser degree of it? A possible answer is: complete friendship is the lesser degree of 
erotic love. Here, erotic love can be seen as a kind of friendship in its “superlative 
degree.” To interpret erotic love in this way, complete friendship and erotic love are 
located in a continuum. On this interpretation, we can very roughly sketch Aristotle’s 
constellation of human relationships as given in Figure 1.  
 
   Erotic Love 
   Complete Friendship (1156b7ff.) 
   Incomplete Friendships (1156a5-b6) 
Relationships of Friendliness (1126b19-24) 
No Relationship 
 
Figure 1: The Continuum of Human Relationships in EN 
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In this picture, complete friendship is an extreme because it is something noble 
and perfect in terms of friendship, but not in terms of human relationship. But erotic 
love is an extreme because it is noble and perfect in terms of human relationship. 
Because erotic love is the extreme par excellence, it can only be directed toward one 
person. Complete friendship is the second best extreme, hence it can be directed toward 
more than one person, but not to too many people. 
 Several commentators of Aristotle see erotic love as complete friendship in its 
superlative degree and nobility. For example, Stewart writes on 1158a9-12: 
Perfect friendship is ‘an exalted state.’ In ix 10. 5, however, which resembles this 
passage closely, to; ejra:n is uJperbolh; tiV filivaV.102  
 
Stewart seems to interpret the word uJperbolhv as an exalted state just as perfect 
friendship is an exalted state. On 1171a8-13, Stewart writes, 
Oujde; ga;r ejndevcesqai . . . a. 13 ojlivgouV] ‘For it would appear that it is not even 
possible to be a great friend of many persons; and this for the same reason that (diovper 
– ‘eandem ob causam ob quam,’ Ramsauer) it is impossible to be in love with several 
persons; for, as love, which may be described as an excessive friendship, is for one 
person, so (dh/ a. 13) great friendship (to; sfovdra fivlov ei\nai) is entertained towards a 
few.’ As the uJperbolh; filivaV limits itself to one, to; sfovdra limits itself to a few.103 
 
Here Stewart does not necessarily see excess as something bad, but only as something 
that limits the number of people one can be friends with. Another commentator, 
Aspasius, writes on 1158a10-12: 
[Aristotle] says it is not easy ‘to be a friend to many according to complete love, just as 
it is not [easy] to love many erotically’ (1158a10-12); for there is a certain excess in 
loving, and this is not easy in relation to many, for excesses are in relation to a few. 
One must speak [here] of excess in respect to what is fine.104 
 
                                                
102. J. A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. 2, 294. 
103. Ibid., 397. 
104. Aspasius, 29. 
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Aspasius is not very clear about whether erotic love is a kind of friendship. He is sure, 
though, that love as an excess is something fine. But the word “excess,” if it is not a 
vice, then it is something perfect or superlative. Then, Aspasius would probably agree 
that love is a kind of friendship, and accordingly, that complete friendship is an 
incomplete erotic love. 
St. Thomas Aquinas does not discuss much about e[rwV in his commentary on 
the EN. His commentary on 1158a10-13 is as follows:  
He shows first, by three reasons, that it is not possible for a person to be a friend of 
many people by perfect friendship built on the good of virtue. The first [2] is that, since 
this friendship is perfect and best, it has a likeness to excess in loving – if the extent of 
love be considered. But if we consider the notion of loving there cannot be an excess. 
It is not possible for virtue and a virtuous person to be loved excessively by another 
virtuous person who regulates his affections by reason. Superabundant love is not 
designed by nature for many but for one only. This is evident in sexual love according 
to which one man cannot at the same time love many women in an excessive manner. 
Therefore, the perfect friendship of the virtuous cannot extend to many persons.105 
 
Here St. Thomas compares sexual love and perfect friendship in his discussion of the 
number of friends that one should have in a virtuous life. Sexual love is excessive 
because it can be directed only to one person. The excess here is concerned with the 
number of the objects of love. However, sexual love is designed by nature to be 
directed only to one person. It seems that St. Thomas does not see the excess in sexual 
love as something negative since it is natural. 
 Another place where Aristotle talks about the relationship between e[rwV and 
filiva is in 1171a6-8. The commentary is as follows: 
It is well for a man not to seek as many friends as possible but as many as are enough 
for living together, because it does not seem possible for a man to be friendly to great 
                                                
105. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. C. I. 
Litzinger, 495-6. 
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numbers. So, likewise, one man cannot love many women by an intense sexual love 
because perfect friendship consists in a kind of excess of love which can be felt for 
only one or a very few persons. For what is superlative always belong to the few, since 
achievement of the highest perfection cannot take place in most cases due to a 
multiplicity of defects and hindrances.106 
 
St. Thomas here again does not see sexual love as something negative. He says that one 
man can only love one woman intensely. He relates what is superlative or excessive to 
the idea of achieving highest perfection. 
These commentators most likely see love as a kind of friendship, but it is higher 
than complete virtue-friendship. This kind of interpretation might look natural to us 
now. After all, friendship does often lead to romantic love. Yet, interpreting Aristotle 
in this way is problematic because there is textual evidence for the view that erotic love 
is a kind of incomplete friendship. Erotic love is a kind of mixture of pleasure-
friendship and utility-friendship, but it is different from the usual pleasure-friendship 
because there is no obvious equal reciprocity in it. Yet, it is a kind of friendship 
(1157a3ff.): 
With these [incomplete friends] also, the friendships are most enduring whenever they 
get the same thing – pleasure, for instance – from each other, and, moreover, get it 
from the same source, as witty people do, in contrast to the erotic lover and the boy he 
loves.107 
 
Aristotle seems to refer to a specific kind of erotic love here, viz., “pederasty” 
(paiderastiva), which is a love relationship between an older man and a boy. It is not 
                                                
106. Ibid., 581. 
107. The rest of the passage goes as follows: “For the erotic lover and his beloved do not take 
pleasure in the same things; the lover takes pleasure in seeing his beloved, but the beloved takes pleasure 
in being courted by his lover. When the beloved’s bloom is fading, sometimes the friendship fades too; 
for the lover no longer finds pleasure in seeing his beloved, and the lover no longer courts the beloved. 
Many, however, remain friends if they have similar characters and come to be fond of each other’s 
character from being accustomed to them. Those who exchange utility rather than pleasure in their erotic 
relations are friends to a lesser extent and less enduring friends.” 
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clear, though, whether Aristotle talks in that passage about the possibility of the 
transformation of this mixture utility/pleasure-friendship into a complete friendship. It 
looks as though the lovers can remain friends because they are fond of (stevrxwsin) 
each other’s character, and not necessarily because their characters are virtuous. The 
point is clear here, that erotic love is a kind of incomplete friendship. 
Aristotle also refers to erotic love as a kind of friendship that arises from 
contraries (1159b12-20). Most likely Aristotle takes this kind of friendship to be 
utility-friendship because it is a friendship between unequals. Aristotle states that 
sometimes lovers appear ridiculous because they expect equal reciprocity even though 
they know that the beloved would not be able to love them in the same way.108 
Unsurprisingly, this kind of love is an unstable friendship.  
 More evidence that erotic love is a kind of friendship is found in 1167a3-7, 
when Aristotle writes, “Goodwill, then, would seem to be a beginning of friendship, 
just as pleasure coming through sight is a beginning of erotic passion (e[oike dh; ajrch; 
filivaV ei\nai, w”sper tou: ejra:n hJ dia; o[yewV hJdonhv). For no one has erotic passion 
for another without previous pleasure in his appearance.109 But still enjoyment of his 
appearance does not imply erotic passion for him; passion consists also in longing for 
                                                
108. “In erotic friendships, however, sometimes the lover charges that he loves the beloved 
deeply and is not loved in return; and in fact perhaps he has nothing lovable in him. The beloved, 
however, often charges that previously the lover was promising him everything, and now fulfills none of 
his promises. These sort of charges arise whenever the lover loves his beloved for pleasure while the 
beloved loves his lover for utility, and they do not both provide these. For if the friendship has these 
causes, it is dissolved whenever they do not get what they were friends for; for each was not fond of the 
other himself, but only of what the other had, which was unstable. That is why the friendships are also 
unstable. Friendship of character, however, is friendship in itself, and endures, as we have said.” 
(1164a5ff.) 
109. Also see 1171b28. 
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him in his absence and in an appetite for his presence.” Erotic love here is said to have 
a different principle from friendship. It is most likely that ajrchv here means efficient 
cause, and not only a starting point. Other uses of ajrchv as efficient cause in EN 
supports this interpretation.110 Furthermore, Aristotle agrees that the cause of 
friendship is either good or pleasure (pa:sa ga;r filiva di j ajgaqovn ejstin h] di j 
hJdonhvn) (1156b19-20).111 One more important note must be made regarding 1167a3ff. 
Aristotle argues that people cannot be friends without previous goodwill, even though 
goodwill does not necessarily imply friendship. Erotic love must consist of goodwill, if 
it is to be a kind of friendship. However, goodwill might appear after “pleasure coming 
through sight.” 
To sum up, the above textual evidence suggests that erotic love is not a higher 
degree of friendship since (1) erotic love is a mixture of pleasure-friendship and utility-
friendship, (2) erotic love is friendship between unequals, and (3) the cause of erotic 
love, which is pleasure, is also one of the causes of friendship. Hence there is a reason 
to avoid translating “extreme” for erotic love as something superlative in degree and 
nobility. 
 
2.1 Erotic Love as a Bad Excess 
Another alternative, then, is to understand erotic love as a negative extreme of 
friendship. One important note is that in EN Aristotle never categorizes erotic love as a 
                                                
110. See e.g., 1110a15, 1113b20, 1114a19, 1139a31. 
111. This is one of the standard interpretations of diva with the accusative. See Hebert Weir 
Smyth, Greek Grammar, #1685. 
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vice. However, Aristotle has another category of badness besides the category of vices. 
In 1148a28-b4, Aristotle talks about extremes that are not vices, but they are still bad 
and need to be avoided: 
Some people are overcome by, or pursue, some of these naturally fine and good things 
to a degree that goes against reason; they take honor, or children, or parents (for 
instance) more seriously than is right. For though these are certainly good and people 
are praised for taking them seriously, still excess about them is also possible. It is 
excessive if one fights, as Niobe did [for her children], even with the gods, or if one 
regards his father as Satyrus, nicknamed the Fatherlover, did – for he seemed to be 
excessively silly about it. There is no vice here, for the reason we have given, since 
each of these things is naturally choiceworthy for itself, though excess about them is 
bad and to be avoided.  
 
These excesses are related to the pleasant things, which are either necessary or 
choiceworthy in their own right. The question is whether friendship is included among 
those things. There is a strong indication that it is because Aristotle says that it is most 
necessary for our life (1155a4). Furthermore, in 1166a23-6, Aristotle talks about a 
person’s finding pleasure in spending time with himself. Friendship also brings 
pleasure to the parties involved when they spend time together. Also, if complete 
friendship includes pleasure and utility, then friendship must be pleasant.112 It seems 
fit, then, to interpret erotic love as something bad because it is excessive, perhaps in 
some features of friendship, such as feelings.113 
One might object to this interpretation by pointing out a place where Aristotle 
says that virtues do not admit excess. In 1107a25, Aristotle writes, 
                                                
112. “This sort of friendship, then, is complete both in time and in other ways. In every way 
each friend gets the same things and similar things from each, and this is what must be true of friends. 
Friendship for pleasure bears some resemblance to this complete sort, since good people are also 
pleasant to each other. And friendship for utility also resembles it, since good people are also useful to 
each other.” (1156b33-1157a3) 
113. On this interpretation, the features of friendship (e.g., having a certain kind of feeling) 
must be seen as pleasant and necessary in life as well.  
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On the contrary, just as there is no excess or deficiency of temperance or of bravery 
(since the intermediate is a sort of extreme [a[kron]), so also there is no mean of these 
vicious actions either, but whatever way anyone does them, he is in error. For in 
general there is no mean of excess or of deficiency, and no excess or deficiency of a 
mean. 
 
This passage suggests that, in general, whatever is virtuous cannot be a vice because it 
is an intermediate. Aristotle’s remark that the intermediate is a sort of extreme perhaps 
means that the intermediate is something perfect. Because friendship is a virtue or 
involves a virtue, then it cannot turn into a vice because it is a mean. Consequently, 
complete friendship cannot turn into erotic love if the latter is a vice. But I have shown 
that erotic love is not a vice, even though it is something bad. The next task would be 
to establish the claim that erotic love is something bad for Aristotle and what makes it 
bad. 
One striking passage that indicates that erotic love is bad is in 1116a12-3, 
where Aristotle writes that “dying to avoid poverty or erotic passion or something 
painful is proper to a coward, not to a brave person.” Aristotle puts erotic passion 
(e[rwta) among poverty and painful things. St. Thomas Aquinas comments on this 
passage, saying that the passion is about things that one cannot possess; hence it is 
painful.114 This is reminiscent of the talk of love in Plato’s Symposium that love is a 
desire for something we do not have.115 Even though it is a cowardly act to avoid erotic 
passion to the point of preferring death, it would still be appropriate to avoid erotic 
passion to the degree that is comparable to avoiding poverty. If we are to compare this 
with friendship, then friendship must be something that is free from the desire to 
                                                
114. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, #557-8. 
115. See a wonderful discussion on this issue in Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 356-7. 
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possess the friend. Friendship is primarily for the sake of the friend himself and is free 
from the fear of loss or failing to possess something.  
 Aristotle probably takes erotic love as something bad because it is related more 
to feeling116 than character. In Eudemian Ethics 1229a20, Aristotle mentions that love 
is a most irrational feeling (paqovV ajlovgiston). In the beginning of EN VIII, Aristotle 
asks us to “examine the puzzles that concern human [nature], and bear on characters 
(ta; h[qh) and feelings (ta; pavqh)” (1155b9-10). The highest kind of friendship is based 
on character, which is something good and noble. However, later Aristotle speaks 
unsympathetically about the young and their feelings.117  
There is a strong connection between erotic passion, pleasure, and the young. 
Erotic love begins with pleasure, and pleasure-based friendships are the most common 
among the young, in contrast with utility-based friendships that are more common 
among older people (1158a20-2). In complete friendships, however, the pleasure 
involved is not only pleasure without qualification, but also pleasure for each other 
(1156b14-5). The mutual sharing must be based on goodness and character, not only 
                                                
116. “By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, 
jealousy, pity, and in general whatever implies pleasure or pain. By capacities I mean what we have 
when we are said to be capable of these feelings – capable of being angry, for instance, or of being afraid 
or of feeling pity. By states I mean what we have when we are well or badly off in relation to feelings. If, 
for instance, our feeling is too intense or slack, we are badly off in relation to anger, but if it is 
intermediate, we are well off” (1105b20-8). 
117. For example, in 1156a31-1156b6 Aristotle writes: “The cause of friendship between young 
people seems to be pleasure. For their lives are guided by their feelings, and they pursue above all what 
is pleasant for themselves and what is at hand. But as they grow up [what they find] pleasant changes 
too. Hence they are quick to become friends, and quick to stop; for their friendship shifts with [what they 
find] pleasant, and the change in such pleasure is quick. Young people are prone to erotic passion (kai 
ejrwtikoi; d j oiJ nevoi), since this mostly accords with feelings (kata; pavqoV), and is caused by pleasure; 
that is why they love and quickly stop, often changing in a single day. . . . These people wish to spend 
their days together and to live together; for this is how they gain [the good things] corresponding to their 
friendship.” 
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based on pleasure. Hence in complete friendships, there is a balance between self-
interest and caring for others. But in complete friendships there is also a possibility of 
temporal asymmetry in reciprocity (1157a15-19): 
Now it is possible for bad people as well [as good] to be friends to each other for 
pleasure or utility, for decent people to be friends to base people, and for someone with 
neither character to be a friend to someone with any character. Clearly, however, only 
good people can be friends to each other because of the other person himself; for bad 
people find no enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit. 
 
This passage is compatible with the fact that true friends wish good for the sake of their 
friends, and not only wishing to have pleasure in reciprocity. Furthermore, Aristotle 
also relates erotic passion to feelings, indicating that the instability of feelings is partly 
responsible for the instability of friendship among the young.118 
It should be noted that Aristotle does not altogether dismiss feelings in moral 
life. He thinks that virtue must involve both feelings and actions (1109b30). Also, there 
are means in feelings and about feelings (1108a32-3). Sherman reminds us that 
Aristotelian emotions “have firm cognitive foundations and rest on appraisals.”119 We 
can cultivate a good habit of feeling the right way about certain things. Feelings can 
“hear” reason and be made compatible with practical wisdom. But, as Sherman notes, 
feelings (pavqh) in EN are something passive (1106a6), i.e., happen by being acted 
upon, in contrast with poiei:n (to make and/or to do). This passivity does not imply total 
                                                
118. Two more passages regarding the young and their feelings are as follows: “This is why a 
youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience of the actions in life, which 
are the subject and premises of our arguments. Moreover, since he tends to follow his feelings, his study 
will be futile and useless; for the end [of political science] is action, not knowledge.” (1095a2-6); “For 
we think it right for young people to be prone to shame, since they live by their feelings, and hence often 
go astray, but are restrained by shame; and hence we praise young people who are prone to shame.” 
(1128b17-20) We can see from these passages that feelings often become hindrances for achieving a 
virtuous life because they often make people disobey the right reason. 
119. Nancy Sherman, “The Role of Emotions in Aristotelian Virtue,” Aristotle: Critical 
Assessments, vol. III, 314. 
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involuntariness, because in a sense feelings correspond to reason. However, it is not 
clear how feelings and choice are related in Aristotle’s EN. For the purpose of this 
chapter, the important point is to see that Aristotle more often sees feelings as 
something beyond control of choice or reason.120 Once again, feelings are not bad in 
themselves. Only excessive feelings, i.e., the ones not based on reason and proper 
habituation, need to be avoided. The good life is guided by rationality, not by feelings, 
even though feelings are an integral part of a virtuous life (1104b13-16). Friendship, 
especially, requires a “feeling” that is not had by mere friendliness (1126b19-24).  
Now, related to seeing love as an excess of feelings, we can try to interpret 
Aristotle’s argument about the number of friends we ideally should have. Based on 
1158a9-12 and 1171a8-13, we can only have a few good friends because (1) it is 
difficult to be a good person  (and complete friendship can only happen between good 
people) and (2) it is difficult to know whether a person is good or not; it is time 
consuming (also see 1156b25ff.). These points are analogous to romantic love: we can 
only have one lover because it is difficult for many people to please the same person 
intensely at the same time. This means that it is difficult to be passionately in love with 
many people. It seems that Aristotle is also saying that the recipient of romantic love 
                                                
120. This especially applies to weak people. Here are some textual evidences for this point: 
“The incontinent person knows that his actions are base, but does them because of his feelings, whereas 
the continent person knows that his appetites are base, but because of reason does not follow them.” 
(1145b10); “For the weak person deliberates, but his feeling makes him abandon the result of his 
deliberation; but the impetuous person is led on by his feelings because he has not deliberated.” 
(1150b20); “That is why he most of all is a self-lover, but a different kind from the self-lover who is 
reproached. He differs from him as much as the life guided by reason differs from the life guided by 
feelings, and as much as the desire for what is fine differs from the desire for what seems advantageous.” 
(1169a5); “For someone who lives in accord with his feelings would not even listen to an argument 
turning him away, or comprehend it [if he did listen]; and in that state how could he be persuaded to 
change?” (1179b25). 
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cannot easily find pleasure from many people, but only from the person he or she 
loves.121 If this is an acceptable interpretation, then this decision to receive love only 
from one person is also guided by feelings, not by reason. Since in EN romantic love, 
pleasure, and feelings are tightly related, then the phrase “to be passionately in love 
with many” could simply mean “to be pleased by many intensely.” Hence love is an 
excess of friendship in a bad way because it is placing too much emphasis on pleasure 
and feelings, instead of goodness and character. Indeed, the passage is not clear about 
how excessive feelings must be in order to be categorized as bad. Aristotle writes 
(1109b20), 
Still, we are not blamed if we deviate a little in excess or deficiency from doing well, 
but only if we deviate a long way, since then we are easily noticed. But how great and 
how serious a deviation receives blame is not easy to define in an account; for nothing 
else perceptible is easily defined either. 
 
This ignorance will not be a problem since the main aim of this paper is to explain the 
relationship between friendship and romantic love. 
 At 1157b28-9, we find additional support that love is more related to feeling. 
For Aristotle, “loving would seem to be a feeling, but friendship a state (e[oike d j hJ 
me;n fivlhsiV pavqei, hJ de; filiva e{xei).” One might object that the use of fivlhsiV here 
(from the same root as filiva) only indicates the act of caring a friend, but not 
necessarily romantic love. My response is that the verb for filiva is also used for 
romantic love, for example, in 1164a3-4: 
In erotic friendships, however, sometimes the lover charges that he loves the beloved 
deeply and is not loved in return (ejn de; th/: ejrwtikh/: ejnivote me;n oJ ejrasth;V ejgkalei: 
o{ti uJperfilw:n oujk ajntifilei:tai). 
                                                
121. Notice that Irwin translates tw/: aujtw/: in 1158a9-12 with “the same person.” 
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And also in 1159b15: 
That is why an erotic lover also sometimes appears ridiculous, when he expects to be 
loved in the same way as he loves (dio; faivnontai kai; oiJ ejrastai geloi:oi ejnivote, 
ajxiou:nteV filei:sqai wJV filou:sin). 
 
Because loving is more about feeling, the excess of feeling in romantic love could take 
a form of excessive loving without reciprocity, similar to the love of inanimate things. 
Sherman writes that “Cupid’s arrow sometimes strays to those whom we know cannot 
requite our love, attachment sometimes becomes a bit too possessive.”122 Romantic 
love sometimes tends to be irrational because it is an obsessive loving, and probably 
directed toward a wrong person. This is not to deny that erotic love can ever be 
reciprocal. But even if it is reciprocal, it is not virtuous because the reciprocity is based 
more on feelings than on virtue. Recall that in 1157a15-9 Aristotle claims that virtue-
friendship is nobler than pleasure-friendship because the former can admit non-
reciprocity in pleasure. My point here is that neither reciprocity nor non-reciprocity in 
itself serves as the indication of erotic love. But if the reciprocity or non-reciprocity is 
based merely on feelings, this indicates a form of erotic love. Friendship consists in 
loving based on goodness, not only on feeling. I have shown that erotic love is 
something bad for Aristotle and that it is bad because it is an excess of feeling. But an 
excess of feeling is not the same as the excess of friendship. I will proceed now to 
discuss in what way romantic love is an excess of friendship. 
 
 
                                                
122. Sherman, 333. 
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2.2. Erotic Love and the Features of Friendship 
One way to understand the claim that erotic love is an excess of friendship is by 
seeing erotic love as the result of taking to extremes some components or features of 
friendship. This is how Pakaluk also interprets the phrase: 
It is correct to say that romantic love involves taking many of the features of friendship 
to an extreme degree; but in cases where X involves taking Y to an extreme, X is to be 
accounted for in terms of Y (it is an ‘extreme of Y’); so romantic love needs to be 
accounted for in terms of friendship; friendship, then, has to be the sort of thing that 
can account for it; but then it has to be something that, of its nature, is directed at a 
few, not at many. If it were naturally directed at many, there would be no sense in 
saying that an exaggeration of it is directed at one.123 
 
Friendship consists of both feelings and actions. If we agree that erotic love is an 
excess of feelings, maybe there is also an excess in some actions that characterize 
friendship. The features of friendship can be found in 1166a1ff.: (1) a friend wishes 
and does good or apparent good to his friend for the friend’s own sake, (2) a friend 
wishes his friend to be and to live for the friend’s own sake, (3) a friend spends his 
time with his friends, (4) a friend makes the same choices, and (5) a friend shares his 
friend’s distress and enjoyment. It is not clear which of these characteristics are 
excessive in erotic love. Perhaps we can exclude (1) and (2) since in an erotic 
relationship, the lover loves not for the sake of the beloved, but for the sake of herself 
or himself. For (3)-(5), we probably can say that these features are the same for erotic 
love, except that in erotic love they are done based on excessive feelings. For example, 
lovers can make the same choices, but actually the choices may not be the good and 
                                                
123. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX, Clarendon Aristotle Series, trans. with a 
commentary by Michael Pakaluk, 220. 
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rational choices. Also, lovers can spend time together, but maybe they spend so much 
time together that they neglect other important things in life.   
Now we already have a good element for understanding romantic love as an 
excess of friendship. Romantic love is an excess of friendship in a bad way, but it is not 
a vice. It is an excess of friendship because it is an excess of some features of 
friendship, primarily an excess of feelings. This excess of feelings may manifest itself 
in an excess of the five features of friendship in 1166a1ff. Take, for example, the 
feature of “living together” as the most characteristic of friendship (1171a1). Living 
together by itself is neutral. Bad people could also live together even though it will not 
be beneficial for them (1166b5ff.). If living together is merely based on feelings, then it 
might be unhealthy for the parties involved since they may be too attached to one 
another. This explains my point earlier that there can be reciprocity in erotic love, but it 
is not a virtuous reciprocity. 
Sir Alexander Grant suggests one interesting interpretation of friendship as an 
excess of feeling. He writes on 1158a9-12: 
Polloi:V ei\nai] ‘It is not possible to be a friend to many men on the footing of the 
perfect kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. 
For (the perfect friendship) is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards 
one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the 
same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good.’ uJperbolhv here 
would nearly be represented by the French word abandon; it implies the throwing 
away of limits and restraints, a giving up of one’s whole self.124 
 
I disagree with Grant’s claim that perfect friendship is an excess of feeling because 
there is no textual support for this claim. It seems that Grant is conflating erotic love 
with perfect friendship. However, his description of uJperbolhv as some kind of a 
                                                
124. Grant, 262. 
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throwing away of limits and restraints fits well with my interpretation of erotic love as 
an excess of feeling. 
Eterovich gives another view on friendship as an excess. He comments on 
1171a8-13 as follows: 
Friendship consists in an excess of love which can be felt for only one or for very few. 
One cannot intensely love many people and cultivate truly intimate relations with 
them. The very nature of the perfect friendship in which love is the highest and the 
most intense, precludes the dividing of that love among many. This is a human 
condition, a limitation of human love, a reality that cannot be ignored. After all, 
whatever the highest achievement is, it must be rare. Therefore, an intimate virtuous 
friendship is possible only with few people.125 
 
Eterovich seems to be using “love” not as a romantic love, but love in a virtuous and 
good sense. If that is so, this is in accord with my interpretation. Complete friendship is 
an extreme degree of the good kind of caring, i.e., caring primarily based on character 
and goodness, and not on feelings. Complete friendship is also a state of intermediates 
that is guided by right decision (1157b30). It is friendship par excellence because it is 
not a coincidental friendship that can end when pleasure and utility disappear (also see 
1158b5). Character “guarantees” that reciprocal pleasure and utility will remain in a 
complete friendship (1156b10ff.). 
Having said that, if one agreed that the word “extreme” in 1158a9-12 applies 
also to complete friendship, then the word needs to be understood equivocally: perfect 
friendship is an excess in a good way, but romantic love is an excess in a bad way. This 
equivocation is not a problem because Aristotle’s point there is not about the badness 
or the goodness of the excess, but about the excess qua something extreme. 
 
                                                
125. Francis H. Eterovich, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: Commentary and Analysis, 227. 
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3. Three Implications 
Now, if Aristotle rejects e[rwV in human relationships, what about its “good” 
functions as mentioned in the Phaedrus? To refresh our memory, the three positive 
functions of non-rational elements in the Phaedrus as summarized by Nussbaum are as 
follows: First, the non-intellectual elements are required to motivate our intellect to go 
in a certain direction. Second, the non-intellectual elements have the non-cognitive task 
of giving information about where goodness and beauty are. Third, the non-rational 
elements have intrinsic values of goodness and beauty, and not just an instrumental 
value. To respond to this question, I will show that filiva is enough since it 
incorporates feelings as well, which are non-rational elements. A further discussion of 
non-rational elements in Aristotle’s philosophy can be found in De Motu Animalium,126 
which I will not discuss here. 
The second question I want to address is this: If romantic love is something 
bad, is friendship between men and women also something bad? I think that it is not. 
For Aristotle, friendship between men and women is natural and even virtuous 
(1161a25ff.). Friendship between men and women, then, is not something excessive 
and is not always romantic or erotic. This kind of friendship is more about fulfilling 
different roles in a household for childbearing and other benefits of life (1162a20ff.). 
                                                
126. See Nussbaum’s commentary on De Motu Animalium 701a22: bouvlhsiV de; kai; qumo;V 
kai; ejpiqumiva pavnta o[rexiV. Aristotle here gives a threefold-division of o[rexiV. “The distinction made 
most of by Aristotle is a distinction among the objects of these desires. bouvlhsiV has as its object the 
good, or the end . . . . ejpiqumiva, on the other hand, is said to belong to all creatures with ai[sqhsiV, 
whether or not they move, just because they feel pleasure and pain . . . . bouvlhsiV is desire for a 
rationally conceived goal, and, derivatively, for constituents of it and means to it, seen as such. . . . The 
place of qumovV in Aristotle’s account is more difficult to explain. It seems to be equivalent to spritedness 
or anger . . . . Its object would seem to be revenge, or, more generally, harming one’s enemies” 
(Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Text with Translation, Commentary, and Interpretive Essays, 335-6). 
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Because of Aristotle’s sexism, though, it is not possible that friendship between men 
and women reach the highest kind of virtue-friendship. It is friendship between 
unequals because of Aristotle’s view that women’s reason is without authority (Pol. 
1260a13), while the highest kind of friendship must be between perfect equals because 
a friend is one’s alter ego (1170b5ff.). 
 The third implication of my interpretation is that romantic love in EN could 
happen between an older man and a younger man, or only between the young. For the 
former, romantic love is a mixture friendship because the older man gets pleasure from 
the younger man and the younger man gets utility from the older man. This friendship 
usually happens in the context of pederasty. The case of Alcibiades’s jealousy toward 
Socrates and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium is sufficient to show how a romantic 
relationship is an excess of feeling. Aristotle’s idea of educational pederasty, if he 
supports it, then could involve a sexual relationship (tav  jAfrodivsia, cf. 1154a18), but 
it is not something romantic and should not be based just on feelings. The role of 
physical sexual relation in complete friendship is worth investigating. Maybe a 
physical sexual relationship without an excess of feelings could strengthen the 
friendship. The romantic love between the young is more likely a pleasure-based 
friendship with an excess of feelings. There might be cases where we have two young 
men who are equal and develop a virtue-friendship. According to Aristotle’s account of 
friendship, there might be a sexual relationship between them as well, but it would not 
be something excessive of feelings. 
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My interpretation fits well with the end of book IX, where Aristotle compares 
erotic love with friendship. Aristotle sees the latter as much superior to the former. In 
Aristotle’s words, 
Whatever someone [regards as] his being, or the end for which he chooses to be alive, 
that is the activity he wishes to pursue in his friend’s company. Hence some friends 
drink together, others play dice, while others do gymnastics and go hunting, or do 
philosophy. They spend their days together on whichever pursuit in life they like most; 
for since they want to live with their friends, they share the actions in which they find 
their common life. . . . Friendship of decent people is decent, and increases the more 
often they meet. And they seem to become still better from their activities and their 
mutual correction. For each molds the other in what they approve of, so that ‘[you will 
learn] what is noble from noble people’. (1172a5ff.) 
 
Friends can, and perhaps should, together engage in philosophy without having an 
erotic relationship. Aristotle’s answer to the title of this paper, then, is negative: “Be 
thou mine friend only, I pray!” 
 
4. A New Dilemma? 
 Since Aristotle rejects e[rwV in human relationships, then there would be no 
dilemma anymore with respect to its objects. The remaining questions we need to 
answer now would be: (1) Are there any other objects for e[rwV in Aristotle’s 
philosophy?; (2) What about the objects of filiva? It seems that Aristotle runs into the 
same problem about the objects of filiva: either particular individuals or wisdom.127 I 
will answer the first question later in the discussion of Metaphysics L. The answer will 
be that must be directed to God or the Unmoved Mover. 
                                                
127. I will equate the filiva for “wisdom” (philosophy) with the filiva for the good. In Plato’s 
Symposium, Diotima equates the gazing of the sea of beauty with the love of wisdom (210d).  
 99 
Now, let me try to briefly address the second question. As an initial note, I 
believe the solution of this issue is ultimately metaphysical. However, I will not discuss 
Aristotle’s revision of Plato’s ontology of the Forms since it is beyond the scope of my 
paper. What I am going to do is to circumscribe the issue and suggest some pointers for 
the solution. Let us begin with Vlastos’s critique of Aristotle: 
Aristotle’s conception of “perfect filiva” does not repudiate – does not even notice – 
what I have called above “the cardinal flaw” in Platonic love. His intuition takes him 
as far as seeing that (a) disinterested affection for the person we love – the active 
desire to promote that person’s good “for that person’s sake, not for ours” must be built 
into love at its best, but not as far as sorting this out from (b) appreciation of the 
excellences instantiated by that person; (b), of course, need not be disinterested and 
could be egoistic. The limits of Aristotle’s understanding of love show up in his failure 
to notice the ambiguity in “loving a person for himself” (filei:n tina di j ejkei:non – a 
phrase which may be used to express either (a) or (b): thus in Rhet. 1361B37 and 
1381A5-6 di j ejkei:non is used to express exactly the same thing which is conveyed by 
ejkeivnou e}neka in 1380B36. But there are passages in which it is clearly used to 
express only (b): so, e.g., in N.E. 1157B3 oiJ d= ajgaqoi; di= auJtou;V fivloi` h|/ ga;r 
ajgaqoiv: here “A and B are good men and A loves B for B’s self” implies “A loves B 
because B is a good man and in so far as he is a good man.128 
 
Vlastos’s charge against Aristotle is that Aristotle fails to recognize that there is an 
ambiguity with respect to the phrase “loving for a person’s sake.” It can either mean 
loving for the interest of the person without regard to our interest or loving the qualities 
of that person as the final end. The first disjunct is unproblematic. But Vlastos points 
out that sometimes Aristotle only means the phrase in the sense expressed by the 
second disjunct, which is problematic. 
Perhaps Vlastos sees the second disjunct to be problematic because the 
particular individuals are not the objects of friendly love, which makes it impersonal. 
Whiting agrees with Vlastos that “Aristotle did not distinguish disinterested affection 
                                                
128. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 33, n.100. 
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for a person from the appreciation of her excellences.”129 However, she thinks that it is 
not a flaw at all, since “[Aristotle] took the appreciation of her excellences as such (and 
not as instruments for one’s own benefit) to constitute disinterested affection for 
her.”130 To understand Whiting’s remark, I suggest the following reasoning. First, since 
a friend is another self, then if a person loves herself for her own sake, she will do the 
same for a few other people. Second, when Aristotle talks about the friendship of a 
person with himself, he writes (1166a13-17): 
Now each of these is true of the good man’s relation to himself (and of all other men in 
so far as they think themselves good; excellence and the good man seem, as has been 
said, to be the measure of every class of things). For his opinions are harmonious, and 
he desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is 
good and what seems so, and does it (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual 
element (dianohtikou:) in him, which is thought to be the man himself). 
 
Aristotle has a strong claim that when one is loving himself based on the good, which 
entails the excellences, one is doing it for his own sake. Aristotle seems to claim that a 
good person must do something good for the sake of his “thinking part” or “mind,” 
which is his real self (1166a23).131 Third, we can extend this principle to another 
person: when we love other people for their excellences, we are doing it for their 
“intellectual element,” which is the “real” them or their individuality. Stewart gives a 
comment on this passage: 
To; noou:n or  to; dianohtikovn is the whole nature of man quâ conscious for itself of 
the harmonious action of all its parts. . . . The ‘personality,’ or self-identity, of man is 
not given in any separate impression of sense or feeling, or separate outgoing of desire; 
it exists only so far as impressions are related to one another, and desires are regulated. 
                                                
129. Jennifer E. Whiting, “Impersonal Friends,” Monist 74 (1991). 
130. Ibid.  
131. The question of whether there are “real” individuals in Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Reason (to; noou:n – to; dianohtikovn), as the source of all relations and rules, in the 
sphere of conduct as well as in that of science, is therefore the true man.132 
 
This way, when we love other people for their excellences, we love them for their own 
individuality and not for ours. In other words, it is a disinterested affection that we 
express to them based on their qualities. Moreover, Whiting reminds us that when we 
love ourselves, what we love is not always our individuality or uniqueness, but rather 
our excellences: we love ourselves in so far as we are good. A person seems to be 
irrational to love herself without any justification. The “problem” as stated by Vlastos 
seems to be perennial in so far as we are human beings who are acting for the sake of 
the good.  
Early in the EN, Aristotle writes that Pra:xiV te kai; proaivresiV, ajgaqou: 
tino;V ejfivesqai dokei: (1094a1-2). But then Aristotle presses the issue until the 
discussion of “the good” reaches an ultimate end, which is desired for its own sake – 
“in and of itself.” Now, Aristotle clearly does not like the notion of a Platonic Form of 
the “good” (1096a10-14). His notion of “the good” is tailored in accordance with the 
categories of being, e.g., the good of the category of substance is God or mind, of 
quality is virtue, of quantity is what is temperate. For Aristotle, the ultimate end of 
action is happiness (hJ eujdaimoniva), since it is always chosen for the sake of itself. 
Happiness itself is rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. This is not the 
case with honour, courage, pleasure, and other excellences. With these latter 
excellences, we choose them both for the sake of themselves qua what they are and for 
the sake of happiness. 
                                                
132. Stewart, 357. 
 102 
What can we make of this pursuit of the “complete end” with respect to our 
discussion of filiva? Aristotle clearly claims that filiva is one of the necessary external 
goods in a virtuous life.133 Filiva consists of feelings and actions. We may also say 
that filiva is a rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. The difference 
between eujdaimoniva and filiva is that the former is something perfect (tevleioV) and 
self-sufficient (aujtavrkhV), whereas filiva is always seen as an indispensable element 
in a complete life. At any rate, manifesting filiva is itself partially manifesting 
eujdaimoniva, since happiness is activity. 
I have said earlier that Aristotle sees the good with respect to substance as “God 
or mind.” But the idea of “substance” is the idea of what a thing really is, as I will 
show later in the discussion of the Unmoved Mover. Human beings must strive for 
happiness, which means that they must strive to be what they are in their essence. 
Happiness or the ultimate good is not something ontologically more real, more to be 
pursued than human beings. To be human (ajnqrwpeuvomai) is to act rationally and 
virtuously in every aspect of one’s being, including in manifesting filiva. Filiva is a 
partial manifestation of eujdaimoniva in the sense that both are activities, but the latter 
can be seen only as activity qua activity, whereas the former can be seen as both 
activity qua activity and activity qua friendship. I will leave this problem about the 
relationship between filiva as practical wisdom and eujdaimoniva as theoretical wisdom 
(contemplation) here. 
                                                
133. I will not pursue the discussion of the issue of “two lives” here. 
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What I hope to have shown is that it is true that in Aristotle’s theory of 
friendship, friends are always loved for the sake of himself and because of the 
excellences in them. But loving excellences in people means loving the whole person 
themselves. Furthermore, the excellences are a part of the goods that human beings 
must always achieve, which will culminate in happiness as the ultimate end. Our love 
for ourselves is always directed toward happiness as well, which in turn will bring us 
as human beings to love ourselves and one another again. Plato cannot say the same 
thing since his metaphysics requires a lover to always aim for the Form of the Good 
without allowing the lover to go back to the beloved or to himself once he has reached 
the true beauty. It is time now to discuss the ultimate good for the category of 
substance, viz., God or mind. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
ON BEING LOVED: 
MOTION AND THE UNMOVED MOVER 
IN ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS L  
Ai omo wan 
Hito wo omouwa 
Odera no 
Gaki no shirie ni 
Nukazuku gotoshi 
 
(To love somebody 
Who doesn’t love you 
Is like going to a temple 
And worshiping the behind 
Of a wooden statue 
Of a hungry devil.)134 
 
 
I have tried to show that with respect to human relationships, Aristotle sees 
e[rwV as something bad that must be avoided. The virtuous life must include of filiva, 
which is perfectly rational. However, Aristotle does not exclude e[rwV altogether in a 
virtuous life. He has a positive view of e[rwV in Metaphysics L. This chapter is 
principally an attempt to interpret what Aristotle means when he writes in 1072b3-4 
that the Unmoved Mover moves all things as being loved (wJV ejrwvmenon). Even though 
the idea of e[rwV is not much discussed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, nevertheless it 
appears in Aristotle’s explanation of motion and the Unmoved Mover, which are two 
of the most important subjects in Aristotle’s philosophy. Interesting as it is, this topic is 
also complicated because, by itself, the sentence in L7 is very hard to understand. To 
                                                
134. A poem by Lady Yakamochi, quoted in Solomon, About Love: Reinventing Romance for 
Our Times, 259-60. 
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interpret what Aristotle means, we need to discuss other issues, such as the nature of 
the Unmoved Mover and the nature of motion. After discussing these subjects, I hope 
to construct an acceptable interpretation of how the Unmoved Mover moves all things 
as being loved. 
In this chapter, I will defend three claims. (1) Motion is a process instead of an 
actuality of a certain degree of potentiality.135 (2) The Unmoved Mover is both a 
principle and a substance. It is possible to interpret a principle as a substance. 
Moreover, substance is a category of entity. (3) The best interpretation of the phrase wJV 
ejrwvmenon is that the Unmoved Mover moves all things by letting them follow their 
own nature. The idea of motion and love in Aristotle’s Metaphyiscs L is different from 
the one in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus. In Plato’s works, e[rwV in the immortal 
souls is directed toward the Platonic Forms, whereas in Aristotle’s writings, e[rwV is 
directed toward the first principle of actuality. In Plato’s philosophy, once the souls are 
able to gaze the Form of Beauty, they will abandon the images of that Beauty, 
including themselves. In Aristotle’s philosophy, when the souls are loving God, they 
return to themselves and manifest the perfect life that consists of filiva. 
Let us now proceed to discuss some background issues before we discuss these 
three subjects. 
 
 
                                                
135. I am not denying Aristotle’s description of motion as the actualisation of potentiality in 
the Physics. I am arguing against Kosman’s interpretation of motion as the actuality of a certain degree 
of potentiality. 
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1. Some Background Notes 
In Metaphysics A, Aristotle discusses Anaxagoras’ view that all things are 
eternal, and generated and destroyed only by aggregation and segregation (984a12-6). 
Aristotle is unsatisfied with this view because it does not provide an explanation of the 
beginning of movement. This concern reappears in Metaphysics L when Aristotle talks 
about Plato’s and Leucippus’ notions of eternal movement. He writes, “But why and 
what this movement is they do not say, nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do 
they tell us the cause of its doing so” (1071b32-35). In Metaphysics A, Aristotle 
mentions Hesiod’s and Parmenides’ idea of love (e[rwV) or desire (ejpiqumiva) as one 
causal explanation of the motion and combination of things in the universe (984b24). 
He moves on to discuss Empedocles’ theory of love (filiva)136 and strife as an attempt 
to explain the first principles of the universe. However, Aristotle finds that 
Empedocles’ account of love and strife as first principles of the universe is 
questionable because it confuses efficient and final cause.137 Still, these thinkers very 
well might have inspired Aristotle to relate the efficient cause of the universe to the 
concept of love. 
                                                
136. It seems that in Empedocles’ theory of love and strife, e[rwV and filiva are used 
interchangeably. 
137. See Harold Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, 222-3. “Some notion 
of an efficient cause might be attributed to Hesiod and Parmenides, for they both give an important place 
to Love in their cosmogonies as if they saw the need of a principle which sets in motion and combines 
things. This suggestion is meant only to serve as an introduction to Empedocles’ treatment of causality, 
for he made ‘Love’ an efficient cause but, since there is evil and disorder as well as good and order in 
the world, he introduced as a separate cause of the former a second force called ‘Strife.’ This Aristotle 
insists must be the real meaning of Empedocles although his inadequate expression may mislead readers; 
consequently in a sense Empedocles was the first to make Good and Evil first principles, since the cause 
of all goods is the Good itself. Here, then, as in the case of Anaxagoras, Aristotle finds a confusion 
between efficient and final cause.” 
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In Metaphysics B, Aristotle formulates some aporiai concerning movement. 
The first one is in the beginning of the book when Aristotle asks “whether the 
principles are universal or like individual things, and whether they exist potentially or 
actually; further, whether they are potential or actual in any other sense than in 
reference to movement” (996a9ff.). The answer to this question can be found in Q 
when Aristotle speaks about potentiality and actuality extending further than the sphere 
of motion (1046a1). Another aporia is mentioned in 999b3ff.: 
Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable; for all perceptible things perish and are 
in movement. But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be a process of coming 
to be; for that which comes to be, and that from which it comes to be, must be 
something, and the ultimate term in this series cannot have come to be, since the series 
has a limit and nothing can come to be out of that which is not. – Further, if generation 
and movement exist there must also be a limit; for no movement is infinite, but every 
movement has an end, and that which is incapable of completing its coming to be must 
be as soon as it has come to be. 
 
This aporia is concerned with the beginning of motion and the need for something 
eternal without which movement is impossible. I believe Aristotle partially answers 
this aporia in L where he talks about the Unmoved Mover as the explanation of 
motion.138 Interestingly, love is not connected with movement in B. The only place that 
might be related to our discussion is in 1000b10ff. when Aristotle talks about 
Empedocles and why hJ filovthV is not specially the cause of existence. The first 
principles must deal with the source of motion in order to be an explanation for beings 
                                                
138. In Met. G 1012b22ff., Aristotle writes, “Evidently those who say all things are at rest are 
not right, nor are those who say all things are in movement. For if all things are at rest, the same 
statements will always be true and the same always false, - but they obviously are not; for he who makes 
a statement himself at one time was not and again will not be. And if all things are in motion, nothing 
will be true; everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible. Again, it 
must be that which is that changes; for change is from something to something. But again it is not the 
case that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing for ever; for there is something which 
always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover must itself be unmoved.” I am using The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes. 
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qua being, which move and change in their life career: “And we know about 
becomings and actions and about every change when we know the source of the 
movement; and this is other than and opposed to the end” (996b22ff.). We are now 
ready to discuss the concept of movement in Aristotle’s philosophy and we will begin 
the discussion from the Physics. 
 
2. The Nature of Motion 
Motion is “the actuality of what potentially is, as such (hJ tou: dunavmei o[ntoV 
ejntelevceia, h/| toiou:ton).”139 According to Ross, “if there is something which is 
actually x and potentially y, motion is the making actual of its y-ness.”140 Following 
Aristotle in Physics, Ross illustrates this principle using the process of building, saying 
that motion is the bringing over of materials that are buildable into a house, i.e., into 
the state of being a house. The buildable is actualized only in the process of building, 
and not before or after the building. Movement or motion, then, occurs only in the 
process of the building because the potentiality of the buildable is still being actualized. 
Movement itself is a kind of actualization, but “one which implies its own 
incompleteness and the continued presence of potentiality.”141 Ross contrasts 
movement with activity (ejnevrgeia142) by saying that “in each moment of activity, 
                                                
139. Physics 201a11. 
140. Ross, Aristotle, 81. 
141. Ibid., 82. 
142. Aristotle uses two words for actuality: ejnevrgeia and ejntelevceia. For a lengthy discussion 
of these two words, see George A. Blair, “The Meaning of ‘Energeia’ and ‘Entelecheia’ in Aristotle:” 
101-117. Kosman is mostly concerned with whether these are equivalent. 
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potentiality is completely cancelled and transformed into actuality.”143 Incompleteness 
is the character of motion as opposed to the completeness of activity.  
Kosman, however, questions whether ejntelevceia must be understood as a 
process or a product.144 We have seen above that Ross sees this term as a process of 
actualization as opposed to ejnevrgeia as actuality. Kosman points out that defining 
motion as a process of actualization is problematic exactly because the ontological 
status of a process of actualizing a potentiality is unclear. Furthermore, referring to 
Physics III, motion indeed may be described as the actualizing of a potentiality, but it 
would be wrong to define it in that way because ejntelevceia obviously signifies a state 
of completeness or perfection in Aristotle’s writings.145 
The most serious problem to see ejntelevceia as a process of actualization is that 
this account leaves the phrase h/| toiou:ton mysterious. The actualization of a being qua 
anything at all would be some sort of motion. There is no point then to include the 
phrase in the definition. But Aristotle seems to take the phrase as a crucial part of the 
definition. Moreover, if we take the phrase seriously, we will not have the intended 
definition. The reason is that the actualization of, say, some bricks and stones qua 
potentially a house would not be the process of building but the process of the bricks 
and stones becoming (the bricks and stones as) potentially a house. The problem is that 
there is no process for bricks and stones to become potentially a house. Even if there is 
                                                
143. Ross, 82. 
144. Aryeh Kosman, “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion,” Aristotle: Critical Assessments, vol. II, 
ed. Lloyd P. Gerson, 35. 
145. Ross himself in his commentary to 1074a30 writes that “ejntelevceia means the resulting 
actuality or perfection” (Aristotle’s Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary). 
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such a process, we still have not arrived at the definition that Aristotle means, i.e., the 
process for bricks and stones as the buildable become a house as the built.  
Kosman, then, concludes that we need to take ejntelevceia as actuality rather 
than actualization. He understands Aristotle’s definition of motion as “the actuality of 
something which is potentially, but not qua what that something is actually at the 
moment, but qua what it is potentially.”146 Aristotle’s definition is seen as involving 
actuality of a potentiality, as opposed to actualization of a potentiality. Kosman 
interprets the phrase “as such” in the definition of motion in the beginning of Physics 
III as an explanatory remark for the actuality of a potentiality, such as the actuality of 
bronze qua potentially a statue. Besides having to recognize that there is actuality in 
potentiality, the definition of motion must also recognize potentiality as potentiality to 
be, e.g., the potentiality of bronze to be a statue, not to become being made into a 
statue. This is mandatory because Aristotle defines motion as the actuality of the 
potential qua potential. For bronze as the potential, the actuality is, for example, a 
statue, and not bronze-being-made-into-a-statue. The problem here is that motion is 
defined as a product and not a process. That is why the definition somehow must yield 
motion and not its result, e.g., the act of making a statue and not the statue as the 
product. 
In order to satisfy the above requirements for an adequate definition of motion, 
Kosman differentiates levels of actuality and potentiality based on De Anima. He 
illustrates what he means by actuality in a potentiality in this way: 
                                                
146. Kosman, 37. 
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Actually1 speaking Greek is then the deprivative actuality of the potentiality to 
potentially speak Greek, or the constitutive actuality of potentially(2) speaking Greek. 
We might say, to distinguish it from actually2 speaking Greek, that it is the actuality of 
the potentiality to speak Greek qua potentiality.147 
 
The deprivative actuality is an actuality that is obtained by depriving what is potential, 
whereas the constitutive actuality is obtained by developing what is potential. The 
potentiality in Aristotle’s definition of motion is similar to actually1 (first grade 
actuality) speaking Greek,148 i.e., the state where a person is really able to speak Greek 
but he or she is not using it, e.g., because he or she is sleeping. Motion itself is the 
manifestation (constitutive actuality) of that potentiality, which will cease once 
actuality2 is obtained. In Kosman’s words, “Motion, then, is the functioning, the full 
manifesting of a potentiality qua potentiality, or more precisely, the functioning of a 
being which is potential as that potential being.”149 In the case of building a house, the 
bricks and stones are having their full manifestation of potentiality as the buildable in 
the process of building. Kosman gives an analogy that might help us see this more 
clearly: 
as the exercise of a disposition is to that disposition, for example, actually2 speaking 
Greek to actually1 speaking Greek, so is motion to potentiality, e.g., the motion in (by) 
which bricks and stones are built into a house to the potentiality for being a house 
which those bricks and stones have when they are not being built, and so is the 
movable in motion to the movable at rest.150 
 
Here Kosman has succeeded in reconciling the idea that motion is actuality, but yields 
a process as well.  
                                                
147. Ibid., 45. 
148. See De Anima 412a16-b10. 
149. Kosman, 48. 
150. Ibid., 47. 
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Because the end of movement is having moved, movement is devoted to finally 
ceasing. Kosman contrasts movement with ejnevrgeia whose end is ejnevrgein, which is 
the acting itself. Motion is a kind of ejnevrgeia, but it is incomplete because it is a 
constitutive actuality of a potentiality that is directed to an end outside itself. One may 
ask what kind of ejnevrgeia it is that is complete, remembering that ejnevrgeia is a kind of 
transition from a disposition to act to actually doing the act, similar to motion as a 
transition from potentiality to actuality. The answer is that it is the ejnevrgeia that is 
always eternal because “its full actuality and realization are present in every instance of 
its occurrence.”151 It has an end that is in itself, viz., the energization (or the exercising) 
of a disposition to act. Kosman then relates the discussion of ejnevrgeia to God because 
God is not in motion, but always in actuality. We will return to this later when we 
discuss the nature of the Unmoved Mover.  
We will now discuss a criticism of Kosman’s account of movement presented 
by Daniel Graham.152 Graham insists that Kosman’s differentiation of levels of 
actuality and potentiality is not necessary to understand Aristotle’s notion of motion. 
Graham shows that there is a simple common structure given by Aristotle to explain 
the actuality of something in the form of “The actuality of the V-able is V-ing.”153 He 
cites several passages from the Physics to show that this is the case, such as: (1) The 
actuality of the alterable qua alterable is alteration (201a11ff.); (2) The actuality of that 
                                                
151. Ibid., 50. 
152. “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion,” Aristotle: Critical Assessments, vol. II, 55-64. 
153. Ibid., 58. 
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which can increase and diminish is increasing and diminishing (a12ff.); and (3) The 
actuality of the generable and perishable is generation and perishing (a14ff.).  
The difference between the views of Graham and Kosman is that the former 
sees Aristotle’s definition of motion in terms of the actuality of the V-able qua V-able, 
whereas the latter sees it in terms of the actuality of M qua V-able, where M refers to a 
variable ranging over matter terms. Kosman expresses some instances of his take on 
the definition, such as “bronze qua potentially a statue” and “the actuality of bricks and 
stones qua potentially something else.” Graham sees a problem with this interpretation 
because, for example, there is no essential relationship between being bronze and being 
potentially a statue. The definiens, however, must be essentially related to motion. The 
definition of motion as the actuality of X qua Y, where there is no essential connection 
between X and Y, is not an adequate one. Furthermore, Graham argues that including 
matter in the definition is not correct because matter cannot be transformed into a 
motion. For example, it is not true to say that building is an actuality of bricks qua 
bricks because bricks cannot be transformed into a motion. It is more proper to say that 
building is an actuality of the buildable qua buildable, where “buildable” does not 
convey any matter terms. “Buildable” is better understood as a dispositional state that 
can be actualized as a motion. Motion is an incomplete actuality not by contrast with a 
complete actuality, but simply because potentiality is essentially incomplete. Motion is 
by definition an incomplete actuality because it is an actuality of a potentiality that is 
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essentially incomplete. Graham interprets Aristotle’s idea of motion simply as “a 
process lying between the beginning and end states of a change.”154 
To bolster his claim that motion is a process, Graham gives a linguistic 
argument concerning the words o[ntoV and kivnhsiV. The argument goes like this: 
Greek morpho-syntax makes a strong distinction between on-going activities and 
complete events. The distinction is embodied in the contrast between the 'present' and 
the aorist verbal systems. The two systems are descendants of Proto-Indo-European 
aspectual systems, the features of which they largely retain, although in classical Greek 
they provide the vehicle for tense distinctions – but only in the ongoing processes, the 
aorist complete events. Verbal adjectives in -tovV ('-able') are constructed from the 
present stem; hence they correlate immediately with present-stem verb forms, but not 
with aorist stem verb forms. Consequently, there is no ambiguity in the Greek 
definition. The actuality corresponding to an adjective denoting potentiality is a verb 
denoting the ongoing actuality of a process. Moreover, the abstract noun in -siV, e.g., 
oijkodovmhsiV, is also built on the present stem, and Aristotle pointedly compares the 
abstract noun with a predication of the present-tensed verb (201a17f). In Greek there is 
simply no temptation to understand the potentiality expressed by the verbal adjective 
as being correlated with a completed action.155 
 
I agree with Graham’s interpretation of motion as an actuality of a process lying 
between the beginning and end states of a change.156 It is not necessary to ask what 
kind of a thing such a process is because it is not an issue for Aristotle. Aristotle seems 
to just assume that such a process occurs without further explanation. I interpret the 
change as not exclusively referring to organism, but also to inanimate things. This very 
well might fit with all types of change listed in L2, viz., the quality, quantity, 
locomotion, and genetic changes.157 This interpretation is supported by the fact that tou: 
                                                
154. Ibid., 61. 
155. Ibid. 
156. Though I cannot develop the question here, we may well ask whether the translation of 
ejntelevceia as actuality is adequate. 
157. Ross also sees these four types of change as four types of movement. See Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, cxxviii. 
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dunavmei o[ntoV can be understood as “of the thing existing as possibility.”158 
Furthermore, in Physics VIII.4, Aristotle talks about natural and unnatural motions of 
both animate and inanimate things.159 Motion is then really a kind of activity.  
  Having established this understanding of motion, we need to notice that 
Aristotle sees movement as belonging to the domain of physics (1069b1). Book L is an 
attempt to account for the source of movement by discussing the Unmoved Mover, a 
subject to which we now turn. 
 
3. The Nature of the Unmoved Mover 
 
The first question we need to ask is why then the Unmoved Mover is needed in 
Aristotle’s philosophical scheme. Aristotle begins his discussion in L by stating that 
substance is the object of his inquiry. There are three kinds of substance mentioned in 
L1: eternal sensible substance, perishable sensible substance, and eternal unmovable 
substance (1069a30-1069b1). The eternal sensible substances are the celestial bodies 
that will not be discussed until the beginning of L7. There Aristotle mentions that 
“there is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is 
motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first 
heavens must be eternal” (1072a20-25). The perishable sensible substances are 
terrestrial creatures such as plants and animals. These two kinds of substance belong to 
                                                
158. There should be a further discussion whether what is potential and what is possible is the 
same for Aristotle. 
159. See Sheldon M. Cohen, “Aristotle on Elemental Motion,” Aristotle: Critical Assessments, 
vol. II, 65-74. Cohen interestingly discuss about accidental natural motion, which is not the actualization 
of an intrinsic disposition towards movement.  
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the domain of physics because they imply movement. The third kind of substance 
belongs to another science because it is unmovable. In L6, Aristotle gives an argument 
for the necessity of the third kind of substance to exist. The first two substances will 
not be understood fully unless there is another kind of substance that addresses the 
need for a source of the movement.  
The argument given by Aristotle in Metaphysics L6 is intended to prove that 
there must be an eternal unmovable substance. Aristotle seems to be giving several 
steps of argument, beginning with this: 
For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things 
are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either come into being or 
cease to be; for it must always have existed. Nor can time come into being or cease to 
be; for there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist.160 
 
There are two reasons for the existence of an eternal substance here. The first reason is 
related to motion:  
(1) The eternal substance exists because otherwise all things are destructible. 
(2) If motion is eternal, then it is not true that all things are destructible.  
(3) Motion is eternal. 
From (2) and (3), we get: 
(4) It is not true that all things are destructible. 
Premise (4) is the denial of the second disjunct of (1), which results in: 
(5) The eternal substance exists. 
Premise (1) could be changed by material implication into: (1a) If it is not true 
that the eternal substance exists, then all things are destructible. One might object that 
                                                
160. Metaphysics 1071b5-10. 
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(1) is a false disjunct. For example, Berti argues that it is not correct to say that there 
must be an eternal substance in order to prevent all things from being destructible. 
There can be only perpetual in generating and corrupting substances affecting one 
another.161 Nor is the existence of an eternal substance required in an eternal time 
because there can be many non-continuous, but only contiguous (ejcovmenai) things, i.e., 
things that are in succession and touching one another.162 Yet Aristotle in On 
Generation and Corruption II.9-11 thinks that if everything is perishable, then at some 
time in the past no thing would have existed. In those passages, Aristotle speaks about 
eternal things that are of necessity, so that it is impossible for them not to be. It is 
necessary that the eternal imperishable things are because motion is eternal, which 
entails that there must be continuous coming-to-be of things. Motion itself is prior to 
the coming-to-be of things. But if motion is eternal, then the substance that causes 
motion must be eternal as well. Therefore, the existence of an eternal substance is 
indispensable if there is to be the coming-to-be of things. This substance is identified 
by Aristotle as God:163 
Now being . . . is better than not-being; but not all things can possess being, since they 
are too far removed from the principle. God therefore adopted the remaining 
alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be 
uninterrupted; for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, 
because that coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually is the closest 
approximation to eternal being.164 
 
                                                
161. Enrico Berti, “The Unmoved mover(s) as efficient cause(s) in Metaphysics L6,” Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum, eds. Michael Frede and David Charles, 183. 
162. Physics 227a10. 
163. It seems that Aristotle is treating qeovV as if it were a proper name. 
164. On Generation and Corruption, 336b27-337a1. 
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 The second reason for the existence of an eternal substance is related to time. 
Premise (3), which says that motion is eternal, is proven by the fact that time is eternal. 
Time is eternal because there could not be a before and an after where time does not 
exist. In the Physics, time is differentiated from motion because motion has a particular 
spatial location whereas time does not and because motion could be fast or slow 
whereas time could not (218b21-219a10). However, time does not exist without change 
or movement. Aristotle thinks that if the state of our minds does not change at all, or if 
we have not noticed its changing, then we do not think that time has elapsed. David 
Bostock holds  that Aristotle’s argument is inadequate because “time may pass without 
our noticing it (as when we are asleep), and there is no obvious reason to think that 
during all that time there has been movement, even if we grant that when we do notice 
the passing of time that is because we notice some movement.”165 Bostock argues 
further that it is possible that even if there is no change, time still elapses. Aristotle’s 
argument that time is something that belongs to movement, i.e., an attribute of 
movement, is weak. Yet if time is indeed an attribute of movement, and if time is 
eternal, then movement must also be eternal.  
 Now we need to discuss premise (2). Behind this premise, there are some 
arguments from De Caelo I.12 concerning the necessity of the existence of such eternal 
being. Aristotle believes that anything that always exists is absolutely imperishable, 
i.e., that what always is cannot not be. In the formal mode, this claim could be stated as 
“if it is always the case that p, then it is necessary that p.”  Waterlow argues that the 
                                                
165. David Bostock, “Aristotle’s Account of Time,” Aristotle: Critical Assessments, vol. II, 
145. 
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proposition is synthetic instead of analytic. This means that the movement from the 
antecedent to the consequent is supported by some other assumptions. One of the 
assumptions is that “in De Caelo I.12 Aristotle operates from a conception of 
possibility as temporalized and relative to the actual.”166 It seems that Aristotle is 
referring only to the things that always are throughout an infinite time that is depicted 
as one single time. Now we could see that the Unmoved Mover is necessarily eternal if 
there has to be eternal continuous movement. In this context, it is necessary that the 
Unmoved Mover exists, which implies that it is imperishable. This conclusion is 
compatible with premise (2) that it is not true that all things are destructible. 
The aforementioned argument supports the claim that there must be an eternal 
substance. But this argument is speaking more about the indestructibility of the 
substance, which is a consequence of the eternity of the substance.  It is obvious that 
the eternity of the substance does not necessarily entail that the substance is unmovable 
since Aristotle allows that there are eternal movable substances such as the first 
heavens. But Aristotle clearly relates the eternity of the substance to its unmovability in 
the next argument, that this eternal substance must be unmovable because otherwise no 
movement is possible.  
Let us now move on to Aristotle’s arguments for an unmovable substance. In 
1071b124, Aristotle writes, 
But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is 
not actually doing so, there will not be movement; for that which has a capacity need 
not exercise it. 
 
                                                
166. Sarah Waterlow, Passage and Possibility, 49. 
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Here Aristotle argues for a moving substance, and this apparently alludes to the 
argument treated in Physics VIII.4-5 even though Aristotle on this occasion does not 
speak about the impossibility of the infinite regress of the movers to argue for the 
Unmoved Mover. In Physics, Aristotle argues that every movement is moved by 
another thing because the actuality that moves must be a different thing from the 
potentiality that is moved. A thing cannot be the potentiality and the actuality at the 
same time or it will yield contradiction (257b2ff.). In L 1071b12ff., the eternal moving 
substance must be always moving because otherwise no movement is possible and 
there will be no explanation for eternal movement. Moreover, the eternal substance 
must be actuality because it is the one that moves all potentiality. Consequently, 
compatible with the definition of motion as the actualization of what is potential, the 
eternal substance is unmovable because it is pure actuality. 
 Another description of the eternal substance mentioned in this section is that it 
is immaterial. The argument is that because the eternal substance is eternal, therefore it 
must be without matter because matter implies change (1069b13ff.). Here an obvious 
problem arises, viz., how could an immaterial substance move material things. We will 
save this discussion for later. Now, let us first look at how Randall interprets the nature 
of the Unmoved Mover. 
 To Randall, the Unmoved Mover is the “reason why,” the diovti, the ajrchv of 
motion.167 Motion has no efficient cause. The Unmoved Mover is neither the creator 
nor originator of motion. Rather, it is a principle of intelligibility or a logical 
                                                
167. John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle, 133-44. 
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explanation of motion. It is neither a physical cause nor a force, but a natural law. 
Randall contends that L “has no real place in Aristotle’s metaphysics, taken as his 
mature First Philosophy.”168 Randall seems to be very skeptical about the existence of 
the Unmoved Mover as an independent immaterial oujsiva. He thinks that Aristotle is 
committing a fallacy of hypostatizing an ideal, i.e., “the fallacy of taking an intelligible 
structure distinguished in experience, and feeling so intensely toward it as a human 
ideal, that he makes it into an independent, self-existing ousia or substance.”169 Randall 
thinks that Aristotle was perhaps still a Platonist when he wrote L. The same goes with 
his interpretation on De Anima’s “Active Intellect,” which he sees as a mythical 
element in Aristotle’s philosophy.  
 Randall’s interpretation is quite radical, since it supposes that L is not a 
coherent part of Aristotle’s metaphysical corpus. It is tempting just to dismiss L as an 
independent mythical treatise, but there is another route to maintain that the account of 
the Unmoved Mover is indeed an independent immaterial oujsiva. One interpretation is 
offered by Kosman.170   
 Kosman sees the mode of divine being as a formal principle of the substance-
being in general. He tries to explain why Aristotle only offers an ontology of substance 
rather than a general ontology like that discussed in the Categories. He sees that 
Aristotle’s theory of oujsiva as an explanation of his general theory of being, “his 
                                                
168. Ibid., 136. 
169. Ibid., 140. 
170. Aryeh Kosman, “Divine Being and Divine Thinking in Metaphysics Lambda:” 165-188. 
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ousiology for the sake of his ontology.”171 Unlike Randall, Kosman sees L as a general 
enterprise of the Metaphysics as a whole. Kosman understands the relationship 
between substance-being and being in general, the relationship made possible by the 
pro;V e{n structure of being (Z4), as analogous to the relationship between the Unmoved 
Mover and substance itself. The divine substance, according to Kosman, is an 
explanation not primarily of the existence of the world, but as an ajrchv of substance-
being, and then transitively as an explanation for being in general (being qua being). In 
Kosman’s words, 
The divine substance is there [in Lambda] identified by Aristotle as the ajrch;...h|V hJ 
oujsiva ejnevrgeia – the principle whose oujsiva is ejnevrgeia, whose essential being is that 
very activity of its nature which in Book Theta Aristotle has discovered for us to be the 
principle of an entity’s oujsiva. When I specify the oujsiva of any natural entity, I do so 
in terms of the specific mode of activity involved in the acting out of that entity’s 
substantial nature.172 
 
Kosman is arguing that because the essence of the divine substance is actuality, then 
the divine substance is explanatory for substance-being with respect to the fact that we 
understand a substance-being in terms of actuality. For example, we understand the 
substance of human beings in terms of their actuality, viz., the living characteristic of 
human beings such as eating, walking, drinking, etc. 
Substance-being, in turn, is explanatory for being in general. Kosman writes, 
“oujsiva is not a category of entity, but a category of being, and its primacy in 
Aristotle’s ontology as well as its explanatory power derive from this fact.”173 Kosman 
                                                
171. Ibid.: 167. 
172. Ibid.: 176-7. 
173. Ibid.: 176. 
 123 
uses the argument from Z1 to show that understanding oujsiva will allow us to 
understand other modes of being: 
We think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or 
what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we 
know each of these things also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is. 
(1027a36ff.) 
 
This quotation indicates that the relationship between substance and other modes of 
being is not one in which the instances of predicate-being are dependent for their being 
on certain subjects, but rather one in which the modes of being exhibited in the things 
that have subject characteristics (and are most suited to be subjects) are explained. The 
fact that oujsiva has two aspects, viz., determinacy and determinability, makes it a 
paradigm of a subject. Determinacy is the fact that a substance is what it is and has an 
essence, an unqualified tovde ti, a determinate this. Determinability is the fact that a 
substance more than any other being is capable of being further determined. The 
priority of understanding oujsiva as a way to understand other modes of being is also 
obvious from Z4 1030a18ff. where Aristotle speaks about the homonymy of “what a 
thing is.” Aristotle believes that the “what” belongs simply (aJplw:V) to substance, but 
in a limited sense to the other categories. Therefore, understanding substance as the 
paradigm tiv ejsti of being is the way to explain the derivative “what” of other 
categories.  
We need to make an additional note on Kosman’s claim that oujsiva is not a 
category of entity. The claim is discussed by virtue of the fact that numerical identity 
does not entail equivalence of being. For example, even if a white human being is a 
 124 
human being, it is not true to say that their ei\nai is the same, i.e., the being of a white 
human being (to; leukw/: ajnqrwvpw/ ei\nai) is not the same as the being of a human 
being (to; ajnqrwvpw/ ei\nai). Kosman’s argument is that if we see oujsiva as a category 
of entity rather than a category of being, then we will conjecture that an individual 
white human being is an oujsiva. Kosman thinks that it is a misreading of Aristotle’s 
project in the Metaphysics. 
 Kosman’s interpretation is very enlightening, yet his contention that oujsiva is 
not a category of entity might be problematic. Shields writes a response to Kosman, 
insisting that it is precisely because oujsiva is a category of entity, and not merely a 
mode of being, that it underpins the existence of all o[nta.174 Shields insists that if 
Socrates is white and a substance, then it will be true to say that a white thing (to; 
leukovn) is an oujsiva. Shields remarks, 
If some feature of Aristotle’s ontology had the consequence that x could be 
numerically identical with y without sharing all of y’s properties, then there would be 
something seriously wrong with his ontology.175 
 
The fact that Aristotle sees to; fdative ei\nai and to; ydative ei\nai as distinct, along with 
the coincidence that the same thing is both f and y, implies that one and the same 
entity can fall under different sortals. This means that being a white man will not fall 
under the substance sortal, while being a man will. However, a white man is still an 
oujsiva for the reason that a white man W is identical with the man W.  
                                                
174. Christopher Shields, “Commentary on Kosman’s ‘Divine Being and Divine Thinking in 
Metaphysics Lambda:” 189-201. 
175. Ibid.: 193. 
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 Shields believes that the discussion of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC) 
in G confirms that all beings “have a property beyond satisfying the PNC, viz., the 
relational property of depending for their existence on the existence of oujsiva.”176 In 
discussing PNC, Aristotle emphasizes the need for a substance being a subject for its 
attributes. The fact that there are many separate subjects indicates that these subjects 
are separate entities, which implies that substance is a category of entity. Shields thinks 
that we could still appreciate the importance of L and the Unmoved Mover without 
giving up the notion that oujsiva is a category of entity. 
 Based on the above discussions, we can conclude that the Unmoved Mover is 
not only a principle of intelligibility, but also an immaterial oujsiva, a thing, an entity, 
and the fullest actuality itself, which serves as the ultimate explanation for motion. We 
are now ready to discuss how such an Unmoved Mover moves all things as being 
loved. 
 
4. On Being Loved 
 At the outset, it must be admitted that an interpretation of the phrase in 1072b3-
4 is likely to be speculative for two reasons: (1) there are many interpretations of the 
nature of the Unmoved Mover and the nature of motion, and (2) the rest of the 
Metaphysics does not talk at all about what “being loved” means. However, we can try 
to construct an interpretation that is supported by adequate arguments. I am aware, 
though, that there will not be one single interpretation that can satisfy all people. 
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 We can start off by discussing a comment made by Leo Elders on this passage. 
Elders writes, 
In a26 Aristotle interrupted his argument for an unmoved Mover, to speak about the 
way in which the object of desire moves. He now returns to this First Mover and says 
that it moves by being desired. The wJV probably serves the purpose of qualifying the 
unusual ejrwvmenon (ejra:n applies to human love). Aristotle could not use the term 
ojrektovn, for an object of desire is not always actually desired [footnote: 'To desire' 
does not always have the pregnant sense of ejra:n, and thus, in the English translation, 
as need not be added.]. It would seem that only things which have mind can experience 
this desire and that Aristotle is thinking here of the celestial bodies.177 
 
It is not totally clear why Elders says that Aristotle could not use the term ojrektovn. In 
1072a26 Aristotle writes "kinei: de w|de to; ojrekto;n kai; to; nohto;n ouj kinouvmena,” 
which is seen as analogous to the Unmoved Mover, viz., like the object of desire and of 
thought, the Unmoved Mover moves without being moved. It seems that Elders is 
arguing that because the Unmoved Mover is being loved continually, then he is not an 
object of desire, but of love. 
 Elders gives a footnote about the English translation that could drop "as" 
because “to desire” does not always have the pregnant sense of ejra:n. Maybe he is 
saying that ejra:n implies an act of love that is always and actually. Hence “as” could be 
dropped from the sentence because the Unmoved Mover is ever loved by all things and 
“as” is an unnecessary word. 
 Elders points out that the Unmoved Mover moves the celestial bodies by being 
loved. Now we encounter the crux of the matter here. First, we have concluded that 
motion in Aristotle is mainly a realization of what is possible, i.e., a process of 
actualizing what is potential. If the Unmoved Mover moves the celestial bodies, then 
                                                
177. Leo Elders, Aristotle's Theology, 174. 
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the Unmoved Mover actualizes what is potential in them. We have seen above that a 
substance is best described as its actuality, i.e., its unique activity as that kind of 
substance. Aristotle describes the unique activity of the celestial bodies as eternally and 
spatially moving in a circle (1072a20-5), e.g., the rotation of the stars around the earth. 
It is still an open question how the Unmoved Mover causes the rotation of material 
things. 
Second, the picture is complicated by the fact that Aristotle mentions about 
fifty-five spheres that move the planets (1074a1-15). It seems that the Unmoved Mover 
first moves these spheres or “intelligences” and then transitively moves the planets. 
How the Unmoved Mover moves the spheres is also still a question, but we may 
presume that it moves them as being loved as well. We understand that the spheres 
move the planets by serving as an end: “they will cause change as being an end of 
movement” (1074a23-5). But it is still a problem whether the Unmoved Mover serves 
as an efficient cause, a formal cause, or a final cause of all movements. Ross writes, 
There has been much controversy over the question whether God is for Aristotle only 
the final cause, or the efficient as well, of change. There can be no doubt about the 
answer. ‘Efficient cause’ is simply the translation of Aristotle ajrch; th:V kinhvsewV, and 
God is certainly this. The truth is that the opposition of ou| e{neka to ajrch; kinhvsewV is 
not a well-chosen one. The ou| e{neka is one kind of ajrch; kinhvsewV.178 
 
Ross’ solution is to redefine what “efficient cause” means given the fact that the phrase 
is a loose translation of ajrch; th:V kinhvsewV. The Unmoved Mover is both the final 
and the efficient cause for all movements, i.e., it serves as an efficient cause by being a 
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final cause. However, the Unmoved Mover is not an end existing as a future ideal. It 
exists eternally and is perpetually moving things.  
Third, the Unmoved Mover is immaterial. It is not possible to see wJV ejrwvmenon 
as the physical force of the Unmoved Mover’s to move what is material. One might 
object by saying that perhaps the Unmoved Mover is like a magnetic force. However, 
Aristotle never talks about it in such a way. It is not possible either for the Unmoved 
Mover to exercise a mental force to other things because it only thinks of itself. This 
fact supports my suggested interpretation of wJV ejrwvmenon that the Unmoved Mover 
moves all things that are in fact actualizing their own natural potentials. 
Fourth, there is a discussion in Ross about whether the celestial bodies are 
living things. The idea is that because the celestial bodies can love the Unmoved 
Mover, then they must have some kind of a soul to love. This is similar to a Platonic 
argument about why the celestial bodies move.179 One alternative is to see that a soul 
resides within them just as the soul of human beings moves human bodies. Ross takes 
some insights from De Caelo 285a29, 292a20, b1 that they are living beings. He 
suggests that life and soul must be seriously ascribed to them. Hence he thinks that 
“desire” and “love” in L are not merely used in a metaphorical sense. But it is difficult 
to interpret these terms in a literal sense because it is clear that the only things that have 
soul in Aristotle’s physics are organisms.  
Fifth, Kosman has an interesting suggestion that the Unmoved Mover serves as 
the paradigm of being, in the sense that it is pure actuality and activity (ejnevrgeia). 
                                                
179. Laws 899. 
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Since all things have a potentiality yet to be actualized, then all things “passionately 
yearn” to reach actuality. In other words, there is no end outside of the things 
themselves. Their ends are their own nature. Kosman makes use of some insights from 
De Anima and the notion of a threptic soul to bolster the claim that the Unmoved 
Mover is an explanation of the generation and decay of animals.  The threptic soul has 
two related functions, viz., nutrition and reproduction: 
The acts in which [the threptic soul] manifests itself are reproduction and the use of 
food, because for any living thing that has reached its normal development and which 
is unmutilated, and whose mode of generation is not spontaneous, the most natural act 
is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, 
in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine.180 
 
The above quotation suggests that the partaking in the divine life simply is living a 
natural life according to one’s nature. That which is natural partakes in the principle of 
generation and decay, i.e., the Unmoved Mover, in their life career.  
 The question is now whether it is possible to interpret a principle as an oujsiva, 
which is an entity. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle very often speaks about principles and 
causes. In the Greek, kaiv can very well be translated as “that is.” Most likely, Aristotle 
sees principles and causes as the same things. In A, Aristotle mentions that “God is 
thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle” (983a8-9). This 
is not Aristotle’s view, but a view held by thinkers before him. Yet Aristotle himself 
takes God as the first principle of the universe: “On such a principle, then, depend the 
heavens and the world of nature” (1072b13-15). The principle is the principle of 
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actuality that attracts emulation for other things. The state of actuality is seen as the 
state of pleasure that all things are supposed to achieve:  
God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, 
and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. 
We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and 
duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God. (1072b25-30) 
 
There is an indication that a principle (ajrchv) is a substance (oujsiva) in 1070b22-25: 
“and that which moves a thing or makes it rest is a principle and a substance.” Another 
possible proof text that substance could be a principle is from 1071a16-25: 
The primary principles of all things are the actual primary ‘this’ and another thing 
which exists potentially. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. 
For the individual is the source of the individuals. For while man is the cause of man 
universally, there is no universal man; but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your 
father of you, and this particular b of this particular ba, though b in general is the cause 
of ba taken without qualification. 
 
This passage seems to exclude universals as the causes of things. Aristotle insists that 
only particulars could be causes of other particulars, never universals. From H1 we 
could conjecture that Peleus is a substance since all natural bodies are substances. 
Aristotle says that Peleus is the principle or cause of Achilles. But we need to ask 
whether it is Peleus as a compound of form and matter or Peleus’ form that really is the 
cause of Achilles. Aristotle writes that the primary causes of particulars are twofold, 
viz., a “this” that is first in actuality as the efficient cause and another thing that exists 
potentially as the material cause. The “this” could refer both to Peleus as a compound 
of form and matter, which is the external cause of man (a father), and to Peleus’ form 
that is somehow “transferred” to Achilles. Both a compound and a form are kinds of 
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substance.181 In L, however, Aristotle argues that form in the sense of a universal 
cannot be the cause of particulars. Perhaps, in this context, it is better to see that Peleus 
as a compound of form and matter and Peleus’ particular form are the efficient causes 
of Achilles. At any rate, it is possible to see an efficient cause or a principle as a 
substance. If God is the ultimate cause of movements, it is possible then to see him as 
both a principle and a substance, i.e., a thing. Based on our discussion of Shields’ view, 
we could add that substance is a category of entity, not only a way of being. However, 
God cannot be a compound because he is immaterial. This might create a problem 
since God needs to be interpreted as some kind of a form to other things that are moved 
by him, which function as some kind of matter. But Aristotle never really explains the 
relationship between God and other things in this way. Moreover, matter is 
unconscious so that there cannot be a relationship of “love” between it and God as its 
form. I will leave this issue as an aporia now.  
Back to the phrase wJV ejrwvmenon, we might be able to connect it to EN. One 
passage that may be relevant is in 1175a10-20 where Aristotle writes, 
Why does everyone desire pleasure? We might think it is because everyone also aims 
at being alive. Living is a type of activity, and each of us is active toward the objects 
he likes most and in the ways he likes most. 
 
Pleasure itself is a state of soul obtained in a continuous life of contemplation, i.e., the 
life of study. In 1177b1ff. Aristotle speaks about study that is liked because of itself 
alone. Human beings have a divine element in them and this element is related to 
continuous study. God himself always enjoys one simple pleasure without change. We 
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could construct an interpretation of God in EN that is more or less similar to what we 
have in L. It seems obvious to me that in both EN and L, God is pure activity and 
actuality. The state of full actuality is being yearned for by all things according to their 
own nature.182 In this sense, God moves all things as being loved. 
  
5. Aristotle’s Revision of Platonic e [rwV 
It is time to compare the account of love and motion in Metaphysics L with the 
one in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus to see Aristotle’s revision of Platonic e[rwV. In 
the Symposium, e[rwV is either directed toward the particular individuals or the Forms. 
There is no mention of motion in the Symposium. The Phaedrus gives a more explicit 
account of motion than the Symposium with its analysis of immortal souls as self-
moving entities. They are the ajrcaivv or the original sources of motion (245c9). They 
are driven by e[rwV, which is a desire to have something, to “fly” to the Forms. Blyth’s 
analysis of the soul’s self-motion is helpful here:  
I infer that soul’s self-motion in Phdr. is portrayed as taking three forms: (a) self-
alteration, consisting in the arising of forms in a soul as subject, which becomes 
identified in belief with them (i.e., serial embodiment) . . . ; (b) that activity, let us call 
it generative, whereby divine soul, while not self-identified with body, maintains and 
orders the cosmos . . . ; and (c) cognitive rotation . . . . It seems clear that (a) is a 
deviation from the combination of (b) and (c), resulting from the corruption of erōs.183  
 
                                                
182. Erich Frank writes, “This God, then, although He dwells in the ether and is superior to the 
change of the terrestrial world, and in that respect is transcendent, yet is finally immanent in nature as its 
true substance” (“The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle:” 180). With respect to the 
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which “illuminates” the nou:V in its turn, thereby creating its power (duvnamiV) of thinking and 
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Anima 432 a 2; 429 a 15),” ibid.: 179. 
183. Dougal Blyth, “The Ever-Moving Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus:” 193. 
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According to Blyth, e[rwV is the force of the self-motion since self-motion is 
teleological. That means, there is no external cause for the motion, yet it is directed 
toward some ends. In the Platonic metaphysical scheme, these ends (the Forms) are 
ontologically separate from the souls and seem to be directing the eyes of the souls in 
such a way that the souls will eventually forget about themselves while gazing the 
beauty of the Forms.184 This is even true with respect to the case (a), in which the souls 
of the lovers are corrupted by sexual intercourse. 
The difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s eternal moving entities is that 
for the latter, it is the heavenly bodies that are primarily moving eternally, whereas for 
the former, it is the “invisible principle within them and all other living bodies.”185 But 
the more fundamental difference between the two is that Aristotle believes in the idea 
of the Unmoved Mover, whereas Plato does not. Aristotle’s idea of a single principle of 
movement appears in De Caelo I.10: 
if the movement is to be continuous, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, 
ungenerated, and incapable of alteration; and if the circular movements are more than 
one, they must all of them, in spite of their plurality, be in some way subordinated to a 
single principle. (337a19-21).  
 
In the Aristotelian metaphysical scheme, organisms have the principle of motion in 
themselves, as obvious in the Physics. However, Aristotle gives an explanation of 
motion in terms of potentiality and actuality. The fact that organisms are still changing 
or moving requires an actuality that makes the change possible in the first place. The 
same requirement is imposed upon anything that is still moving, even eternal entities. 
                                                
184. The Phaedo (74d-75b) and Timaeus (29a-32b) would further suggest that the order of 
change and diversification is governed by (erotic) striving to constitute an image of the forms” (ibid.: 
211). 
185. Ibid.: 195. 
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The fact that they are moving requires a prior actuality that makes the movement 
possible. Furthermore, a single principle of all movement is required because 
conceptually speaking, it is one pure actuality that can serve as the first explanation of 
all movement, whether it is eternal or not. Aristotle seems to be adding to Plato this 
notion of pure actuality to bring a more complete explanation of reality. 
Another important difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies is 
that in the Phaedrus, the souls move toward the Forms because of love, whereas in the 
Metaphyiscs L, the souls move toward their own perfection by loving the Unmoved 
Mover, which is a separate entity. I said earlier that the souls in the Phaedrus will 
eventually disregard themselves for the sake of the Forms. In Aristotle’s philosophy, 
e[rwV brings the souls to God, but then brings them back to themselves. But the 
paradox is that the perfection for human beings is nothing other than an acceptance for 
their imperfection and interdependency with their fellow human beings. Nussbaum has 
mentioned that filiva embraces the half, whereas Platonic e[rwV is craving for 
wholeness and perfection. In my reading, Aristotelian e[rwV in Metaphysics L is also a 
craving for wholeness and perfection, but in a paradoxical way. This metaphysical 
paradox makes filiva the center of Aristotle’s ethics: the e[rwV for God is manifested in 
human beings’ filiva for both particular individuals and wisdom. As a note, there is no 
specific account of filiva in Metaphysics L except at places where Aristotle talks 
about Empedocles’ theory of love and strife (e.g., 985a3-6, 996a8). 
I have brought up three issues in this chapter. First, I have discussed the nature 
of motion in Aristotle’s philosophy. Motion is the actuality of what is potential. It is the 
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actuality of a process, which consists in a transformation from potentiality to actuality. 
Second, I have tried to show that the Unmoved Mover is both a principle and a 
substance, which is a category of entity. Third, the best interpretation of the phrase wJV 
ejrwvmenon is that it moves all things by letting them follow their own nature. 
Aristotle, indeed, does not speak much about love in his Metaphysics, yet he 
uses the language of love to explain reality. Maybe he is still influenced by a concept in 
Empedocles that love is what unites the many.186 Perhaps he is influenced by the 
speech of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium that love is some kind of a harmony.187 
These are all speculations. At any rate, Aristotle needs a unifier for his ontology and 
cosmology. Love seems to be the best candidate for that task. As a last comment, if 
there is a love story between the Unmoved Mover and all things that are moved by 
him, then it is a tragic one. Unfortunately, the Unmoved Mover only loves himself. 
Fortunately, all things are not weary of loving him. Life goes on. 
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187. Symposium 188a. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 What is Aristotle’s revision of Platonic e[rwV and filiva? Below are summaries 
of the main points I have tried to show in my thesis. 
 
1. On e [rwV  
Plato’s Symposium gives a dilemma with respect to the objects of e[rwV, viz., 
between loving particular individuals and loving the Form of Beauty. The disjunction 
is mutually exclusive. The problem with loving particular individuals is that it is 
temporary and full of negative emotions. The advantage with loving particular 
individuals is that it is human. The problem with loving the Form of Beauty is that it 
does not allow one to take the first step of the scala amoris at all. Also, it is too divine 
a love. The advantage with loving the Form of Beauty is that it is eternal and perfectly 
rational.  
 Plato’s Phaedrus can be seen as a possible solution to the dilemma. In the 
Phaedrus, e[rwV is redefined to be something perfectly virtuous. One can love particular 
individuals en route to the Beautiful. Even though there is no mutually exclusive 
disjunction anymore, the problem remains about whether one can love particular 
individuals genuinely for their sake. This is an important issue to deal with because, 
intuitively, true love should be non-egoistic. 
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 Aristotle’ EN sees e[rwV primarily in terms of human relationships. The objects 
of e[rwV in EN are particular individuals. However, this kind of e[rwV must be avoided. 
Aristotle escapes the horns of the dilemma given in Plato’s Symposium by rejecting to 
approve e[rwV at all with respect to loving particular individuals. 
 Aristotle’s Metaphysics L mentions God as the object of e[rwV. However, since 
loving God means loving own’s own nature, human beings must strive for filiva in 
their relationships with one another. 
 
2. On fili va 
 Plato’s Symposium seems to have an implicit dilemma with respect to the 
objects of filiva. Sometimes is filiva used for inanimate objects, such as horses and 
wine. At other times, filiva is directed toward particular individuals in the context of 
human friendships. In the case of Aristophanes and Socrates, filiva is identical with 
e[rwV; hence the same dilemma is also present here with the objects of filiva. 
 Plato’s Phaedrus gives a possible solution to the dilemma in the Symposium 
with respect to the objects of filiva. Filinais directed both to particular individuals for 
the sake of attaining true beauty and wisdom. 
 Aristotle’s EN has to deal with whether it is possible to genuinely love a friend 
for her sake when one has to love also for the sake of the good. The solution to this 
problem is both ethical and metaphysical. First, the ethical solution hinges upon 
Aristotle’s notion of a friend as another self. When a person loves someone for the sake 
of the good, the good will bring her back into loving the individual qua the individual 
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as she loves herself qua individual. Furthermore, Aristotle requires that someone loves 
herself in so far she is good. That means, loving one’s own self is also about 
excellences and not only about loving one’s own individuality. Second, the 
metaphysical solution is that the excellences or the good are not something 
ontologically independent of human beings. The fact that the ultimate good is one’s 
own perfected nature brings human beings back to themselves in the enterprise of 
friendship, which consequently will make them love their fellow human beings for 
their excellences and their individuality. 
 Aristotle’s Metaphysics L mentions the Unmoved Mover the object of filiva, 
but not human particular individuals. Aristotle also discusses Empedocles’ account of 
love (filiva) and strife, and also wisdom as the object of filiva (philosophy).  
 
3. On the Relationship Between e [rwV and fili va 
 Plato’s Symposium has three views on the relationship between e[rwV and filiva. 
The first is Phaedrus’ position that e[rwV is an elevator of filiva. The second is 
Pausanias-Eryximachus-Agathon’s position that e[rwV is the originator of filiva. The 
third is Aristophanes-Socrates-Diotima’s position that e[rwV is filiva (for Aristophanes, 
the objects of Love are particular individuals, whereas for Socrates-Diotima the objects 
of Love is the beautiful). The Symposium sees both e[rwV and filiva to be indispensable 
in a virtuous life. 
 Plato’s Phaedrus has two views concerning the relationship between e[rwV and 
filiva. The first is that e[rwV is the counterpart of filiva, both of which are directed 
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toward particular individuals. The origins of the two might be different. It is possible to 
have a life with filiva but without e[rwV, which is a life that is not totally virtuous. 
However, it seems that it is not possible to have e[rwV without filiva in a virtuous life. 
The second view is e[rwV is filiva with respect to wisdom (philosophy). 
 Aristotle’s EN sees e[rwV as the bad excess of filiva, which must be avoided in 
a virtuous life in the context of human relationships. 
 Aristotle’s Metaphysics L sees e[rwV in a positive way with respect to loving 
God. Aristotle is silent about the relationship between e[rwV and filiva. 
 
4. The Unanswered Question 
 It must be said that I have not adequately dealt with the issue of whether 
Aristotle succeeds in answering whether one can genuinely love another person for that 
person’s own sake, while simultaneously she has to love that person for the sake of the 
good. But it was not my intention to solve this issue; only to circumscribe it. My 
suggestion was that even in Aristotle’s metaphysical scheme, human beings love one 
another for the excellences in them, and not just for their individuality. This is notably 
similar to the Platonic account that human beings love one another because of the 
qualities in them. The difference between them seems to be ultimately metaphysical. 
The relationship between Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics needs deeper research, and 
is beyond the scope of this current project. 
 As a concluding remark, I would say that Aristotle’s theory of e[rwV and filiva 
is more human than Plato’s, since it reminds human beings of their imperfection and 
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interdependency with each other. It is by “embracing the half,” viz., themselves and 
other people, that they move toward the ideal happy life.  
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